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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters that investigate the importance of frictions 
in insurance and labour markets and their effects on macroeconomic outcomes. It 
asks how the behavior of aggregate employment and unemployment are affected, 
or the behavior of a planner who sets benefits to maximize welfare, when agents 
possess a number of risk sharing opportunities and luck in the labour market is 
the principal component of idiosyncratic risks.
Chapter one deals with the technical aspects of this question. I introduce wealth 
accumulation in a battery of familiar search models and explore the implications 
for wages, allocations and the amount of risk sharing that firms can provide to 
their workforce.
The second chapter investigates how the government should optimally set 
unemployment benefits depending on the range of private insurance opportunities 
in the economy. I consider a class of models tha t feature heterogeneous agents 
and wealth accumulation and contrast their properties with another where firms 
can provide additional insurance to their workforce. I show that the role of public 
policy is substantially different between the two economies.
The third chapter is joint work with Jochen M ankart. We consider another 
margin of insurance, namely family self insurance, whereby household members 
can adjust jointly their labour supply to insure against income losses. We 
investigate how this feature can affect the cyclical behavior of key labour market 
statistics. In the US data we find that insurance within the family is important 
in explaining why the labour force is acyclical and not volatile but when we turn 
to the model we get the converse prediction. We then evaluate what important 
additions need to be made to our framework to make the model consistent with 
the data.
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Preface
Throughout their working lives, economic agents face a considerable amount of 
idiosyncratic earnings uncertainty. They dislike these risks and they are willing 
to pay high premia to  avoid them, but the insurance opportunities that axe 
available through markets are far from perfect. Understanding how uncertainty 
and incomplete insurance markets shape economic outcomes is the main goal of 
this thesis. It assigns a very precise interpretation to the background economic 
risks and presents agents with a well defined array of opportunities to insure 
against them.
In the three chapters that compose this work, unemployment is the principal 
component of income losses; agents enjoy a higher income when they are working 
but they are constantly faced with a probability tha t they will loose their job. 
When they become unemployed they have to confront the frictions in the labour 
market that make the length of their spell uncertain. Against these risks they 
possess a number of insurance margins; they can accumulate assets to buffer 
shocks in labour income or they can rely on the government and their employers 
for transfers, but they can also be part of a family whose members adjust their 
labour supplies jointly. How these insurance arrangements affect the behavior 
of agents in frictional labour markets and how they translate into aggregate 
outcomes is focal point of this work.
Chapter 1 deals with some of the technical aspects of this venture. It builds on 
the observation that many influential models of search in the labour market assign 
a secondary role to risks; they rely on environments tha t are populated by risk 
neutral agents, and I introduce wealth accumulation and risk aversion to these 
models. I characterize allocations under two important arrangements; in one firms 
can sign long term contracts with their workforce subject to limited commitment 
and in another allocations have to be re-bargained each period according to a 
Nash sharing rule. I also present two general equilibrium frameworks to close 
these models. Depending on the scope of commitment, of the firm and the worker, 
allocations can entail much more risk sharing in some economies than others (in 
particular more risk sharing when commitment is abundant). I then ask whether
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the role of public policy differs along this dimension, and I find that differences in 
the range of private insurance opportunities present the planner with substantially 
different tradeoffs.
Chapter 2 takes a closer look to this last implication. It investigates how 
the government should devise its UI scheme to minimize the interference with 
private markets. I consider two economies: In the first one agents can do no 
better than to accumulate wealth during employment and in the second firms 
can provide additional insurance to their workforce. This is again comes in the 
form of contracts with limited commitment although in this context I reinterpret 
the arrangement to show that it can summarize other realistic insurance margins 
such as severance payments. Public policy can crowd out private markets in both 
economies but I find th a t the optimal level of benefits is much smaller in the 
second case than in the first. Further on, with firm insurance the optimal UI 
scheme doesn’t have the typical shape; optimal payments in this economy should 
increase in the duration of an unemployment spell. To the extent tha t models 
of heterogeneous agents have been used to evaluate the welfare implications of 
public policy, the results of this chapter call for a more detailed account of the 
risk sharing opportunities in private markets.
Chapter 3 is the product of joint work with Jochen Mankart. We contrast the 
implications for the aggregate labour market of economies with realistic frictions, 
heterogenous agents and wealth accumulation and pay particular attention to 
the structure of the household unit. In one case we use the standard incomplete 
market model of bachelors households and in another we introduce couples of 
two ex ante identical agents that form search, labour supply and consumption 
decisions jointly. We use the model to investigate whether joint insurance within 
the family can explain the low procyclicality of the US labour force simultaneously 
with the suggestive business cycle correlations of other labour market statistics. 
Using samples of married couples from the CPS we show that joint insurance is 
an im portant feature of the US data, but our models are unable to  capture it. 
We then go on to investigate what important additions need to be made to the 
baseline framework to reconcile the model with the data.
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1 On the Joint Modeling o f Incomplete Asset and Labour Markets
1.1 Introduction
Modern economic theory has become increasingly assertive of the fact tha t 
economic agents face a considerable amount of earnings uncertainty throughout 
their working lives, and that the insurance opportunities against these risks 
available to them are limited. A large body of work has tried to make sense of the 
large cross sectional dispersion of wage outcomes experienced by the economy’s 
workforce, predominantly by viewing as central the notion that search and luck 
components in the labour market are im portant 1, and another voluminous 
literature has relied on estimations of the idiosyncratic earnings processes to 
assess the welfare implications of the lack of insurance markets and those of 
redistributive policies. 2 It seems however tha t there are very few formal 
connections between these two attempts. For instance modern micro theories of 
the labour market have had an enormous amount of success in matching the cross 
sectional distribution of wages (see Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002, 2005), Postel 
Vinay and Turon (2009)), by developing complicated economic environments 
only to colonize them with risk neutral agents, and quantitative models with 
heterogeneous agents and wealth accumulation have remained largely agnostic 
about the sources of risk that economic agents face over their lifetimes.
This chapter embraces the idea tha t the two frictions, in asset and labour 
markets should not be viewed in isolation but rather modeled jointly and presents 
an exhaustive account of their interactions. The aim is to develop a theory of 
wages in environments where active matches entail the existence of rents, and 
workers and firms can transfer resources intertemporally through the accumulation 
of assets. W ith very few exceptions up to  date, search theoretic models tha t 
allow for these ingredients (see Lise (2007), Alvarez and Veracierto (2001)) have 
assumed that wage profiles remain constant throughout the life of the match. In 
contrast one of the focal points of this chapter is that the sharing of rents tha t 
accrue to active matches must be optimal in some sense, and that ’optimal wages’ 
need not be fixed. Firms can rearrange the timing of payments in such a way so 
as to encourage the accumulation of assets and thus provide insurance against 
unemployment even in the absence of any other formal instruments. Another 
possibility (see Krusell et al (2007), Bils et al (2009(a), 2009(b)) is to assume that 
match rents are bargained for period by period say through a Nash protocol. Here 
Nash solutions are shown to be a special case of the firm’s general contracting
1See Eckstein and Van Den Berg (2005) for a survey.
2See Heathcote et al (2009) for a survey.
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problem, one that requires that optimal policies be time consistent.
Section 1.2 explores these ideas in depth. I set up a simple matching model 
where job opportunities arrive to unemployed job seekers at a constant rate and 
matches are heterogeneous in productivity. These ingredients form a theory of 
search, matching and bargaining with assets that derives from the work Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994) and off course the relevance of the latter framework for 
quantitative macro cannot be overstated. To develop the concept of ’optimal 
wages’ recursive representations of the firm’s Pareto program are written whereby 
in the constraint set, the ability of the firm and the worker to commit to policy 
rules th a t dictate allocations at various horizons is included. There are three 
possibilities; first, in section 1.2.2, I consider an ex ante Pareto optimal program 
with enforceable contracts. Then I refine this concept to require that allocations 
satisfy participation by the firm and the worker at all future dates in section 
1.2.3. Finally, section 1.2.4, describes a model with lack of commitment and per 
period bargaining.
All of these arrangements appear to be im portant in the relevant literature. 
For instance Rudanko (2008, 2009) uses commitment contracts to investigate how 
risk sharing between workers and firms affects the business cycle properties of 
aggregate wages, vacancies and unemployment (her model however doesn’t have 
self insurance) and similarly Nash bargaining has been a primitive assumption 
for labour market models since the seminal work of Pissarides (1985). But with 
very few exceptions (namely the recent of work of Krusell et al (2007) and Bils 
et al (2009(a), (2009(b))) these models that explain the sources of idiosyncratic 
risks, feature too few private insurance opportunities for the economy’s workforce 
and this is the gap that this chapter aims to bridge.
More substantively section 1.3 attem pts to incorporate the analysis into a 
general equilibrium framework whereby distributions of wealth and wages and the 
contact rates between vacant jobs and job seekers are endogenously determined. 
It does so by relying on two equilibrium concepts: The first in section 1.3.1 builds 
on the directed search model of Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) 
to develop a notion of the equilibrium whereby firms post contracts and workers 
channel their search to the most profitable direction. The main task here is to 
characterize the equilibrium set of contracts and show th a t its a manageable 
object, thus making the model suitable for quantitative macro work. The second 
(section 1.3.2) is an undirected search equilibrium similar to the models of Krusell 
et al (2007) and Bils et al (2009(a), 2009(b)). In this case my work extends
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previous attem pts by adding the notion that firms can commit to long term 
allocations with their workforce.
To put this theory at work I setup a simple optimal policy problem: A bene­
volent social planner chooses the level of non-employment income and levies taxes 
on the firm’s output subject to budget balance each period. The finding here 
is that optimal policy prescriptions differ markedly depending on the contract 
offered to employed workers in the economy. I argue that many of the conclusions 
for optimal policy drawn from models with search and self insurance (see Alvarez 
and Veracierto (2001)) may have been misguided by the fact that the impact of 
wages on risk sharing opportunities has not been properly accounted for. Section
1.4 concludes. The Appendix (in section 1.5) contains a number of derivations 
extensions and numerical algorithms for the models of this chapter.
The theory presented in this chapter is in itself a contribution, in that it brings 
together incomplete insurance markets and a battery of familiar models of search. 
It is aimed to help researchers setup models with realistic heterogeneity where 
search frictions play a central role in labour market outcomes and which can be 
used in evaluations of optimal policy (this is a task th a t I take up seriously in 
chapter 2 of this thesis), or more generally to explore the aggregate implications of 
heterogeneity in individual labour supply rules. Both this and the next chapters 
can be viewed as complementary to this attempt.
1.2 The Model
I consider a labour market populated by a continuum of infinitely lived workers 
and entrepreneurs of equal but irrelevant measure. Workers are strictly risk 
averse, derive utility from the consumption of a general multipurpose good and 
discount the future at rate /3; entrepreneurs on the other hand are risk neutral 
and discount future cash flows at rate T
At any point in time a fraction e of the economy’s workforce will be employed, 
matched with entrepreneurs in a joint production project, and the remaining 
u workers are unemployed and waiting for a suitable matching opportunity to 
arrive. In employment a worker-entrepreneur pair produce ze units of output 
per unit of labour, where z is the aggregate component of labour productivity 
and e is a match specific (idiosyncratic) component that derives from a general
18
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probability distribution Fe. The latter is assumed to remain constant throughout 
the life of the match.
Unemployed workers produce a flow value of income b per unit of time and 
meet a potential trading partner (entrepreneur) at a constant rate p each period. 
I assume that workers have access to incomplete financial markets and can only 
borrow up to exogenous (ad hoc) limit a to finance consumption. Let r denote 
the rate of return on savings and assume that: r < R  < ^ and r < ^ 3.
Applying standard arguments we can represent the unemployed worker’s dyna­
mic programming problem as:
U(at) = m axu(ct) + P (1 -  p) U(at+i) + /3 p /  max{£/(at+i), W (at+i, e)} d Feat+1 j
(1.2 . 1)
Subject to the constraint set:
at+i > a at + 1 =  r(at + b - c t) (1.2.2)
In the notation U (at) is the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker with wealth 
at in the current period and W (at+i,e) denotes her expected utility conditional 
on the event of meeting an entrepreneur next period in the market. The pair, 
upon the arrival of the job opportunity, draw a match specific value e and then 
decide whether or not to give up search and form a productive match. To make 
m atters simpler assume that the joint surplus of the match is strictly positive 
for every e in the support of F, that is to say in what follows I always assume 
that max{C/(at+i), W (at+1, e)} =  W (at+i,e) Ve. Furtheron, to introduce an 
outflow from employment into unemployment, assume that existing partnerships 
terminate exogenously at rate s each period. These properties (no reservation 
wage and exogenous separations) are not at all restrictive for the analysis tha t 
follows.
1.2.1 The General Contracting Problem
When they meet, the worker entrepreneur pair draw a value for the match specific 
productivity e, and an allocation rule of the form W(a, e) (that is an object that
3 Assumption r < ^ is necessary to have a well defined equilibrium in this class of models 
(that is to guarantee that savings do not diverge).
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I scrutinize below) gives the share of the surplus that accrues to each party. What 
happens after this initial assignment is the focal point of this section. I argue that 
firms and workers will rearrange payments over the life of the match in a manner 
tha t is Pareto optimal, and generally this requires to fix the value W (a, e) and 
choose a sequence of allocations that maximize the firm’s profit stream. With this 
notion of equilibrium the analysis writes recursive representations of the firm’s 
program where in the constraint set, the ability of the worker and the firm to 
commit to policy rules that dictate allocations at various horizons is included.
I distinguish between the following cases: In section 1.2.21 assume that contracts 
in this economy are enforceable and that both the principal (firm) and the worker 
have sufficient commitment to adhere to date zero optimal policies. I refer to this 
program as the full commitment first best solution and generally I treat it as a 
benchmark relative to which more realistic alternatives are compared. Section
1.2.3 refines the equilibrium concept, to require tha t efficient outcome paths 
(the ones th a t solve the firm’s dynamic program) satisfy certain sustainability 
conditions; namely tha t anywhere on the optimal contract both parties should 
be weakly better off than in autarky (unemployment). Finally section 1.2.4 
introduces the notion that optimal contracts must be time consistent, and relies 
on a Markov perfect structure with Nash Bargaining to characterize optimal 
allocations.
The scope of the firm’s and the worker’s commitment is shown to have profound 
impact on the shape of the optimal compensation scheme. Generally with 
commitment introducing wealth as a state variable makes possible (and optimal) 
to transfer resources, in the first period, between the firm and the worker in 
a manner th a t is most cases is shown to be time inconsistent. Markov perfect 
contracts on the other hand induce a time invariant wage schedule as a function 
of the agent’s wealth endowment.
There is a battery of results tha t I highlight. First an im portant issue is to 
determine the extent to which the firm can rearrange payments in such as way, 
so that allocations provide insurance against unemployment risks. The finding 
here is that with commitment there are cases where the optimal contract features 
complete insurance (and also wealth is a perfect substitute for any other form of 
insurance) but without commitment this is no longer possible. Further on another 
substantive theme that I pursue is whether asset contractibility (that is whether 
the worker or the firm dictates optimal savings decisions) matters for the optimal 
policies. This turns out to be the case for time consistent (Markov Perfect)
20
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contracts, but with commitment I show either theoretically or numerically that 
this is not the case. Very few of these results can be established analytically 
and instead I have to rely on numerical methods to discern something about 
the optimal decision rules. The details of the algorithms are delegated to the 
Appendix.
1.2.2 Full Commitment
Commitment programs are nothing but ex ante Pareto optimal allocations. They 
involve maximizing the expected utility of one party, subject to the other party 
getting at least the payoff that is prescribed when the contract is signed. For 
instance here if Wo is the agreed level of utility for the worker (under any some 
initial allocation rule) then the planner (entrepreneur) must choose a sequence 
of transfers and wealth to deliver Wo to the worker in the most efficient (profit 
maximizing) way. Further on these optimal policies define a sequence of payoffs 
for the worker, and assume tha t at some generic point in time t her expected 
continuation utility under the allocation is given by Wt and her outside option 
(unemployment) by U(at). There are two important points:
First the time paths for Wt and U(at) are inessential for the complete (full 
commitment) contract analyzed in this section (but not for the other arrangements 
studied in this chapter). That is to say the allocation here permits to have 
Wt < U (at) for some t, since contracts are enforceable and participation need 
not be satisfied and the same holds for the stream of profits tha t accrue to the 
entrepreneur.
Second the economy studied in this section (and more generally all of the 
models of this chapter) admits to a recursive representation; it allows us to take 
any point in time t and summarize the optimal allocation by the state variable 
W t , the level of expected utility that the entrepreneur must deliver to the worker 
from tha t point onwards. There are other inputs in the state vector (current 
assets at and the firm specific productivity e) but recursive representations mean 
that optimal choices for the next period are time invariant functions of these 
arguments.
Consider a firm that maximizes the present value of its profits II in a complete 
contract. The per period payoff is the difference between the wage paid wt and 
the labour productivity ze , and the match terminates at a rate s per period 
so the effective discount factor for the firm equals The firm must choose
21
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current transfers wt (wages), next period’s wealth at+1 and a continuation payoff 
W t + 1 tha t will be taken as given in the next period. These solve the following 
functional equation:
1 — s
n (Wu au e) =  max z e -  wt +  — U{Wt+i,a t+i, e) (1.2.3)Wt+i,at+i,wt K
Subject to the constraint set:
(At) u{—at+ i/r +  at +  Wt) +  (3(1 — s) Wt+1 +  (3s U(at+1) >  Wt (1.2.4)
(Xt)  <h+i >  a (1.2.5)
Added in parentheses are the multipliers on the constraints. Equation (1.2.4) is 
the so called promise keeping constraint stating that the expected level of utility 
delivered to the worker from the optimal contract must be weakly greater than 
the promised value Wt. Note th a t by varying the value of Wt it is possible to 
trace the entire frontier of utilities for the firm and the worker in the current 
context. Equation 1.2.5 is the borrowing constraint on assets.
The policy rules for wt Wt+i and at + 1 define an implicit consumption sequence 
tha t adds up to the payoff Wt in expectation. Notice that, in the absence of 
separations, this sequence could be financed solely by wages and indeed in this 
case the risk sharing role of wealth becomes meaningless. But if s > 0 then 
wealth is an important variable because it allows to (partially) control the agent’s 
consumption when she becomes unemployed. Since the entrepreneur can control 
this variable, the above program corresponds to a full commitment allocation 
with contractible wealth. That is to say that the implications of this arrangement 
could in principle be different to those of contract where the firm can only set 
wages, and the worker makes optimal savings and investment decisions.
O ptim ality . Taking first order conditions with respect to Wt+i , at+1 and 
wt we get:
A tu'(ct) =  1 (1.2.6)
^ - I W i  +  At/3(1 — s) = 0 (1-2-7)
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^ n ai+1 -  +  f i a X t U ^  - X t  = o (1.2.8)
Along with the Envelope conditions: IIwt = —Xt and n at =  Xtu'(ct) =  1
These objects have a straightforward interpretation. For instance in equation 
(1.2.6) the multiplier Xt is the (relative) Pareto weight assigned to the worker 
on the optimal program. Lowering wages by one unit entails a unitary marginal 
utility benefit for the entrepreneur (due to risk neutrality) whilst the local cost 
for the worker is given by u'(ct). Moreover equation (1.2.7) gives the law of 
motion of this weight over time. To see this make use of the envelope condition 
for Wt to derive a general recursion of the form:
Xt+i = 0RXt (1.2.9)
Finally equation (1.2.8) determines the optimal policy for asset accumulation in 
the next period. Off corners (when \ t  — 0 ) the firm equates the net marginal 
cost of supplying an extra unit of savings ( ^  — £ ) 4 to the marginal benefit of 
insuring the worker against unemployment next period whereby the allocation 
takes into account the weight At and the relative discounting of the firm and the 
worker.
These conditions can go a long way towards characterizing some of the salient 
features of the optimal allocation. For instance consider equation (1.2.9). It 
is clear that differences in discounting ( in the sense R  = r < ? )  make the 
sequence of Pareto weights strictly decreasing over time and in the limit the 
optimal allocation implies that the marginal utility of the worker will tend to 
infinity (her consumption will tend to zero). Since wealth and wages are the 
two instruments used to finance consumption in the current context this result 
suggests that over time the values for these objects are decreasing.
Further on equation (1.2.8) determines the extent to which the optimal contract 
provides sufficient insurance against the event of a job loss. To see this rearrange 
(1.2.8) making use of the envelope conditions and the law of motion of marginal
4Note that by the envelope condition for a* the firms profit function is linear homogeneous in
wealth and thus Xt -  if- =  Tr r
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utility in (1.2.9) to get:
u'(cu, t  +  1) =  Uat+1 = u'(ce, t +  1) +  (------- 1)—-—-------   +  Xt (1.2.10)r s
W here Xt = 5 and subscripts e and u  denote the relevant quantities for
employed and unemployed workers respectively.
The following proposition summarizes the optimal provision of insurance in 
first best full commitment contracts.
P r o p o s i t i o n  1 .1  Consider the special case r = R: Then if  at+1 > a the 
worker is perfectly insured against unemployment (in the sense that i/(cu,t  + 1) =  
u'(ce, t + 1) ) . I f  at+i = a consumption rises when the agent becomes unemployed. 
On the other hand with sufficient discounting r < R =  |  the agent is underinsured 
almost everywhere on the optimal contract unless at+1 =  a in which case it is 
impossible to sign the difference in marginal utilities.
The result follows readily from equation (1.2.10) . It suggests that if the firm’s 
discount rate is equal to the market interest rate (i.e. R  = r )  assets are sufficient 
to insure the agent against unemployment spells and indeed wealth in this case 
can be shown to be a perfect substitute for any form of severance compensation. 
W ith the same discount factor though (i.e. when R  = jj or more generally 
when R >  r ), this result no longer holds, because in this case the entrepreneur 
has access to a technology that transfers resources intertemporally earning a 
higher rate of return ( * > 0  than the riskless savings in the market. Under 
such return dominance it is not uncommon for optimal allocations to feature an 
extraction of the agent’s wealth endowment in the initial period and in general 
for underinsurance to carry over in the entire optimal path.
O p tim a l C om p en sa tio n . The implications of these results for optimal 
compensation are shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2; they trace wages in the first 
(left axis) and second (right axis) period of the contract as a function of the 
initial wealth endowment of a newly employed worker. The value of the firm 
productivity is normalized to unity and the worker’s discount factor and the
5 Note that if the constraint binds Xt <  0 . This derivation makes use of the fact that
At+iu'fce^+i) =  1 from the first order conditions in the next period.
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market interest rate equal /3 =  .995 and r =  1.0041. In both of these Figures 
function W (a, e) (that determines the initial placement of workers on the Pareto 
frontier) is a solution to the following Nash Bargaining program:
W (a, e) £ argmax(VF — U(a))r,Tl(WJ a, e) 1-?7 (1 .2 .1 1 )w
where I set 77 =  1 / 2 .
Consider the case W (a, e) > >  U(a) and R  = r (Figure 1.1). If the worker 
enjoys a capital gain from search (say if 77 > 0 ) then her consumption will rise 
when she becomes employed and if /3R is close to unity it will remain high for 
several periods. The complete insurance result states th a t wages in the first 
period must be high enough to finance the accumulation of assets, and in the 
next period wages will fall below productivity and continue to fall as the expected 
utility path is downward sloping in the optimal contract. 6
If on the other hand r < R  — jj (Figure 1.2) and capital gains are not 
sufficiently high, then part of the agent’s wealth endowment is extracted in the 
initial period, which could make wages negative, and this extraction is used to 
finance higher wages permanently from period two onwards. As capital gains 
increase the difference between period one and period two wages decreases.
These implications highlight the importance of the relative discounting as­
sumptions and of the timing of wages for the notion that active matches provide 
insurance against unemployment. They seem to hold over a range of reasonable 
calibrations for the model’s parameters. For instance in the limit when s —> 0, 
whereby the risk sharing role of assets becomes meaningless, it can be establi­
shed tha t whenever R  > r wealth is zero everywhere on the optimal contract 
(it is extracted in the initial period), whereas it becomes redundant whenever 
R  = r. In the latter case any form of contract including flat wage contracts can 
be optimal 7. More generally higher values of s imply tha t insurance in the
6It is easy to argue that even if W (a,e) =  U(a) and R  =  r  the optimal path of wages is 
front-loaded. To see this consider a constrained worker i.e. one that finds a job with an 
initial endowment of wealth equal to a and let without loss of generality a =  0. For this 
agent unemployment is equivalent to consuming b units each period. But when employed 
the optimal allocation implies that eventually her consumption path will be driven below 
b since marginal utility is increasing over time. To compensate for this the entrepreneur 
must offer an initial level of consumption that is strictly greater than 6, and coupled with 
complete insurance it must be that at+1 > a. Such an accumulation of assets can only be 
financed if wages are sufficiently high in the first period of the contract.
7From equation 1.2.8 it follows that when s —» 0 then xt  =  ^ ~ where Xt is the multiplier
on the borrowing constraint. When r < R  the optimal policy is for wealth to be zero 
anywhere on the optimal contract and hence it is extracted in the initial period.
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in Figure 1.1 can be reinterpreted as a simple wage and severance payment scheme. 
This means that wages don’t have to be frontloaded if this feature seems rather 
(empirically) unappealing. 10.
1.2.3 Limited Commitment
In the previous section I defined the nature of the interaction between the firm 
and the worker as one where both parties can commit to a long term  plan, 
independent of the path of utility that it entails. In other words contracts were 
fully enforceable once signed at date zero. Here I refine this concept by requiring 
tha t efficient outcome paths (the ones that solve the firm’s program) satisfy 
certain sustainability conditions; namely that neither the principal nor the agent 
must be strictly better off anywhere on the optimal contract, reneging on their 
commitments and reverting to autarky (unemployment).
This requirement can a priori rule out certain aspects of the optimal allocation 
under full commitment that were discussed in the previous section. For instance 
when r = R  < jj it was shown tha t marginal utility tends to infinity in the 
long run, but clearly such solutions are not admissible here since the worker can 
always quit to become unemployed, in which case her consumption is bounded by 
b. Or even in the case R  =  ^ I showed tha t under-investment in wealth could 
mean that the firm’s profits become negative after the first period and in this 
case, entrepreneurs would better off unmatched.
10In Chapter 2 I provide a general proof for a similar search model. Here consider the following 
argument based on the first order conditions of the firm’s program when an additional 
control variable Ct (severance payment) is included. It can be shown that off corners 
(when at+i > a), optimality for wealth and severance compensation is determined by the 
following equations:
1 — s 1
— --------+ At PsU at+1 (at+i + Ct) =  0 wrt a t+ iK r
— +  \ t @sU<;t (a t+ i  +  Ct) = 0 wrt  Ct
Clearly when R >  r  the first condition is not satisfied and wealth is equal to zero (insurance 
is provided only through severance payments). Severance payments in this case are equivalent 
to the firm extracting the agents wealth endowment and investing it, earning a higher rate 
of return (or otherwise allowing access to a superior storage technology). When R  =  r  
the two equations are the same and since a*+i and Ct enter additively in the utility the 
optimal allocation is indeterminate.
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match is more valuable, and hence initial investments in wealth increase with this 
parameter8. Similarly higher e (and higher 77) means that the worker commands 
more gains from search under the initial allocation rule, and hence given the 
insurance properties of the models, asset accumulation should be higher 9. The 
qualitative patterns of the Figures are preserved.
Finally note that some of the features of the optimal allocation in both cases 
are not sustainable if either party can unilaterally revert to autarky at some point 
in the future. The shaded regions in Figures 1.1 and 1 .2  identify the locations 
where the optimal contract makes either the entrepreneur or the worker better off 
in unemployment than in the match. In Figure 1.1 all of this violation comes from 
the side of the worker, since by front-loading wages in the first period, the firm 
makes unemployment a less unattractive state (remember that in this case utility 
for the worker falls over time). A similar intuition applies to the highlighted part 
a t the low end of the asset grid in Figure 1.2 but when wealth is high it is the 
entrepreneur that must pay subsequent wages greater than productivity and hence 
would rather renege on this commitment. The next section makes an explicit 
reference to these ideas by introducing the notion that optimal contracts must be 
self enforcing in the sense that at no point should they violate participation by 
either the firm or the worker.
N o n co n trac tib le  A ssets. How are these results affected when the agent’s 
control over her assets is restored? The answer is that for the first best contract 
of this section the standard Euler equations are satisfied, and given her control 
over transfers, the principal can implement the same allocations as an equilibrium 
outcome in an environment with non contractible wealth. To see this formally 
summarize the optimal allocation in the sequence {cj, c* t+1, c* t+ 1  , a^+1} and 
in the following conditions:
«'(<) =  /3 flu '« (+1) (1.2.12)
+  (7 -  1 )^ % ± ^  +  xt (1-2.13)
f U
Then note that off corners ( \ t  — 0) if the agent were to depart from the optimal 
savings schedule the marginal cost of doing so is u(cj') and the marginal benefit
8This is visible from equation (1.2.10) whereby a higher separation rate means that the wedge 
between the unemployed and the employed worker’s consumption shrinks given r and R.
9Again this can be read off equation (1.2.10).
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for next period is given by:
P ( 1  ~  « W « t+ i )  +  /5 s™ '« (+1)
But notice that the later quantity equals:
^tt(Ct*)( 1 -  s) +  -^(su'(c*) +  -  l)u(c*)) =  u'(c*t )
(a similar condition applies when the optimal contract features a*+1 =  a.)
This result is very intuitive. It suggests tha t by making payments as erratic 
as those shown Figures 1.1 and 1.2 the firm can induce the worker to save (or 
dissave) to finance a smooth consumption path. For instance when R  = r the 
agent expects his income to fall between the first and the second period and her 
optimal response is to accumulate precautionary savings to buffer consumption 
against this drop. In the first best this motive turns out to yield the same optimal 
investment for the worker, as the one that would be chosen by the firm if the 
latter dictated allocations in the match. The following proposition summarizes 
the result.
P r o p o s it io n  1 .2  Optimal first best contracts are equivalent under contractible 
and non contractible savings.
To conclude this section there are a few points that need to be clarified: First 
complete insurance in the current context (whenever that obtains) should not 
be misconstrued to imply that the worker’s consumption path is unaffected by 
the risk of job separations. On the contrary when the job terminates, the worker 
is beyond the reach of the firm and her consumption falls as an unemployment 
spell progresses through standard wealth effects. It is only in the initial period 
that sufficient wealth is stored to alleviate the risk of a drop in consumption.
Further on in this simple model insurance against unemployment is accompli­
shed through investments in assets and the timing of payments is central to the 
notion that active matches provide insurance. It can be established though that 
assets are a perfect substitute for other (more popular) forms of insurance such 
as severance payments. I mentioned this earlier but it is important to repeat 
here because it has the following implication for the timing of payments: If the 
firm is given both margins of insurance then the optimality conditions cannot 
uniquely determine the ratio investments, and in this case the wage profile shown
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in Figure 1.1 can be reinterpreted as a simple wage and severance payment scheme. 
This means that wages don’t have to be frontloaded if this feature seems rather 
(empirically) unappealing. 10.
1.2.3 Limited Commitment
In the previous section I defined the nature of the interaction between the firm 
and the worker as one where both parties can commit to a long term  plan, 
independent of the path of utility that it entails. In other words contracts were 
fully enforceable once signed at date zero. Here I refine this concept by requiring 
tha t efficient outcome paths (the ones that solve the firm’s program) satisfy 
certain sustainability conditions; namely that neither the principal nor the agent 
must be strictly better off anywhere on the optimal contract, reneging on their 
commitments and reverting to autarky (unemployment).
This requirement can a priori rule out certain aspects of the optimal allocation 
under full commitment that were discussed in the previous section. For instance 
when r = R  < jj it was shown tha t marginal utility tends to infinity in the 
long run, but clearly such solutions are not admissible here since the worker can 
always quit to become unemployed, in which case her consumption is bounded by 
b. Or even in the case R  =  ^ I showed tha t under-investment in wealth could 
mean that the firm’s profits become negative after the first period and in this 
case, entrepreneurs would better off unmatched.
10In Chapter 2 I provide a general proof for a similar search model. Here consider the following 
argument based on the first order conditions of the firm’s program when an additional 
control variable Ct (severance payment) is included. It can be shown that off corners 
(when at+i > a), optimality for wealth and severance compensation is determined by the 
following equations:
1 — s 1
— --------+ At PsU at+1 (at+i + Ct) =  0 wrt at+1K r
— + \ t@sU<;t(at+i + Ct) = 0 wrt Ct
Clearly when R >  r  the first condition is not satisfied and wealth is equal to zero (insurance 
is provided only through severance payments). Severance payments in this case are equivalent 
to the firm extracting the agents wealth endowment and investing it, earning a higher rate 
of return (or otherwise allowing access to a superior storage technology). When R  =  r 
the two equations are the same and since a*+i and Ct enter additively in the utility the 
optimal allocation is indeterminate.
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This type of arrangement also entails many more appealing features relative to 
the first best contracts. For one thing wage profiles are not so extreme in the sense 
tha t the differences between first and subsequent period wages are not as large 
and this is consistent with the notion that empirically wages are very persistent. 
On the other hand I argued previously that the optimal transfers shown in Figure 
1.1 are the result of the particular insurance arrangement considered here and 
th a t under alternative mechanisms one can get more realistic wage profiles out 
of the model. Private risk sharing can be reinterpreted as a simple wage and 
severance payment scheme and even for the limited commitment model of this 
section it is possible to construct examples where this equivalence holds.
The self-enforcing contracts described in this section are rather common in the 
related literature. In fact Thomas and Worall (1988) were the first to explore 
their implications in a labour market context and Rudanko (2008, 2009) uses 
this model to investigate how risk sharing between workers and firms affects the 
business cycle behavior of aggregate wages, vacancies and unemployment. This 
work however doesn’t give to agents any self insurance opportunities through 
assets and in a labour market with unemployment such an inclusion is important
since wealth can buffer the risk of a job loss. This at least was one of the central
implications of the model of the previous section.
To characterize policy rules in an environment where date zero contracts are 
self enforcing, a dynamic programming procedure can be followed here similar 
to the one defined in equations (1.2.3) to (1.2.5), the main difference being that 
a set of forward looking sustainability constraints must be added to the firm’s 
Pareto program (see Ligon et al (2000, 2002)). These are:
(7t+i) Wt+i > U{at+l) (1.2.14)
((Pt+i) II(Wt+i, flt+i, e) > 0 (1.2.15)
Equation (1.2.14) imposes that investment in wealth must not be too high (or 
future continuation utility too low) to make the worker better off in unemployment, 
and equation (1.2.15) is the analogous participation constraint for the firm. Added 
in the parentheses are the multipliers on these constraints.
The nature of these objects (that they are forward looking) entails a theoretical 
difficulty in that they may not define a convex set, and establishing convergence 
to a concave value function becomes a formidable task. The analysis that follows
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uses the optimality conditions to characterize some features of the optimal plan 
but these require sufficiency which is impossible to prove. Nonetheless, in all the 
simulations carried out in this and the next chapter I found tha t II is strictly 
decreasing and concave in Wt. The Appendix outlines the numerical procedure I 
used.
O p tim a l Policies. The first order conditions for the optimum can be written 
as:
l - s  _  XM ptl + w  +  7t+1[/ai+i _  ^ +1 =  o (1.2.16)
JrC T
I W i  +  At/3(1 — s) — 7 t+i — </>t+iTLwt+i = 0 (1.2.17)R
Along with the Envelope conditions: IIwt == ~Af And IIat =  Atu \ c t) =  1
These equations have a similar interpretation to the analogous conditions 
derived for the full commitment program the novel elements being the multipliers 
on the constraints (1.2.14) and (1.2.15). This addition gives rise to the following 
two interesting implications for the optimal contract:
First forwarding the envelope condition one period we can restate equation
(1.2.17) as:
At+i =  (1-2.18)
Remember th a t At is the inverse of the marginal utility of consumption, 
the Pareto weight attached to the worker’s utility from the planning problem. 
Condition (1.2.18) then states that this weight is time varying, even if the firm 
and the worker share the same discount factor. When the constraint on the 
worker’s outside option binds, so that 'jt+i < 0, the weight assigned to her jumps, 
and consumption increases within the period, whilst if the principal needs to be 
made better off in the future date, resources will shift from the worker to the 
firm (since in this case fa+i < 0).
It is clear that the limiting behavior of the sequence of multipliers defined in
(1.2.18) is substantially different from the analogous sequence in the first best
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contract. There the value of Xt shrunk to zero whenever the worker discounted 
the future more heavily than the entrepreneur but here the multipliers will adjust 
to keep this stationary value strictly greater than zero. A similar argument can 
be applied to the case R  =
The second interesting object is a modified Euler equation (whose derivation is 
delegated to the Appendix). It can be shown that optimal savings in the current 
context are governed by the following condition:
“ '(Ct) > /3(1 -  s)ru'(ct+!,«,) +  r(3su'(ct+liU) +  ru '(ct)7 1+1(u'(ct+1,u) -  u'(ct+i,e))
(1.2.19)
(With equality if at + 1 > 0)
The leading terms pertain to the familiar marginal benefit of an extra unit of 
savings adjusted (through the inequality) for debt limit facing the agent. The 
last term in (1.2.19) reveals the effect of the sustainability constraints on optimal 
inter-temporal consumption choices whereby an extra unit of savings has a direct 
effect on the allocation by affecting the magnitude of the multiplier 7t+i.
For instance consider the case 7 t+i < 0 and u'(ct+i)U) — u'(ct+^e) < 0. In 
this case the optimal allocation dictates a rise in the weight Af+i next period 
and hence a rise to the worker’s consumption. Should this rise be financed by 
an increase in current savings then this would relax the constraint. To see this 
note that, from the envelope condition of the unemployed worker’s program, 
the marginal utility of consumption in unemployment in period t+1 ( u'(ct+iiU)) 
equals the marginal valuation of an extra unit of savings in this state (i.e Uat+1). 
Increasing consumption next period financed through current savings implies that 
the value of autarky (unemployment) rises less than the value of employment. 
Hence the constraint is relaxed. The converse holds if u'(ct+i )U) — u'(ct+i,e) > 0.
Further on it should also be clear from equation (1.2.19) that in an environment 
of limited commitment the assumptions about asset contractibility are no longer 
innocuous to the shape of the optimal paths. Generally these last terms in 
equation (1.2.19) drive a wedge between marginal costs and benefits to an extra 
unit of savings, though establishing the direction of the difference between desired 
savings for the worker and optimal savings with contractible assets for the firm, 
would require to sign the differences in marginal utilities and to know where 
exactly the enforcement constraints bind. 11 Instead one can rely on numerical
11 It substantially harder to solve the firm’s program in recursive form when wealth is non-
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analysis to see whether departures from full commitment signal violations of 
the standard Euler equation. I tend to find that such violations are minimal, 
undistinguishable from numerical errors of an acceptable order of magnitude, 
which suggests th a t including the Euler equation as an additional constraint 
to the firm’s program would not affect the shape of the optimal compensation 
scheme (see section 1.5.1 of the Appendix for further details).
Im plica tions for w ages. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 display the wage profiles in the 
first and the second period of the optimal contract as a function of the wealth 
endowment of the worker. As in Figure 1.1 when R  = r wages are front-loaded 
to provide insurance against unemployment through the accumulation of assets, 
but the extent to which these initial transfers are possible is limited here by the 
requirement that optimal contracts satisfy participation for both parties. Full and 
limited commitment profiles differ most, precisely in the region where violations 
of the worker’s participation constraint occur (i.e. the highlighted part of Figure 
l . i ) .
On the other hand the bulk of the difference, between full and limited com­
mitment profiles when R  = comes from the higher end of the grid of assets. 
There period one wages were extremely low to extract wealth initially in Figure 
1.2, and for all subsequent periods they exceeded the marginal productivity of 
the job. This path is off course no longer admissible.
In su ran ce  p ro p e rtie s  w ith  lim ited  com m itm en t. It is possible to show 
that the optimal investment in wealth (when the borrowing constraint doesn’t 
bind) is governed by the following optimality condition:
=  1 +  7t+i, r, R, s) (1.2.20)u'(ce, t  + l)
contractible. The relevant state variable is no longer a promised level of utility but rather a 
promised utility function of the form Wt{a) which has to be endogenously determined along 
with the optimal policies. Although it is theoretically feasible to characterize solutions in 
this context an application of this theory would involve dealing with curse of dimensionality 
issues. It is beyond the scope my analysis to attempt this. Alternatively one could use the 
methodology developed by Marcet and Marimon (1997) that can handle Euler equations as 
a additional constraint in programs with limited commitment. There are two reasons why I 
don’t pursue this here. First in all the model simulations I tend to find that violations of 
the Euler equation are minimal and indistinguishable from numerical errors of acceptable 
tolerance. Second possible non-convexities introduced by the enforcement constraints may 
actually throw off these calculations.
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Where:
n(at, e) € argmax(W  -  U{at))"{n{Wt at, e))1" ” (1.2.24)
w
$ (a t , e) = II(fi(at , e), au e) (1.2.25)
Equations (1.2.21) to (1.2.25) set the basis for an efficient algorithm of compu­
ting Markov equilibria in this context whereby the functional equation (1.2.21) 
along with the unemployed worker’s program in (1.2.1) can be iterated to conver­
gence. Equation (1.2.23) is the analogous object to the promise keeping constraint 
of the firm’s program under commitment. It requires th a t at least a level of 
lifetime utility Wt be delivered to the worker although in this case continuation 
utility must be consistent with the equilibrium payoff fl(at+i,e). 13 Further on 
the firm’s profit is defined in (1.2.25) after the requirement tha t W  =  f7(at , e) 
is imposed and the reason that the program is written this way (as opposed to 
working with a functional equation for $(a*, e)) is that this formulation makes 
clear how choices of wages and wealth need to be consistent with the Nash sharing 
rule in (1.2.24).
This type of contract does not appear to be new in the literature. In fact 
Krusell et al (2007) and Bils et al (2009(a) , 2009(b)) among others, build models 
with search frictions in the labour market and incomplete insurance and assume 
that rents are bargained for each period with a Nash protocol, but their approach 
is very different from mine; they approximate the Nash sharing rule with an 
invariant function it; (a) and solve the worker’s optimal control program. Instead 
I treat Markov perfect solutions as part of a more general contracting problem 
and what this approach offers, is the possibility to incorporate additional features 
in the analysis, such as other insurance margins, a choice of effort etc and hence 
this formulation may prove useful in other contexts as well.
O ptim al Policies. It can be shown that optimal choices of wt and at+1 
satisfy the following first order conditions :
A tu'{ct) = 1 (1.2.26)
AtP(sUaw  +  (1 -  s)Qat+1) -  1 +  ^ ( 1  -  Ai+1n am ) <  0 (1.2.27)
13Notice that participation constraints need not be added to the program since solutions to 
Nash sharing rule will always induce positive capital gains for both parties (so long as they 
are defined).
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fx d \ ^1 1 i &+i U'(cu, t  + T)u{<pt+i , i t+ i ,r ,R ,s )  =  ( - -  — +   --------------   lt+i)~
r R  1 - s  1 s i ~ T ^ (l>t+i
Notice th a t when 7*+1 =  ^ +1 =  0 and r = R  the term  uj(<j>t+i1')ft+ur i R , s ) 
equals zero, and in this case perfect insurance obtains, as in a complete (full 
commitment) contract. But when the worker’s participation constraint binds (in 
which case 7 t+ 1  < 0 ) then the worker is underinsured (her consumption would 
fall if she becomes unemployed) and the converse holds when the firm must be 
made better off (hence when 0 t+ 1  < 0 ).
To understand how these results relate to the optimal profiles shown in this 
and the previous section notice that when R  = r allocations entail an initial loan 
from the firm to the worker and hence it seems that <j) t + 1 =  0  always holds in this 
case. Then the only relevant constraint is on the worker’s participation and the 
optimal contract could provide at most as much insurance against unemployment 
as the full commitment allocation. In this case the ratio of marginal utilities 
reduces to
u'(cu, t + 1) tt,(cu,£ + 1) -R ^
u'(ce, t +  1) 1 — s ^ t+1 s ~
On the other hand when R  > r both constraints could bind (although not 
simultaneously) and when the firm needs to be made better off, the optimal 
investment is higher than under full commitment (or the initial extraction of the 
agent’s endowment is smaller). In this case the allocations provide more insurance 
against unemployment than what is implied by the full commitment model.
u \ c u, t  + T) =  1 _  1 (f>t+1 1 R  _  . 1
u'(ce, t  +  l) r R  1 - s  !  -  -  r s
1.2.4 Equilibria with Nash Bargaining
The maintained assumption in the versions of the model studied so far has been 
that both parties (the worker and the firm) have sufficient commitment to adhere 
to date zero optimal policies without ever renegotiating the optimal contract 
no m atter if such renegotiations are from the perspective of one of the parties 
profitable. These commitments, were sustained by the threat of mutual reversion 
to autarky if ever the terms of trade were to be violated; for instance if the
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Further on consider the case ^at+i <  0. From the Nash rule it is easy to show 
that Qat+1 — Uat+1 < 0 (i.e. that the marginal increment from an extra unit 
of wealth is higher for an unemployed that for an employed worker). Then off 
corners rearranging equation ( 1.2.27) we reach the following expression:
V i f i at+1 =  1 +  r ^ - g )  (PrsUat+1 +  (1 -  A t+1Uat+1 (1.2.29)
Equation (1.2.29) generalizes the underinsurance result for markov perfect 
contracts. It states that whenever $ at+i ^  0 the term in the parenthesis is 
positive and consumption falls as the agent becomes unemployed. 15 Whenever 
$ at+1 > 0 underinsurance is impossible to prove.
Finally from equation (1.2.27) it is possible to argue that differences in dis­
counting with markov perfect contracts have a minimal impact on the shape of 
the optimal compensation scheme. To see this notice that even if R = ^ and 
s  = 0 equation (1.2.27) could be consistent with a positive level of at+1 whereas
15This follows from the fact that: At+ it/0t+1 =  >
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firm was to reset the agreement at some future date the implicit assumption 
of the previous sections was tha t the worker would break the match to become 
unemployed. There was such an opportunity in the case R  = where the firm 
optimally extracted part of the agent’s wealth endowment in the initial period 
and made unemployment a strictly inferior state to be in.
To throw off any profitable deviation of this form optimal contracts must be 
signed every period or otherwise date zero policies must be time consistent and 
this section introduces this notion by focusing on Markov perfect equilibria where 
no history m atters for the optimal policies, other than what is summarized in 
the endowment of wealth tha t the agent holds. I assume th a t at any point in 
time the optimal contract can be renegotiated and that the shares of the match 
surplus that accrue to the firm and the worker are determined as the solution to 
the familiar Nash sharing rule with respective weights 1 — 77 and 7 7 .
Contrary to the commitment models of sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 this process 
induces a time invariant wage schedule and equilibrium payoffs of the form Ll(at , e) 
and $(a t, e) for workers and firms respectively. Optimal continuation policies 
must conform with these objects in the sense that any expected utility path that 
is inconsistent with Q(at , e) is not an equilibrium outcome. In turn for the firm 
the payoff function f2(at, e) gives pairs of current wages and wealth accumulation 
that are consistent with Nash bargaining.
Value Functions. To see how the equilibrium in this economy can be compu­
ted consider an auxiliary program of a firm that must deliver a level of lifetime 
utility W  to  the worker (not necessarily on the equilibrium path), and let 
II(VK, at , e) be the associated profit function borne out of the optimal policies. In 
the standard notation the firm’s program can be represented recursively as:
1 — s
II (Wu e,at) = max ze — wt -\ — $ at+1,e (1.2.21)
w t , a t + \ > a  K
Subject to 12:
W* 5^  u (—dt+i/r +  at +  Wt) +  (3sU(at+1) +  /3(1 — s)f2(at+i, e) (1.2.23)
12If savings decisions are non contractible, the firm’s dynamic programming problem must be
solved subject to the Euler equation as an additional constraint:
u'{ct) >  pr(sUat+1 +  (1 -  s)ttat+1) (1.2.22)
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Where:
n(at, e) € argmax(W  -  U{at))"{n{Wt at, e))1" ” (1.2.24)
w
$ (a t , e) = n (n (a f, e), au e) (1.2.25)
Equations (1.2.21) to (1.2.25) set the basis for an efficient algorithm of compu­
ting Markov equilibria in this context whereby the functional equation (1.2.21) 
along with the unemployed worker’s program in (1.2.1) can be iterated to conver­
gence. Equation (1.2.23) is the analogous object to the promise keeping constraint 
of the firm’s program under commitment. It requires th a t at least a level of 
lifetime utility Wt be delivered to the worker although in this case continuation 
utility must be consistent with the equilibrium payoff fl(at+i,e). 13 Further on 
the firm’s profit is defined in (1.2.25) after the requirement tha t W  =  f7(at , e) 
is imposed and the reason that the program is written this way (as opposed to 
working with a functional equation for $(a*, e)) is that this formulation makes 
clear how choices of wages and wealth need to be consistent with the Nash sharing 
rule in (1.2.24).
This type of contract does not appear to be new in the literature. In fact 
Krusell et al (2007) and Bils et al (2009(a) , 2009(b)) among others, build models 
with search frictions in the labour market and incomplete insurance and assume 
that rents are bargained for each period with a Nash protocol, but their approach 
is very different from mine; they approximate the Nash sharing rule with an 
invariant function it; (a) and solve the worker’s optimal control program. Instead 
I treat Markov perfect solutions as part of a more general contracting problem 
and what this approach offers, is the possibility to incorporate additional features 
in the analysis, such as other insurance margins, a choice of effort etc and hence 
this formulation may prove useful in other contexts as well.
O ptim al Policies. It can be shown that optimal choices of wt and at+1 
satisfy the following first order conditions :
A tu'{ct) = 1 (1.2.26)
AtP(sUaw +  (1 -  s)Qat+1) -  1 +  1 ^ ( 1  -  Ai+1n am) < 0 (1.2.27)
13Notice that participation constraints need not be added to the program since solutions to 
Nash sharing rule will always induce positive capital gains for both parties (so long as they 
are defined).
37
1.3 General Equilibrium
0.45
0.4
1 0 35mo
c 0.3 
o
S.E 0.253«
0.2
Markov Perfect
CoO0)O)TOC0)o
0.15
Comm itm ent R>r
£  0.1
Comm itm ent R=r
0.05
Wealth
F ig u r e  1.6: C o n s u m p t io n  L o s s e s  in  U n e m p l o y m e n t
1 .3  General Equilibrium
T h e  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  p re v io u s  s e c tio n  c a r r ie d  o u t  a  g e n e ra l d e s c r ip t io n  o f  o p t im a l  
c o m p e n s a tio n  sch em es in  v a r io u s  e n v iro n m e n ts  b u t  th e y  h a d  n o th in g  to  sa y  a b o u t  
o b s e rv a b le  e q u i l ib r iu m  o u tc o m e s  w h e re b y  d i s t r ib u t io n s  o f  w e a l th  a n d  w a g e s  in  
th e  e c o n o m y  a re  e n d o g e n o u s ly  d e te rm in e d . O p tim a l  w ag e  p a t t e r n s  w h e re  sh o w n  
to  v a ry  w i th  t h e  a g e n t ’s e n d o w m e n t  o f  w e a l th  a n d  c a n  b e  s h o w n  to  v a ry  w i th  
t h e  p r o d u c t iv i ty  o f  th e  m a tc h ,  a n d  th u s  t h e  d i s t r i b u t io n  o f  jo b  s e e k e rs  a c ro s s  
t h e  r e le v a n t  s t a t e  s p a c e  is im p o r t a n t  fo r  d r a w in g  im p l ic a t io n s  f ro m  th e  v a r io u s  
sc h e m e s . F u r th e r  m o re  a n d  p e r h a p s  m o re  s u b s ta n t iv e ly ,  c o n ta c t  r a t e s  b e tw e e n  
firm s a n d  w o rk e rs  h av e  b e e n  p u rp o se fu lly  h e ld  fix ed  so  fa r , b u t  i t  is p re c ise ly  th e s e  
o b je c ts  t h a t  m a k e  t h e  f r a m e w o rk  a m e n a b le  t o  p ro v id e  a n s w e rs  t o  a n  a r r a y  o f  
e c o n o m ic a lly  in te re s t in g  q u e s tio n s , b e  th e y  r e la te d  to  o p t im a l  p o lic y  e x p e r im e n ts  
o r  to  c h a n g e s  in  a g g re g a te  c o n d it io n s .
T o  a d d re s s  th e s e  c o n c e rn s  S e c tio n s  1.3.1 a n d  1.3.2 a t t e m p t  to  c lo se  th e  m o d e l 
b y  m a k in g  th e s e  c o n ta c t  r a te s  a  fu n c tio n  o f  th e  w illin g n ess  o f  firm s to  c re a te  jo b s  
a n d  o f  th e  w o rk e rs  t o  lo o k  fo r  th e m  b y  r e ly in g  o n  tw o  a l t e r n a t iv e  e q u i l ib r iu m  
c o n c e p ts :  T h e  f ir s t  ( in  s e c t io n  1.3.1 ) b u i ld s  o n  t h e  d i r e c te d  s e a rc h  m o d e l  o f  
M o en  (1997) a n d  A cem o g lu  a n d  S h im e r (1999) to  d ev e lo p  a  n o tio n  o f  e q u ilib r iu m
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(with strict equality if at+\ > 0 ).
Envelope: $ at =  1 -  XtQat
These equations have a similar interpretation to the analogous objects under 
commitment. An increment is wealth in equation (1.2.27 ) has two distinct effects 
on the firm’s profits: it lowers required wages to finance a given consumption 
stream, but also it increases the level of promised utility tha t the firm must 
deliver to the worker (according to the derivative fiat+1) • The latter effect would 
tend to dominate the closer the wealth is to the bound a since it is precisely 
there that an increment in assets encounters the higher marginal utility gains.
To see how that is im portant rearrange equation (1.2.27) making use of the 
envelope conditions to get the following Euler condition for the model with 
Markov perfect contracts:
u'(ct) >  Pr(sUat+1 +  (1 -  s)n„,+1) +  (1.2.28)
Equation (1.2.28) sets the marginal cost of saving an extra unit today ( u'(ct) 
equal to the standard life cycle theory marginal benefit ( /3r(sUat+1 +  (1 — s)f2at+i)) 
and an extra term that pertains to the shape of the profit function. Should $ at+i 
be less than zero the marginal cost would be less than the marginal benefit and 
the agent would be savings constrained. The converse holds if $at+i > 0.
The difference between optimal (for the firm) and desired savings ( for the 
worker) turns out to have a significant impact on the shape of the wage rule in 
the current context. Figure 1.5 traces the optimal (time invariant) wage rules for 
the cases of contractible and non-contractible wealth when the share of the firm 
in the Nash protocol is set at 77 =  1/2. Violations of the Euler equation occur 
when these policy rules diverge since the two programs are not equivalent in 
this case, and a higher wage signals that the entrepreneur can control the agents 
wealth since combinations of wages and assets must be consistent with the Nash 
rule in all cases. When assets are near the borrowing constraint an increment in 
wealth encounters the highest returns and it is precisely there tha t $ at+1 < 0  
holds. Larger values of r) make this distinction less and less relevant 14.
14In fact it is possible to show that the model with 77 =  1 (where the worker extracts all the 
surplus from the job) features a flat wage contract equal to ze each period and that coupled 
with incomplete markets and the unemployment risks the worker will have the standard 
precautionary savings behavior. Notice that in that case $ 0t+i =  0
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F u r th e r  o n  c o n s id e r  th e  case  ^a t+ i <  0. F ro m  th e  N a sh  ru le  i t  is e a sy  to  sh o w  
t h a t  Q at+1 — Uat+1 <  0 (i.e . t h a t  t h e  m a r g in a l  in c r e m e n t  f ro m  a n  e x t r a  u n i t  
o f  w e a l th  is  h ig h e r  fo r  a n  u n e m p lo y e d  t h a t  fo r  a n  e m p lo y e d  w o rk e r) . T h e n  o ff 
c o rn e rs  r e a r r a n g in g  e q u a t io n  ( 1 .2 .27 ) w e re a c h  th e  fo llo w in g  e x p re ss io n :
V i f i at+1 =  1 +  r ^ - g )  (PrsUat+1 + (1 -  A t+1Uat+1 (1 .2 .2 9 )
E q u a t io n  (1 .2 .2 9 )  g e n e ra l iz e s  t h e  u n d e r in s u r a n c e  r e s u l t  fo r  m a rk o v  p e r f e c t  
c o n t r a c t s .  I t  s t a t e s  t h a t  w h e n e v e r  $ at+i ^  0 t h e  t e r m  in  th e  p a r e n th e s i s  is  
p o s i t iv e  a n d  c o n s u m p t io n  fa lls  a s  th e  a g e n t  b e c o m e s  u n e m p lo y e d . 15 W h e n e v e r  
$ at+1 >  0 u n d e r in s u ra n c e  is im p o ss ib le  to  p ro v e .
F in a l ly  f ro m  e q u a t io n  (1 .2 .2 7 ) i t  is  p o s s ib le  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  d if fe re n c e s  in  d is ­
c o u n t in g  w i th  m a rk o v  p e r f e c t  c o n t r a c t s  h a v e  a  m in im a l  im p a c t  o n  th e  s h a p e  o f 
t h e  o p t im a l  c o m p e n s a t io n  sc h e m e . T o  se e  t h i s  n o t ic e  t h a t  e v e n  i f  R  =  ^  a n d  
s  =  0 e q u a t io n  (1 .2 .2 7 ) c o u ld  b e  c o n s is te n t  w ith  a  p o s it iv e  level o f  a t+1 w h e re a s
15This follows from the fact that: At+ it/0t+1 =  >
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where firms post contracts and workers channel their search to the most profitable 
direction. These contracts consist of a sequence of transfers from the firm to 
the worker (a wage tenure profile essentially) and the implied rules for asset 
accumulation. I establish that the equilibrium set of contracts can be summarized 
in a sufficient statistic, the present discounted value of profits tha t accrue to 
the entrepreneur, which I denote by J , and th a t they always place the firm 
worker pair on the Pareto frontier of utility. Along this J  dimension markets are 
(possibly) segmented, and each segment attracts a group of workers tha t have 
the same wealth endowment. With this, the equilibrium set becomes manageable 
and computations can be extremely efficient. The second framework (section
1.3.2) is the standard search and matching model where a centralized undirected 
algorithm brings together vacant jobs and job seekers. Although this approach 
doesn’t  appear to be new in the literature 16, the main contribution here is to 
extend previous attempts by applying the notion that firms can commit to long 
term payment plans with their workforce.
Rather than pursuing just a simple description of the recursive equilibria in 
these economies I use the tools laid out to address a very relevant question. In 
section 1.3.3 I set up a simple framework for optimal policy. I ask how would a 
social planner choose the level of unemployment insurance b to maximize the 
economy’s welfare when there are different contracting schemes at work. This 
experiment is motivated by the finding of section 1.2 that commitment contracts 
have considerably different implications for risk sharing than Markov Perfect 
contracts under certain conditions. The results suggest that optimal policy should 
account for the extent of these private insurance arrangements between workers 
and firms.
1.3.1 Directed Search With Commitment
Consider the following generalization of the environment studied in section 1.2.3 
of this chapter. To simplify assume th a t all firms have the same constant 
level of productivity and that the population of searchers consists exclusively of 
unemployed agents. The discount rate of workers is denoted by p  (assume that 
there is a unit mass of these agents) and the analogous object for entrepreneurs
16See Krusell et al (2007), Bils et al (2009(a),2009(b))
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with commitment that was never the case). This is so because initial extractions 
of the agent’s wealth holdings are not time consistent in the sense that after they 
take place, the level of promised utility cannot exceed the one implied by the 
bargaining problem (i.e. 17(0, e)).
An ordering of insurance across the various schemes
As a general m atter it is really difficult to go far in characterizing the optimal 
allocations from the first order conditions for the models analyzed in the chapter. 
It is also hard to discern an ordering between the limited commitment and the 
markov perfect contracts in terms of the overall risk sharing that they entail. In 
the absence of a general proof this can be done numerically though.
Figure 1.6 presents such an ordering for the baseline calibration of the economy 
(see section 1.3.3 for details). It plots consumption losses suffered by an agent 
whose job is destroyed as a function of her endowment of assets and this corres­
ponds to an imperfect measure of insurance provided by the two models. By 
far more losses accumulate at high levels of wealth, for the limited commitment 
contract with R  = L since the optimal allocation was shown to feature an initial 
extraction of the agent’s endowment and under-investment carried over in the 
entire path. Markov perfect contracts on the other hand imply much lower risk 
sharing when wealth is low. In that region both commitment solutions featured 
some insurance. Finally from all these models the limited commitment contract 
with R = r features the smallest consumption losses.
These results are more general for all the versions of the model in this and the 
next chapter and they suggest tha t when firms and workers can commit, and 
firms discount the future at the market interest rate r, near complete insurance 
against (short term) unemployment can obtain. A worker in this environment 
doesn’t have to worry about her consumption dropping on impact during an 
unemployment spell and faces considerably less risks than a worker that must rely 
on precautionary savings (as in a Markov perfect context) to finance insurance. 
In chapter 2 I reinterpret the limited commitment model as an arrangement 
that summarizes other important forms of insurance that firms provide to their 
workforce, such as severance payments. I exploit measures of consumption losses 
for unemployed workers to argue that public policy (in particular unemployment 
benefits) has a smaller importance in this economy.
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1 .3  General Equilibrium
T h e  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  p re v io u s  s e c tio n  c a r r ie d  o u t  a  g e n e ra l d e s c r ip t io n  o f  o p t im a l  
c o m p e n s a tio n  sch em es in  v a r io u s  e n v iro n m e n ts  b u t  th e y  h a d  n o th in g  to  sa y  a b o u t  
o b s e rv a b le  e q u i l ib r iu m  o u tc o m e s  w h e re b y  d i s t r ib u t io n s  o f  w e a l th  a n d  w a g e s  in  
th e  e c o n o m y  a re  e n d o g e n o u s ly  d e te rm in e d . O p tim a l  w ag e  p a t t e r n s  w h e re  sh o w n  
to  v a ry  w i th  t h e  a g e n t ’s e n d o w m e n t  o f  w e a l th  a n d  c a n  b e  s h o w n  to  v a ry  w i th  
t h e  p r o d u c t iv i ty  o f  th e  m a tc h ,  a n d  th u s  t h e  d i s t r i b u t io n  o f  jo b  s e e k e rs  a c ro s s  
t h e  r e le v a n t  s t a t e  s p a c e  is im p o r t a n t  fo r  d r a w in g  im p l ic a t io n s  f ro m  th e  v a r io u s  
sc h e m e s . F u r th e r  m o re  a n d  p e r h a p s  m o re  s u b s ta n t iv e ly ,  c o n ta c t  r a t e s  b e tw e e n  
firm s a n d  w o rk e rs  h av e  b e e n  p u rp o se fu lly  h e ld  fix ed  so  fa r , b u t  i t  is p re c ise ly  th e s e  
o b je c ts  t h a t  m a k e  t h e  f r a m e w o rk  a m e n a b le  t o  p ro v id e  a n s w e rs  t o  a n  a r r a y  o f  
e c o n o m ic a lly  in te re s t in g  q u e s tio n s , b e  th e y  r e la te d  to  o p t im a l  p o lic y  e x p e r im e n ts  
o r  to  c h a n g e s  in  a g g re g a te  c o n d it io n s .
T o  a d d re s s  th e s e  c o n c e rn s  S e c tio n s  1.3.1 a n d  1.3.2 a t t e m p t  to  c lo se  th e  m o d e l 
b y  m a k in g  th e s e  c o n ta c t  r a te s  a  fu n c tio n  o f  th e  w illin g n ess  o f  firm s to  c re a te  jo b s  
a n d  o f  th e  w o rk e rs  t o  lo o k  fo r  th e m  b y  r e ly in g  o n  tw o  a l t e r n a t iv e  e q u i l ib r iu m  
c o n c e p ts :  T h e  f ir s t  ( in  s e c t io n  1.3.1 ) b u i ld s  o n  t h e  d i r e c te d  s e a rc h  m o d e l  o f  
M o en  (1997) a n d  A cem o g lu  a n d  S h im e r (1999) to  d ev e lo p  a  n o tio n  o f  e q u ilib r iu m
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Further on an unemployed worker’s optimal strategy is a choice <r* such that: 
o* G argm ax f(O a)Wa +  (1 -  f (0 a))U' (1.3.2)<tG£*
where Wa is the lifetime utility that the generic contract promises and U' is (an 
abbreviation of) the next period lifetime utility for the unemployed worker if she 
fails to find a job.
This is a standard definition of the directed search equilibrium tha t appears 
in many different contexts in related theoretical work. For instance Acemoglu 
and Shimer (1999) consider an economy where firms make ex ante investments 
in capital, and workers are risk averse and hold wealth, to show that the output 
maximizing level of unemployment insurance is greater than zero. Their theoretical 
results derive from a static version of this model, and in a dynamic context they 
only allow for flat wage contracts. Further on Rudanko (2008, 2009) uses the 
directed search equilibrium in an environment with commitment contracts, but 
no assets, to  describe the business cycle implications for the aggregate labour 
market. My treatment here is much more general and shows how this model can 
be used for quantitative macro work.
C o m p u ta tio n . The above (informal) definition describes an equilibrium that 
is computationally unmanageable (because the equilibrium set E* is infinite 
dimensional) but there are ways to make it much more tractable by illustrating 
that the firm’s expected profits J  is a sufficient statistic for market clearing and 
optimization in this economy. The following three steps summarize this argument:
S te p  1. Notice that given risk neutrality of entrepreneurs, from the zero profit 
condition (1.3.1) it follows that for any two contracts a, o' G E* such that 
Ja — J<rf potential entrants are indifferent and equation (1.3.1) traces a locus of 
points that determines the tightness ratio as a function of the expected profits J  
that accrue to the firm.
S te p  2. All contracts offered in equilibrium will place workers and firms on 
the Pareto frontier of utility. To see this consider two contracts cr^p G E* 
such that Jap = J<jNp • Contract crP corresponds to a Pareto efficient allocation 
where by definition the value of the worker is maximized subject to the firm’s
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where firms post contracts and workers channel their search to the most profitable 
direction. These contracts consist of a sequence of transfers from the firm to 
the worker (a wage tenure profile essentially) and the implied rules for asset 
accumulation. I establish that the equilibrium set of contracts can be summarized 
in a sufficient statistic, the present discounted value of profits tha t accrue to 
the entrepreneur, which I denote by J , and th a t they always place the firm 
worker pair on the Pareto frontier of utility. Along this J  dimension markets are 
(possibly) segmented, and each segment attracts a group of workers tha t have 
the same wealth endowment. With this, the equilibrium set becomes manageable 
and computations can be extremely efficient. The second framework (section
1.3.2) is the standard search and matching model where a centralized undirected 
algorithm brings together vacant jobs and job seekers. Although this approach 
doesn’t  appear to be new in the literature 16, the main contribution here is to 
extend previous attempts by applying the notion that firms can commit to long 
term payment plans with their workforce.
Rather than pursuing just a simple description of the recursive equilibria in 
these economies I use the tools laid out to address a very relevant question. In 
section 1.3.3 I set up a simple framework for optimal policy. I ask how would a 
social planner choose the level of unemployment insurance b to maximize the 
economy’s welfare when there are different contracting schemes at work. This 
experiment is motivated by the finding of section 1.2 that commitment contracts 
have considerably different implications for risk sharing than Markov Perfect 
contracts under certain conditions. The results suggest that optimal policy should 
account for the extent of these private insurance arrangements between workers 
and firms.
1.3.1 Directed Search With Commitment
Consider the following generalization of the environment studied in section 1.2.3 
of this chapter. To simplify assume th a t all firms have the same constant 
level of productivity and that the population of searchers consists exclusively of 
unemployed agents. The discount rate of workers is denoted by p  (assume that 
there is a unit mass of these agents) and the analogous object for entrepreneurs
16See Krusell et al (2007), Bils et al (2009(a),2009(b))
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by Financial markets are incomplete and workers can only borrow up to an 
ad hoc limit a.
Firms and workers are brought together via search. At the beginning of each 
period entrepreneurs open up vacant positions, and each vacancy advertises a 
contract th a t consists of a sequence of payments from the firm to the worker. 
Let a denote a generic contract and define E to be the set of feasible contracts 
in this economy. More precisely the latter is the collection of all contracts that 
satisfy participation by firms and workers in the current context.
Unemployed workers observe the set of contracts offered by entrepreneurs and 
channel their search to the most profitable direction. Each worker can only fill 
one application per period but depending on the decisions of the population of 
searchers there may be more competition for some jobs than others. Let Qa be 
the ratio of vacant jobs (offering contract a) to unemployed applicants, which 
is an index of the extent of this competition. The 2-tuple {a  , 6a} defines a 
submarket for this contract. I assume that the to tal number of matches that 
occur in this submarket is governed by a technology of the form m(va,u a). By 
the standard properties of the matching function (CRTS and concave), any firm 
in the sub-market for contract a has a vacancy filling rate equal to q(0a) and 
every unemployed worker meets a firm at a rate f (0 a).
W h a t does an  eq u ilib riu m  look like in  th is  econom y? In a decentralized 
equilibrium with undirected search the set of contracts E* is such tha t three 
conditions axe met 17: First firms choose the allocation a  to  maximize their 
profits. Second unemployed agents choose the contract to which they apply given 
complete information about the structure of payoffs in the economy. Third there 
is free entry (perfect competition among potential entrants) in the market, that 
drives the expected profits off all entrepreneurs from the creation of vacancies to 
zero.
More formally let £ be the per period cost associated with keeping a vacancy 
open and denote by Va and Ja the value of a vacant and a filled job respectively 
for a generic contract in the equilibrium set. Then free entry requires:
K  =  +  -  V°) =  0 ^ (1.3.1)
17See Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Rudanko (2009) for farther details.
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Further on an unemployed worker’s optimal strategy is a choice <r* such that: 
o* G argm ax f(O a)Wa +  (1 -  f (0 a))U' (1.3.2)<tG£*
where Wa is the lifetime utility that the generic contract promises and U' is (an 
abbreviation of) the next period lifetime utility for the unemployed worker if she 
fails to find a job.
This is a standard definition of the directed search equilibrium tha t appears 
in many different contexts in related theoretical work. For instance Acemoglu 
and Shimer (1999) consider an economy where firms make ex ante investments 
in capital, and workers are risk averse and hold wealth, to show that the output 
maximizing level of unemployment insurance is greater than zero. Their theoretical 
results derive from a static version of this model, and in a dynamic context they 
only allow for flat wage contracts. Further on Rudanko (2008, 2009) uses the 
directed search equilibrium in an environment with commitment contracts, but 
no assets, to  describe the business cycle implications for the aggregate labour 
market. My treatment here is much more general and shows how this model can 
be used for quantitative macro work.
C o m p u ta tio n . The above (informal) definition describes an equilibrium that 
is computationally unmanageable (because the equilibrium set E* is infinite 
dimensional) but there are ways to make it much more tractable by illustrating 
that the firm’s expected profits J  is a sufficient statistic for market clearing and 
optimization in this economy. The following three steps summarize this argument:
S te p  1. Notice that given risk neutrality of entrepreneurs, from the zero profit 
condition (1.3.1) it follows that for any two contracts a, o' G E* such that 
Ja — J<rf potential entrants are indifferent and equation (1.3.1) traces a locus of 
points that determines the tightness ratio as a function of the expected profits J  
that accrue to the firm.
S te p  2. All contracts offered in equilibrium will place workers and firms on 
the Pareto frontier of utility. To see this consider two contracts cr^p G E* 
such that Jap = J<jNp • Contract crP corresponds to a Pareto efficient allocation 
where by definition the value of the worker is maximized subject to the firm’s
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profit being equal to Jap. Contract cr^p does not. Letting Wap and WaNP 
denote the expected lifetime utilities of employed workers at date zero for these 
two contracts it should be clear that Wap >  WffNP. If this condition holds 
with equality then allocation a^p  is Pareto optimal. On the other hand if 
Wap > WaNP and both contracts are part of the equilibrium set then by the zero 
profit condition (1.3.1) it must be that they encounter the same ratio of vacancies 
to unemployed workers. But firms that offer a^p  can actually do much better, 
since by increasing the worker’s utility (or offering an efficient allocation for that 
matter), they can convince more workers to join the pool of searchers for that 
particular contract. Thus equation (1.3.1) would fail to hold.
In turn efficient allocations are a solution to the following program: 
W (au Jt) =  max u{ct) 4- (3U(at+i)s +  (3(1 -  s)W(at+i, Jt+i) (1.3.3)
J t + i , a t + i , w t
Subject to the constraint set:
at+i = r(o t +  wt -  Ct) (1.3.4)
Jt =  z — wt -\— (1.3.5) 
Jt+i > 0 (1.3.6)
W (a t + 15 Jt+1 ) >  U(at+1) (1.3.7)
S te p  3. For an unemployed agent given the iso-profit line for vacant jobs and 
the payoff W (a t, Jt) optim al policies are a solution to the following functional 
equation:
U(at) = max u ( - ? m  + at + b) +  /?(1 -  f(6 j))U (at+i) +  P f{6 j)W (a t+u J)
a t + i > a , J  r
(1.3.8)
A few comments are in order here. First notice how these equations pose 
the Pareto program by having the worker choose prices as opposed to the firm 
choosing allocations as studied in section 1.2 of this chapter. This is a convenient 
representation for the current context and doesn’t affect the optimal policies. The 
worker can rearrange payments between the present and future to maximize her
utility while adhering to a promised value Jt to be delivered to the firm, and
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equations (1.3.6) and (1.3.7) require that participation for both firms and workers 
be satisfied on the optimal path.
Further on the solution to equation (1.3.8) is a time invariant policy rule J* 
tha t defines a mapping from assets to the optimal choice of J. Under general 
conditions this map can be shown to be monotonically decreasing in wealth and in 
this case the equilibrium gives rise to an interesting form of market segmentation 
whereby wealthier workers choose a lower J  (higher wages) because they can 
afford to wait in unemployment for better opportunities to come along. However, 
this property is not necessary for the equilibrium to be well defined in the current 
context.
Finally notice that since the equilibrium here is based on the assumption that 
firms advertise a wage tenure profile to attract job applicants it is important that 
there is sufficient commitment in the economy to adhere to the announced path. 
With Markov perfect contracts say, either the firm or the worker would have the 
incentive to re-bargain after all investments in search are made, and the only way 
whereby payoffs are well defined in this economy is for firms to advertise different 
values of the weight 77.
The Appendix generalizes this analysis to a model th a t features uncertainty 
about match quality and describes a numerical procedure that makes computations 
in the economy a near trivial task. The next paragraph defines the competitive 
equilibrium in this economy.
Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The stationary competitive equilibrium consists of a set of value functions 
{[/(a), kF(a j), U}for workers and firms, a set of decision rules on asset holdings 
and continuation values {a!w a^ Jy a!u J'w for employed and unemployed 
agents and a decision rule J* defining optimal search policies of unemployed 
workers as a function of assets. It also consists of a set of prices {r, u ^ j ) }  and 
an invariant measure p  of agents across assets and employment states such that:
1) Free entry condition (2) V  =  0 —► £ =  (3eqdJ holds VJ
2) Given R and f{0 j)  asset accumulation and optimal search rules are the 
solution to the agent’s program.
3) Given optimal search rules J* and the stationary distribution of workers 
across states, flows in and out of each segment are balanced. Define A to be a set
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on the asset grid with the property, J*€A =  J  for some J. Also define the steady 
state measure of unemployed in segment J: u-j. The balance of flows requires:
« E  E
J  a: a '= a ' , „(.lA  a: a '= a '  , , e A  a&Aiu , (a ,J )  u , (a )  ’ ^
(inflow) be equal to:
u
a\af=af , ,4A,a€A
(outflow).
4) Consistency: fi is the invariant distribution generated by optimal decision 
rules of households.
1.3.2 Undirected Search
This section uses a concept of equilibrium that is entirely different from the one 
defined in section 1.3.1. There the set of contracts offered was such th a t the 
equilibrium gave rise to an interesting form of market segmentation whereby 
workers with a different endowment of wealth made different choices of J  and 
hence encountered job opportunities in the market at different rates each period. 
Here job creation is the outcome of a centralized undirected algorithm, where 
the locations of vacant jobs and the identities of job seekers are submitted each 
period, and a common unemployment to employment transition rate (which I 
denote by /(# )) applies to all workers in the economy.
I already said that this setup is not new in the related literature; Krusell et al 
(2007) and Bils et al (2009(a), 2009(b)) build similar models where job creation 
encounters matching frictions and workers can self insure against unemployment, 
and use these to address how changes in aggregate productivity affect unemploy­
ment and vacancies in the labour market. My contribution here, besides of the 
different focal point of my analysis, is to extend this previous work to a more 
general framework that distinguishes between alternative contracting schemes.
I again assume that there is a unit mass of risk averse agents in the economy 
and a continuum of firms (entrepreneurs) of irrelevant measure. The standard
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assumptions, parameters (discount rates and borrowing constraints) and techno­
logies are maintained here. At any point in time a fraction e of the economy’s 
workforce are employed workers matched with firms in joint production, and the 
remaining u workers are active job seekers in the labour market. There is also a 
number v of available job opportunities.
Firms and workers are brought together via search which is a time consuming 
activity. In particular the frictions tha t impede instantaneous transitions from 
unemployment to employment are summarized in a technology of the form m ViU 
tha t gives the total number of matches as a function of these inputs. I assume 
that the standard properties of the matching function (constant returns to scale, 
increasing in both arguments and concave) apply. By these properties we can 
denote the job finding rate for unemployed workers and the filling rate for vacant 
jobs by f(6)  =  rn^ v) and q(6) = respectively. In turn 6 =  J is an index
of competition (tightness) in the labour market.
Finally to describe the equilibrium in this economy I consider an environment 
whereby match rents must be rebargained each period. The analysis can be easily 
extended to include limited commitment contracts and in the Appendix I provide 
a thorough description of the equilibrium in that case.
V alue F unctions In section 1.2.4 I established that in an economy with time 
consistent contracts, payoffs for firms and workers are of the form $(at, e) and 
f2(at , e) respectively. These are a solution to the following functional equations:
1 — s
U(Wt,at ,e) = max ze -  wt H —  3>(at+i, e) (1.3.9)
at+i>a,wt K
Subject to:
W* <  u (~ at+i-/R +  at +  Wt) +  0(1 — s)f2(fl£+i, e) +  0sU(cit+1) (1.3.10)
fl(at ,e) G argmax(VF — U(at))v(U(W, at, e ) )1 v N ash  B argain ing  (1.3.11) w
$(a t, e) =  II(fi(at , e), at , e) C onsistency  (1.3.12)
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Equation 1.3.9 represents the firm’s dynamic programming problem where 
expected utility Wt is a state variable along with wealth and productivity. In 
equilibrium it can only be that Wt = £l(at, e) (since no promise can be sustained 
th a t is inconsistent with the Nash bargaining rule) and this is precisely the 
requirement imposed by condition (1.3.12).
Further on the lifetime utility for an unemployed worker with a stock of wealth 
at in the current period solves:
U{at) =  max u ( - / r a c a t+i r + a t+6)+/?/(0) /  fi(at+1, e) dFe+ j3(l- f(0 ))U (a t+i)
a t + i > a J
(1.3.13)
The solutions to the value function programs ( 1.3.9) and (1.3.13) give rise 
to a set of optimal policy rules au,(a)l o^r emPl°yed and unemployed
workers respectively. In turn these policies induce a invariant measure fi of agents 
across assets, productivity and employment status which evolves according to 
the following law of motion:
For all A c  A, E  C S
Where are //e(a, e) and fJLu(a) are the marginal cdfs for employed and unem­
ployed workers and A  and £ denote the relevant state space of wealth and 
productivity respectively.
F ree E n try  C ond ition . Just like in the equilibrium of section 1.3.1 job 
creation in this economy needs to be consistent with the notion that prospective 
entrants in the market make zero profits from vacant jobs. Letting £ be the per 
period cost of posting a vacancy and given the steady state measure /i it must 
be that:
- {  +  - ! * /  /  * (a , e) dFc = 0 (1.3.16)
R  J Ja'u(a) f d f i u{a)
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F ig u r e  1 .7: W e l f a r e  C r it e r io n  M a r k o v  P e r f e c t  a n d  C o m m it m e n t
C o n t r a c t s
W here  do these  choices come from ? T h e r e  is  a  s im p le  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  
th e s e  r e s u lts :  F i r s t  n o tic e  t h a t  in  a ll e c o n o m ie s  h ig h e r  v a lu es  o f  b in c re a se  u t i l i ty  
fo r u n e m p lo y e d  w o rk ers , b u t  a lso  im p ly  h ig h e r  ta x e s  ( a n d  h e n c e  low er o u tp u t )  o n  
e x is t in g  m a tc h e s .  T h is  is so  b e c a u s e  g iv e n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  u n e m p lo y e d  w o rk e rs  
a n  e c o n o m y  t h a t  s a t is f ie s  b u d g e t  b a la n c e  r e q u ir e s  t h a t :  r  =  ^  a n d  h e n c e  a n  
in c re a s e  in  b e n g in e e rs  a  r is e  in  r e q u ir e d  r e v e n u e s  fo r  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t.  F u r th e r  
o n  g iv e n  t h e  le v e l o f  s e a rc h  c o s ts  in  t h e  e c o n o m y , a  lo ss  in  t h e  m a tc h  s u r p lu s  
a s s o c ia te d  w i th  h ig h e r  ta x e s ,  t r a n s la te s  in to  lo w er d e s ire d  jo b  c r e a t io n  fo r firm s , 
a n d  w i th  fe w e r  a c t iv e  jo b s  t h e  t a x  b u r d e n  o n  e x is t in g  m a tc h e s  in c re a s e s . F o r  
a ll o f  t h e  e c o n o m ie s  c o n s id e re d  th e  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  a g g r e g a te  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  t o  
c h a n g e s  in  t h e  lev e l o f  b e n e f i ts  is  s im ila r ;  I f in d  t h a t  a  r is e  in  b f ro m  .4 t o  .5 
in c re a se s  a g g re g a te  u n e m p lo y m e n t fro m  th e  b a s e lin e  v a lu e  to  .0788  a n d  .0791 in  
th e  u n d ir e c te d  m o d e l w ith  m a rk o v  p e rfe c t a n d  c o m m itm e n t c o n tr a c ts  re sp ec tiv e ly .
B u t  w h e r e  th e s e  m o d e ls  s e e m  to  d iffe r , is  in  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  r is k  s h a r in g  t h a t  
p r iv a te  p a r tn e r s h ip s  b e tw e e n  w o rk e rs  a n d  f irm s  e n ta i l .  I p re v io u s ly  s u m m a r iz e d  
th i s  b y  lo o k in g  a t  t h e  c o n s u m p t io n  lo sse s  t h a t  t h e  w o rk e rs  su ffe r  w h e n  th e y  
b e c o m e  u n e m p lo y e d . In  t h i s  c a se , in  th e  b a s e l in e  c a l ib r a t io n  th i s  s t a t i s t i c  is 
21%  fo r t h e  e c o n o m y  w ith  m a rk o v  p e r f e c t  c o n t r a c t s  a n d  o n ly  8%  w i th  o p t im a l
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Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The stationary competitive equilibrium consists of a set of value functions 
{U (a), fl(a, e), 3>(a, e)}, and a set of decision rules on asset holdings {a!w e^ a'u 
for employed and unemployed agents and an invariant wage rule of the form wa^ . 
It also consists of an index of labour market tightness 6 and an invariant measure 
p  of agents across assets, productivity and employment status such that:
1) Equilibrium payoffs solve the functional equations (1.3.13) and (1.3.9) and 
optimal policies derive.
2 )The invariant measure p  is consistent: In particular the law of motion of p 
must be consistent with(1.3.14) and (1.3.15)
3) Equilibrium tightness 6 is consistent with the free entry condition (1.3.16)
1.3.3 Numerical Analysis: An Optimal Policy Experiment
Section 1.2 of this chapter highlighted the important role of the timing of wages in 
providing insurance against unemployment risks by encouraging the accumulation 
of assets. In this context commitment contracts were shown to feature considerably 
more insurance than markov perfect contracts and in some cases (with appropriate 
discounting assumptions and when the enforcement constraints were slack) the 
worker’s consumption was unaffected in the event of a job loss.
This section makes a point that prescriptions of optimal policy in quantita­
tive macro models with heterogeneous agents and idiosyncratic risk cannot be 
accurate unless they account for the extent of private risk sharing arrangements 
between economic agents (here the choice of wage setting scheme between firms 
and workers). It envisages that a benevolent social planner would choose the 
level of unemployment income b optimally and use lump sum taxes levied on 
entrepreneurial profits to finance the expenditures subject to budget balance (BB) 
each period. The choice of the location of taxes is almost inconsequential in the 
current context in the sense that both commitment and markov perfect models 
feature a sharing rule (the former as an initial allocation rule) that implies that a 
reduction in one party’s expected payoffs translate into a loss of utility for the 
other party.
My findings suggest tha t conclusions for optimal policy drawn from models 
with search and self insurance (see Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), Hansen and
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Imhrohoroglu (1992) and Wang and Williamson (2002)) may have been misguided 
by the fact that the impact of wages on risk sharing opportunities has not been 
properly accounted for. Indeed a result that comes out of the analysis is that when 
commitment is abundant in the economy there is much less scope for publicly 
provided insurance against unemployment, since increases in the level of benefits 
can disturb private insurance arrangements. This is a result th a t I establish 
using both the concept of the undirected and the directed search equilibrium 
although in the latter case lack of commitment cannot be made consistent with 
the notion that workers direct their search to a market with well defined ex ante 
payoffs (unless each contract consists of a different bargaining share rj). Instead 
I assume tha t workers and firms trade with flat wage contracts in one case and 
with optimal limited commitment contracts in another.
T h e  E n v iro n m en t. To simplify matters assume that all firms have the same 
level of productivity and a discount factor R  =  r. These choices imply that 
insurance against unemployment can be perfect in some regions of the limited 
commitment contract (I established this numerically before) so the results that 
follow can be interpreted as an upper bound on the difference in optimal policies 
between the two schemes. Let r  denote the tax levi on the match output u be 
the fraction of unemployed agents in the economy (analogously e =  1 — u  is the 
fraction of employed workers).
I what follows I restrict attention to steady state outcomes and I assume that 
optimal policies derive from a welfare function whereby the social planner assigns 
an equal weight to all agents in the economy. Further on notice that, since both 
models used in this section feature zero profits for the population of unmatched 
entrepreneurs, there are three inputs in the welfare criterion: The average utility 
of unemployed and employed workers and the profits of existing jobs (matched 
entrepreneurs). Given the invariant measures of agents across the relevant state 
space the welfare criterion (in an economy with time consistent contracts say) is 
given by:
J  U(a) d nu(a) +  J (Q(a) +  $(a)) dfie(a) (1.3.17)
C alib ra tio n . I briefly explain my choice of parameters and functional forms: 
Given tha t the model period is set to one month the target interest rate is
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r = 1.0041 18 and the rate of time preference fJ is set at .995. Following Shimer 
(2005 (a)) I set the separation rate s to 3 % per month and the contact rate 
between unemployed workers and firms to .4 in steady state. In this case in 
the undirected search equilibrium the unemployment rate equals ^  =  .0698 
and with a value b = .4 taxes burden the match output by an amount equal 
to .0279. I also calibrate the search cost £ to be consistent with these targets. 
With directed search, matters are more complicated because there the equilibrium 
unemployment rate is partly determined by the workforce’s optimal choices, and 
I need to adjust £ to make the average job finding and unemployment rates as 
above 19.
The matching algorithm is standard and is guided by the relevant literature: 
fnv,u = The value of rj is set to .5 and x  = -4 is calibrated to make
compatible the steady state job finding rate for unemployed workers equal to .4 
with a tightness ratio 6 = 1. Aggregate productivity z is normalized to unity. 
Finally the utility function of the workers is of the form:
u{ct) = log(ct)
Results: Directed and Undirected Search Models
Figure (1.7) plots the value of the Welfare criterion (for the undirected search 
equilibrium) as a function of the level of benefits b 20. Optimal policies differ 
markedly between the two contracting schemes and with commitment the social 
planner is required to set b = .3 to maximize welfare while her preferred value is 
around .65 in the economy with Nash Bargaining.
A similar result emerges in the directed search equilibrium; I find tha t with 
optimal contracts the government sets b = .28 but without them (this economy 
has flat wages instead of markov perfect contracts) the optimal level of benefits 
equals .55. The differences between the two models stem from the fact that the 
directed search equilibrium features considerably less risks for unemployed agents 
since they can determine the probability of finding jobs by choosing the market 
to which they apply.
18This value yields and yearly analogue of 5 %.
19Notice that the steady state numbers differ depending on the contracting scheme. I calibrate 
all economies to be consistent with the targets by choosing different values for the parameters.
20These values are normalized to fit the same scale
52
1.3 General Equilibrium
-10
-1 5
M arkov Perfect C ontracts
-2 5
-3 0
-3 5 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Unemployment Insurance
F i g u r e  1 .7: W e l f a r e  C r i t e r i o n  M a r k o v  P e r f e c t  a n d  C o m m i t m e n t
C o n t r a c t s
W here  do these  choices come from ? T h e r e  is  a  s im p le  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  
th e s e  r e s u lts :  F i r s t  n o tic e  t h a t  in  a ll e c o n o m ie s  h ig h e r  v a lu es  o f  b in c re a se  u t i l i ty  
fo r u n e m p lo y e d  w o rk ers , b u t  a lso  im p ly  h ig h e r  ta x e s  ( a n d  h e n c e  low er o u tp u t )  o n  
e x is t in g  m a tc h e s .  T h is  is so  b e c a u s e  g iv e n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  u n e m p lo y e d  w o rk e rs  
a n  e c o n o m y  t h a t  s a t is f ie s  b u d g e t  b a la n c e  r e q u ir e s  t h a t :  r  =  ^  a n d  h e n c e  a n  
in c re a s e  in  b e n g in e e rs  a  r is e  in  r e q u ir e d  r e v e n u e s  fo r  t h e  g o v e rn m e n t.  F u r th e r  
o n  g iv e n  t h e  le v e l o f  s e a rc h  c o s ts  in  t h e  e c o n o m y , a  lo ss  in  t h e  m a tc h  s u r p lu s  
a s s o c ia te d  w i th  h ig h e r  ta x e s ,  t r a n s la te s  in to  lo w er d e s ire d  jo b  c r e a t io n  fo r firm s , 
a n d  w i th  fe w e r  a c t iv e  jo b s  t h e  t a x  b u r d e n  o n  e x is t in g  m a tc h e s  in c re a s e s . F o r  
a ll o f  t h e  e c o n o m ie s  c o n s id e re d  th e  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  a g g r e g a te  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  t o  
c h a n g e s  in  t h e  lev e l o f  b e n e f i ts  is  s im ila r ;  I f in d  t h a t  a  r is e  in  b f ro m  .4 t o  .5 
in c re a se s  a g g re g a te  u n e m p lo y m e n t fro m  th e  b a s e lin e  v a lu e  to  .0788  a n d  .0791 in  
th e  u n d ir e c te d  m o d e l w ith  m a rk o v  p e rfe c t a n d  c o m m itm e n t c o n tr a c ts  re sp ec tiv e ly .
B u t  w h e r e  th e s e  m o d e ls  s e e m  to  d iffe r , is  in  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  r is k  s h a r in g  t h a t  
p r iv a te  p a r tn e r s h ip s  b e tw e e n  w o rk e rs  a n d  f irm s  e n ta i l .  I p re v io u s ly  s u m m a r iz e d  
th i s  b y  lo o k in g  a t  t h e  c o n s u m p t io n  lo sse s  t h a t  t h e  w o rk e rs  su ffe r  w h e n  th e y  
b e c o m e  u n e m p lo y e d . In  t h i s  c a se , in  th e  b a s e l in e  c a l ib r a t io n  th i s  s t a t i s t i c  is 
21%  fo r t h e  e c o n o m y  w ith  m a rk o v  p e r f e c t  c o n t r a c t s  a n d  o n ly  8%  w i th  o p t im a l
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contribution of my work here is to present a flexible framework that can be used 
to deal with the two frictions jointly.
56
1 On the Joint Modeling o f Incomplete Asset and Labour Markets
commitment contracts given the distribution of agents over the relevant state 
space (I obtain similar numbers for the directed search model). By this metric 
there is considerably more insurance in one case than in the other and hence a 
different role is assigned to public policy to complete the market.
These results mask considerable heterogeneity in outcomes. For one thing 
these economies may not be comparable due to differences in the steady state 
distributions and to the number of periods tha t the typical agent spends in 
unemployment. However important these features maybe, it is not my intention 
here to go far in analyzing the different tradeoffs with which the planner is 
confronted. Rather the point was to put the theories laid out in this chapter at 
work and to explore some of their aggregate implications. W hat these results 
suggest is that aggregate effects could be important.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis I scrutinize the implication that the range of private 
risk sharing sets the scope of public insurance by calibrating my artificial economy 
to be consistent with a large range of stylized facts for unemployment and the 
current UI scheme in the United States. As here I contrast the properties of 
two models; in one firms can allocate risks efficiently with their workforce and in 
another only flat wage contracts are perm itted and I find th a t the predictions 
of this section survive the more detailed analysis that I attem pt. Public policy 
is different in the two models. I then go on to evaluate the extent to which the 
government can devise more complicated insurance schemes to avoid or minimize 
the interference with private markets. In the context of UI payments more 
complicated mechanisms have an obvious interpretation; they are related to the 
timing of benefits and one of the findings is that unemployment insurance should 
be back-loaded in some cases (in the sense th a t transfers should increase over 
time).
1.4 Conclusions
Quantitative macro models of heterogeneous agents and wealth accumulation 
have had a tremendous impact in shaping and economic policy propositions over 
the past decade. Yet these models are agnostic about the sources of risk that 
give rise to a meaningful role of insurance markets. On the other hand search 
models of the labour market present a convincing foundation for the uncertainty
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that agents face over their working lives but build complicated environments 
only to colonize them with risk neutral agents whereby the role of insurance is 
meaningless.
This chapter sets out to build a theory that accounts for the interactions 
of these two frictions in asset and labour markets. It uses a standard search 
matching and bargaining framework where job availability in the economy is 
limited and agents can self insure against unemployment risks. It goes far in 
exploring modeling strategies for wages and characterizes the implications of 
alternative wage setting schemes. More substantively, by extending the existing 
literature, I develop two equilibrium concepts whereby the contact rates between 
workers and firms in these economies are endogenously determined.
This theory can help researchers setup models with realistic heterogeneity 
where search frictions play a central role in labour market outcomes, and my 
calculations illustrate that there is scope to reconsider many of the messages 
and implications of the literature of welfare effects of policies under limited 
insurance. I setup a simple experiment whereby the government chooses the level 
of unemployment insurance optimally along with taxes to finance the scheme and 
I find that depending on the range of insurance opportunities in worker employer 
relationships, the welfare benefits of public policy can be small or large. This 
important dimension seems to be missing from the literature of heterogeneous 
agents and labour market frictions (see Wang and Williamson (2002), Hansen 
and Imhrohoroglu (1992) and Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) ) in spite of the fact 
that insurance provided by firms to their workforce is not uncommon (Pissarides
(2004), Chetty (2007)).
A lot of other important implications are left unexplored. For one thing the 
work of Krusell et al (2007) and Bils et al (2009(a), 2009(b)) explains how 
models that feature both frictions in asset and labour markets, fare in matching 
the suggestive business cycle correlations in key labour market statistics (they 
both use an undirected search model). We yet don’t  know much about how 
heterogeneity in individual labour supply rules aggregates over the business cycle 
but this appears to be an important question for future work. For instance Chang 
and Kim (2006) use a model with heterogeneous agents and an extensive margin 
of labour supply (their economy doesn’t feature search frictions) to show that the 
elasticity of labour supply is much larger at the aggregate than at the individual 
level, and Chang and Kim (2007) use a similar framework to point out that these 
ingredients explain the cyclical behavior of labour market wedges. One important
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v a lu e  (a ro u n d  -.1 5 ) fo r low  levels o f  w e a lth . T h is  is sh o w n  in  F ig u re  1.9 t h a t  p lo ts  
th e  v io la t io n s  o f  th e  E u le r  e q u a t io n  a lo n g  w i th  th e  p ro f i t  fu n c t io n . T h e  p a r t i a l  
d e r iv a tiv e  o f  th e  l a t t e r  is n e g a tiv e  (p ro f its  fa ll in  w e a lth )  s u g g e s tin g  t h a t  th e  te r m  
^-jpyt $ a t+i *s n e g a t iv e - C le a r ly  th e  a g e n t  is  sa v in g s  c o n s t r a in e d  in  th is  case .
1.5 .2  Algorithms for Com puting Equilibria in the  Undirected  
Search M odel
An Equilibrium with Commitment and Undirected Search
C o n s id e r  t h e  m o d e l o f  s e c t io n  1 .2 .3  w h e re  f irm s  a n d  w o rk e rs  h a v e  th e  a b i l i ty  to  
c o m m it to  lo n g  t e r m  d a te  z e ro  p o lic ie s , in s o fa r  a s  th e y  s a t is fy  th e  s u s ta in a b i l i ty  
c o n d it io n , t h a t  th e  p a r tn e r s h ip  is w e a k ly  p re fe ra b le  t o  a u ta r k y  (u n e m p lo y m e n t) .  
C e n tra l  to  th e  n o tio n  o f e q u ilib r iu m  h e re  is a  jo b  f in d in g  r a te  f ( 9 )  fo r u n e m p lo y e d  
jo b  s e e k e rs , a n  a n a lo g o u s  r a t e  q(0)  fo r  v a c a n t  jo b s ,  a n d  t h e  p a y o ff  f u n c t io n s  
W (a * ,e )  ( in i t i a l  a l lo c a t io n  fo r  e m p lo y e d  w o rk e rs )  a n d  U (a t ) ( fo r  u n e m p lo y e d  
a g e n ts ) .  T h e  A lg o r i th m  c o n s is ts  o f  th e  fo llo w in g  s te p s :
S t e p  1. F o rm  in i t ia l  g u e sse s  fo r  t ig h tn e s s  60 a n d  p a y o ff  fu n c t io n s  W o(fy , e) 
a n d  Uo(at ). G iv e n  th e s e  o b je c ts  so lve  th e  f i r m ’s p ro b le m :
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contribution of my work here is to present a flexible framework that can be used 
to deal with the two frictions jointly.
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1 — s
n (W t,a t ,e) =  „  m a x  z e - w t +  — Yl(Wt+1,a t+i,e) (1 .5 .8 )
Wt+i,at+i,wt K
S u b je c t  to  th e  c o n s t r a in t  se t:
u ( - a t+i / r  +  at +  wt) +  (3(1 -  s) Wt+1 +  /3s U ( a t+ i ) >  Wt (1 .5 .9 )
a t + 1 >  a 
FF,+1 >  U(at+i) 
n(VFf+i,at+1,e) > 0
S t a n d a r d  te c h n iq u e s  (eg . v a lu e  fu n c t io n  i t e r a t i o n )  c a n  b e  a p p l ie d  h e re  a n d  
o p t im a l  p o lic ie s  c a n  b e  d e r iv e d  b y  i te r a t in g  c o n v e rg e n c e  o n  th e  fu n c tio n a l  e q u a tio n  
(1 .5 .8 ) . 21
21A few comments are in order here: First to reduce the number of control variables we can 
get rid of wt by making use of the fact that the promise keeping constraint will always 
bind, given a period utility that satisfies the Inada conditions. It follows from the worker’s 
promise keeping constraint that:
wt = at+1/r -  at + u~l(Wt -  (3(1 -  s) Wt+1 -  (3s U(at+1))
With this addition we can write the firm’s program as:
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1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Proofs and Derivations 
Derivation of equation (1.2.19) in Text
Consider the first order conditions (1.2.16) and (1.2.17) th a t solve the firm’s 
optimal program.
r - s  _  Atn^t) + Xt/3Uat+iS + lt+lUat+i -  ^  = 0 (1.5.1)
^  nivt+1 +  a*/3( i  — s ) — 7t + i — < P t + i ^ w t+1 — o (1.5.2)
Note that by the envelope conditions: —IIw1+1 =  At+i =  Then clearly:
4>t+1 =  1 ^  -  -  ») -  (1-5.3)
- f t  ^ £ + 1  ^ £ + 1
2 -  =  0*Uat+i + f}{ 1 -  s ) - f -  +  2±I(C/at+1 -  J - )  (1.5.4)
™£ 'V+l A£ A£+l
Which is equation (1.2.19) in text.
Derivation of equation (1.2.20 ) in Text
For the first order conditions of the limited commitment program (equations 
(1.2.16) and (1.2.17)) it follows that off the borrowing constraint:
1 — s
At/?(1 — s) =  7 t+i — 0t+iAt+i H— At+i —► (1.5.5)
— > At P  —  ^ ( l t + i  — 0t+iAt+i) +  ^A t+i1 — s K
1 1  s
s \ tpUat+l = -  — — +  — +  (f)t + 1 — 7t+iC^at+i (1.5.6)
1 1 , 1 JL 1 N JL 1
-  r ~ R  +  $ i R - * t+1T ^ s ) +  ,t>t+1~ s ~ 7t+lUat+'
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Substituting out At/3 in equation (1.5.6) and rearranging we get:
(1.5.7)
Which is equation (1.2.20 ) in text.
Discussion of the Importance of Contractible Assets
In the text it was shown th a t optimal investments in limited commitment and 
markov perfect contracts was governed by the two following Euler equations:
m '(c ( ) > 0(1 -  s)ru'(ct+i,e) + r0su'(ct+liU) +  ru'(ct)^t+l(u'(ct+l u ) -  u'(ct+i , e ) )
rt'(ct) >  0r(sUat+1 +  (1 -  s)flat+1) +
The discussion emphasized that the last terms on the right hand side of these 
equations represent terms to the standard life cycle theory Euler equations that 
result from the fact that wages and investment are determined on the same side of 
the market (in other words assets are contractible by the firm). To the extent that 
these terms are im portant optimal contracts need to incorporate an additional 
state variable, the agent’s marginal utility as in Abraham and Pavoni (2005) or 
Werning (2002) (or otherwise the standard life cycle theory Euler equation as an 
additional constraint to the firm’s program).
Although it is not possible to provide a general proof the simulations of the 
model suggest that such violations are minimal in the context of a contract with 
limited commitment. This is visible from Figure 1.8 that plots the violations of the 
Euler equation (essentially the term u'(ct) — (3(1 — s)ru'(ct+i,e) — r(3sv!(ct+i>u)) in 
the baseline calibration of the model. These residuals are really small in absolute 
value to discern a pattern and in fact they seem consistent with numerical errors 
of acceptable order of magnitude.
In contrast a model with per period bargaining and contractible assets has 
a discernible pattern  whereby the residuals are negative and large in absolute
L ) =
( 1 <Pt+i  ^ , 1 1 ,
s { R - — S ) +  r - R  +
+ 0t+1 1 — s -  It+iUiOt+1 1 — S
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value (around -.15) for low levels of wealth. This is shown in Figure 1.9 that plots 
the violations of the Euler equation along with the profit function. The partial 
derivative of the latter is negative (profits fall in wealth) suggesting that the term 
^-jpyt$at+i *s negative- Clearly the agent is savings constrained in this case.
1.5 .2  Algorithms for Com puting Equilibria in the  Undirected  
Search M odel
An Equilibrium with Commitment and Undirected Search
Consider the model of section 1.2.3 where firms and workers have the ability to 
commit to long term date zero policies, insofar as they satisfy the sustainability 
condition, that the partnership is weakly preferable to autarky (unemployment). 
Central to the notion of equilibrium here is a job finding rate f(9)  for unemployed 
job seekers, an analogous rate q(0) for vacant jobs, and the payoff functions 
W(a*,e) (initial allocation for employed workers) and U(at) (for unemployed 
agents). The Algorithm consists of the following steps:
S t e p  1. Form initial guesses for tightness 60 and payoff functions Wo(fy, e) 
and Uo(at). Given these objects solve the firm’s problem:
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IF the update 6 1  is close enough to the initial guess 6 0  EXIT. ELSE repeat 
S t e p  1.
Markov Perfect Equilibria with undirected search
S t e p  1. Form an initial guess for the index of tightness 90  and equilibrium payoff 
functions Uo(at) and £lo(at , e) for unemployed and employed workers respectively. 
Choose a large grid of expected utility W  to solve the firm’s auxiliary program 
which can be represented recursively as follows:
1 — s
n  (W,at, e )=  max: z e - w t + — -  n (f t0(af+i), a*+i, e) (1.5.15)
wt ,a t+ i > a  K
Subject to the constraint set:
W  < u ( - a t+i / r  +  at +  wt) +  P(l  -  s)Q(at+i, e) +  /3sU(at+1)
u'{ct) > /?(1 -  s)^at+i +  0sUat+1 With Equality If at + 1 >  0
Notice tha t continuation utility promises must conform with the function 
to be time consistent. Further on if assets are non-contractible (as 
in Krusell et al (2007), Bils et al (2009(a), 2009(b)), the Euler equation is an 
additional constraint to the firm’s program 22 Consistent with the equilibrium is 
the notion that the payoff function of the firm satisfies the following condition:
$ (a t ,e) =  e), at , e)
Standard Methods (say Value function iteration) say can be applied here to obtain 
numerical solutions to the optimal policies.
22The algorithm for non-contractible savings in these two papers doesn’t use the firm’s program 
as I do here. It approximates the function w(a, e) (wages as a function of wealth) and 
solves for assets by maximizing the worker’s utility who takes as given the wage schedule. 
The wages have to be consistent with Nash bargaining. For a detailed description see Bils 
et al (2009(a), 2009(b)).
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1 — s
n (W t,a t ,e) =  „  m a x  z e - w t +  — Yl(Wt+1,a t+i,e) (1 .5 .8 )
W t + i , a t + i , w t K
S u b je c t  to  th e  c o n s t r a in t  se t:
u ( - a t+i / r  +  at +  wt) +  (3(1 -  s) Wt+1 +  /3s U ( a t+ i ) >  Wt (1 .5 .9 )
a t + 1 >  a 
FF,+1 >  U(at+i) 
n(VFf+i,at+1,e) > 0
S t a n d a r d  te c h n iq u e s  (eg . v a lu e  fu n c t io n  i t e r a t i o n )  c a n  b e  a p p l ie d  h e re  a n d  
o p t im a l  p o lic ie s  c a n  b e  d e r iv e d  b y  i te r a t in g  c o n v e rg e n c e  o n  th e  fu n c tio n a l  e q u a tio n
(1 .5 .8 ) . 21
21A few comments are in order here: First to reduce the number of control variables we can 
get rid of wt by making use of the fact that the promise keeping constraint will always 
bind, given a period utility that satisfies the Inada conditions. It follows from the worker’s 
promise keeping constraint that:
wt = at+1/r -  at + u~l (Wt -  (3(1 -  s) Wt+ 1 -  (3s U(at+1))
With this addition we can write the firm’s program as:
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S t e p  2. Given the optimal value function, update the employed worker’s 
payoff Q(at , e) by solving the following Nash Bargaining Program:
Qi(at ,e) e  argm ax(W  — U(at))1_7?(II(W, au e))v (1.5.16)w
IF  function Qi(at , e) is close to the initial guess £lo(at , e) proceed to S te p  3 . 
ELSE repeat S te p  1.
S t e p  3. Update the unemployed worker’s value function. This can be accom­
plished by iterating convergence on the following functional equation:
U{at) = max u (—af+i / r  +  at +  b) +  (3 (1 -  f e) U(at+1) +  f e [  ft(at+i, e) d Fe
a t + i > a  J
IF  the update is close enough to the initial guess proceed to St e p  4 . ELSE 
repeat St e p  1.
S t e p  4. Update the value of 9. Given the steady state measures pejCL and pu,a 
for employed and unemployed job seekers over the relevant state space (wealth) 
the zero profit condition for vacant jobs requires:
£ +  j  j  A l u^,a d Fv 0
1.5.3 Equilibria With Directed Search 
Numerical Algorithm
S t e p  1. Choose a grid of profits J  for firms and assets a. Given the para- 
metrization of search costs and the matching technology equilibrium tightness 
solves the zero profit condition (1.3.1). Form an initial guess for the unemployed 
worker’s value function Uo(at) and solve the employed worker’s program by 
iterating convergence on the following functional equation:
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Step  2. Update objects Wo(at,e) and Uo(at). In particular solve the following 
Generalized Nash Bargaining problem:
W i(at,e) G argm ax (VU — C/(a))1_7?n(m , a, e)17 (1.5.13)w
The update for U\{at) can be obtained by solving the unemployed worker’s 
value function, equation (1.2.1) in text.
IF  the updates U\{at) and W i(at, e) are close enough to Uo(at) W o(at,e) 
respectively proceed to St e p  3. ELSE repeat St e p  1.
St e p  3. Update the tightness index 6. Given a stationary measure of 
unemployed workers over assets pUja, the free entry condition for vacant jobs 
requires:
+  /  II(VV(a,e),a,e)d/xU)a d Fe =  0 (1.5.14)
x l  J J a e A
U(Wt ,at ,e) =  max z e -  at+1/ r  +  at -  u l (Wt -  @{1 -  s) Wt+X -  (3s U(at+i))
W t + i , a t + i
+  n(W t+i ,a t+i,e) (1.5.10)
Further on note that from (1.5.10) it follows readily that the firm’s profit function is 
linear homogeneous in at . By this property, n(W t, a*, e) =  II(Wt, 0, e) -f at , we can drop 
current wealth as a state variable and rewrite equation (1.5.10) as:
n(W t, 0, e) =  max z e -  at+i / r  -  u~ l {Wt -  /3{1 -  s) Wt+i -  (Is U(at+i))
vy t + i , a t + i
+  ^  (flt+i +  II(Wi+i, 0, e)) (1.5.11)
This problem is considerably easier to deal with but still it contains two control variables 
and dimensionality may be an issue even in this case. However by constraining pairs of 
Wt+1 , at+1  to those that satisfy the relevant Euler equations we can go a long way towards 
alleviating this burden. For instance in section 1.2.3 we saw that optimal insurance against 
unemployment (the choice of assets to be more precise ) obeys the following first order 
condition:
=  u'(Ce,t+1)( l  +  i ( ^ - l ) )  =  ^ ^ ( l  +  ^(^-l)) (1.5.12)
s r p K  s r
u’j u - ^ W t  -  0(1 -  s) Wt + 1 -  0 s  U(at+i)))  ! 1 R
PR s r
In turn since u'(cU}t+i)  depends on wealth and is independent of the firm’s optimal policies, 
equation (1.5.13) can be used to determine off corners solutions to the value function 
under limited commitment. When the enforcement constraints bind we know that either 
W t+1  =  U(at+1) or n(W t+i ,a t+i,e ) =  0 and in this case it is again much simpler to 
characterize optimal policies.
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IF  the update 6 1  is close enough to the initial guess 6 0  E X IT . ELSE repeat 
S t e p  1.
Markov Perfect Equilibria with undirected search
S t e p  1. Form an initial guess for the index of tightness 90  and equilibrium payoff 
functions Uo(at) and £lo(at , e) for unemployed and employed workers respectively. 
Choose a large grid of expected utility W  to solve the firm’s auxiliary program 
which can be represented recursively as follows:
1 — s
n  (W,at, e )=  max: z e - w t + — -  n (f t0(af+i), a*+i, e) (1.5.15)
wt ,a t+ i > a  K
Subject to the constraint set:
W  < u ( - a t+i / r  +  at +  wt) +  P(l  -  s)Q(at+i, e) +  /3sU(at+1)
u'{ct) > /?(1 -  s)^at+i +  0sUat+1 With Equality If at + 1 >  0
Notice tha t continuation utility promises must conform with the function 
to be time consistent. Further on if assets are non-contractible (as 
in Krusell et al (2007), Bils et al (2009(a), 2009(b)), the Euler equation is an 
additional constraint to the firm’s program 22 Consistent with the equilibrium is 
the notion that the payoff function of the firm satisfies the following condition:
$ (a t ,e) =  e), at , e)
Standard Methods (say Value function iteration) say can be applied here to obtain 
numerical solutions to the optimal policies.
22The algorithm for non-contractible savings in these two papers doesn’t use the firm’s program 
as I do here. It approximates the function w(a, e) (wages as a function of wealth) and 
solves for assets by maximizing the worker’s utility who takes as given the wage schedule. 
The wages have to be consistent with Nash bargaining. For a detailed description see Bils 
et al (2009(a), 2009(b)).
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S t e p  2. Given the optimal value function, update the employed worker’s 
payoff Q(at , e) by solving the following Nash Bargaining Program:
Qi(at ,e) e  argm ax(W  — U(at))1_7?(II(W, au e))v (1.5.16)w
IF  function Qi(at , e) is close to the initial guess £lo(at , e) proceed to S te p  3 . 
ELSE repeat S te p  1.
S t e p  3. Update the unemployed worker’s value function. This can be accom­
plished by iterating convergence on the following functional equation:
U{at) = max u (—af+i / r  +  at +  b) +  (3 (1 -  f e) U(at+1) +  f e [  ft(at+i, e) d Fe
a t + i > a  J
IF  the update is close enough to the initial guess proceed to St e p  4 . ELSE 
repeat St e p  1.
S t e p  4. Update the value of 9. Given the steady state measures pejCL and pu,a 
for employed and unemployed job seekers over the relevant state space (wealth) 
the zero profit condition for vacant jobs requires:
£ +  j  j  A l u^,a d Fv 0
1.5.3 Equilibria With Directed Search 
Numerical Algorithm
S t e p  1. Choose a grid of profits J  for firms and assets a. Given the para- 
metrization of search costs and the matching technology equilibrium tightness 
solves the zero profit condition (1.3.1). Form an initial guess for the unemployed 
worker’s value function Uo(at) and solve the employed worker’s program by 
iterating convergence on the following functional equation:
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W (a t, J t) = max +  at +  z -  J t +  - — - J t + i )  (1.5.17)
at+i>a,Jt+i r  r
+  {3sU(at+i) +  (3(1 — s)W(at+i, J t + i )
Subject to:
Jt + i  > 0 5 Jt+1 ) >  U(at+1)
Notice th a t this formulation makes use of the fact tha t the promise keeping 
and resource constraints are satisfied with equality. In turn equation (1.5.18) can 
be solved using standard techniques ( i.e value function iteration).
S t e p  2. Update the value function of the unemployed worker by iterating 
convergence on the following functional equation:
U{at) = max +  at +  b) +  0(1 -  f  (0j))U(at+i) + (1 f  (0j )W (a t+i, J)
(1.5.18)
IF  the update U\(at) is close enough to the initial guess Uo(at) E X IT . ELSE 
repeat St e p  1.
Notice th a t once objects U(at) W (at , Jt) converge the equilibrium has been 
computed in the sense that tightness ratios are determined from equation (1.3.1) 
and there is no need to iterate on labour market conditions as in the undirected 
search equilibrium model. On the other hand because optimal allocations are 
computed by maximizing the worker’s utility (as opposed to the firm’s) it is much 
harder to get rid off state variables and make computations more efficient. In the 
next paragraph I outline a way around dimensionality problems that makes the 
value of the firm’s profits J  a permanent state that is relevant on job creation. 
The idea is to combine the worker’s wealth endowment and the promised utility 
to the firm into a composite state variable which I define as cash in hand. Then 
the agent’s program consists of choosing a level of assets and a level of dept 
obligations to the firm and I find that this formulation increases the efficiency of 
computations.
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A modified Program For Directed Search Equilibria
Consider the resource constraint of an employed with a current stock of wealth 
at and a promised present discounted value of profits to the firm equal to J:
(1 — 5)
fl«+i/r  =  a t ~  J  +  % H  ^ — J t+ i ~  ct  (1.5.19)
This section shows that it is possible to make J  a permanent state variable in the 
worker’s optimal control program which facilitates computing numerical solutions 
in the directed search model.
Define Wj = z — J(  1 — ^ p ) to be the constant per period wage that delivers 
the prescribed value J  to the firm (over the infinite horizon) and note that it 
follows from (1.5.19) and the definition of Wj  that:
1 — s
at+i/r = at -  J  + w j  + 1 ~  J) ~  ct (1.5.20)
Define d /)t =  — ^ p (Jt+ i — J) to be the agent’s debt to the firm (issued in the 
current period). Then clearly if J t + 1 > J  the agent front-loads part of the 
compensation and next period enters a state with a lower present discounted 
value of wages. Rearranging we can obtain the budget constraint of the agent for 
this period as:
at+i /r  + ct + d f j  = at + w j  = x t (1.5.21)
In the next period conditional on the survival of the job and given her optimal 
choices, the agent will be in state {Jt+i ,a t+i}, and in the analogy of equation
(1.5.19) forwarded one period, total available resources to finance consumption 
and asset accumulation are: at + 1 +  z — Jt+ i  +  ^ p  Jt+2  Rearranging we can write:
1 — s 1 — s
<h+i +  z  ~  J t+ i  H  R ~ ^ t+ 2  =  a t+ 1  ~*r W j ~  W + i  —  J )  d  R ~ ^ t+ 2  ~  ^  =
  d f tR  1 — 5,
a t +1 +  W j  +  — 1- - - - - - - - - 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Jt + 2  — J)1 — 5 r
The last two terms in equation ( 1.5.22) represent interest payments on firm 
debt outstanding and new debt issued in period 2. Applying the same reasoning 
we can derive the constraint set facing the agent having spend an arbitrary 
amount of time on the job as:
at+i/ R  +  Q +  dfj  =  Xt x t+i = at + 1 + w j  + =  at+i +  w j  +  R fd f tt
65
1 On the Joint Modeling o f Incomplete Asset and Labour Markets
V alue F u n c tio n s  Given the above derivations the employed worker’s program 
can be cast in the following form:
W {xt, J ) =  max u(xt - a t + i / r - d fit) + ( 3 ( 1 - s )W (x t+uJ)  +PsU(at+i)
01+1)“ /, t
(1.5.22)
Subject to the constraint set:
x t+i = W j +  at+i + dfytR f  (1.5.23)
W ( x t+i, J) > f7(Ot+i) - ^ - d f ,t + J >  0 (1.5.24)
1 s
Similarly the unemployed worker’s program can be written as:
U(at) =  max u ( - ? :m + a t+ b ) + P ( l - f (0 j ) )W ( a t+ i+ w j , J )+ ( 3 f ( 0 j ) U ( a t+i) 
a- t +i >a , J  T
(1.5.25)
To conclude this section it is important to make the following remark: by 
writing the program as in equation (1.5.22) it is possible that the agent will
embark upon a path of increasing wealth and indebtness to the firm that would
violate the transversality condition. In the simulations carried out for this chapter 
this was never the case; It is possible to verify ex post that no such violations occur, 
although this may be unnecessary in the presence of participation constraints.
The Treatment of Uncertainty
Consider an extension of the directed search equilibrium of section 1.3.1 that 
allows for different productivities e at the firm level. Assume that productivity 
becomes known after the worker and the entrepreneur meet and that it remains 
constant throughout the life of the match. The representation of the optimal 
contracting problem for a matched worker is analogous to equation (1.3.3), the 
only difference being that that the lifetime utility is of the form W (J t, at , e) (i.e. 
e is added to the list of state variables in the value function).
Unemployed workers also face a similar program in this case. Given that firms 
post contracts summarized in an expected present discount value of profits J  
and the equilibrium tightness ratio Oj will determine the extent of competition 
in this market, then optimal choices of a market segments are made to maximize 
gains from search. Off course since productivity is not known a priori but rather
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revealed when a match is formed and the investments in search are sunk, an 
initial allocation J  (a, e, J) (i.e. a map from initial wealth, productivity and J  to 
expected utility) needs to be defined. For that assume that date zero allocations 
solve the following program:
max E W (a 0, J ( a 0, e, J),e)
J ( a 0,e,J)
Subject to:
J  J { d 0,e, J) d Fe = J
W (d0, J ( d 0, e , J ) , e ) > U { d 0) Ve 
J ( d 0,e ,J)  >  0
In words initial allocations in the current context must adhere to the same 
principle of optimality whereby the workers utility is maximized subject to the 
firm making in expectation J  profits and participation being satisfied for both 
parties. Given the above initial period optimization problem the equilibrium is 
similar to the one described in section 1.3.1 of the text.
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2.1 Introduction
The optimal provision of unemployment insurance by governments has generated 
a voluminous literature since the work of Shavell and Weiss (1978) highlighting a 
central theme: In environments that are fraught with moral hazard allocations 
must be distorted away from optimal risk sharing to provide private incentives. 
Further on in these economies the ability of agents to insure privately against 
fluctuations in labour income is assigned an important role for two reasons; first 
because the range of these insurance opportunities determines the overall welfare 
gains from the UI scheme, and second because, in some cases, private insurance 
makes the implementation of public policy harder by taking away from the planner 
her control over allocations.
These ideas are well understood and yet in most of the relevant theoretical work 
the risk sharing role of private markets is largely understated. For instance there 
are numerous attem pts in the literature that build on the baseline incomplete 
market model of heterogenous agents, where private insurance is simply wealth 
accumulation (as in Hansen and Imhrohoroglu (1992) and Wang and Williamson 
(2002)), and these models are often used to quantify the welfare gains from one 
UI scheme or the other. The problem is that in reality private risk sharing goes 
far beyond that; there is a wealth of instruments in partnerships between workers 
and firms such as severance payments and dismissal delays that can be readily 
used, along with assets, to buffer the risks of unemployment and minimize it’s 
impact on consumption.
To the best of my knowledge no previous effort was made to put these realistic 
margins of insurance in a dynamic model, and understand their im portant 
interactions, and this is precisely the gap I attem pt to bridge with this work. I 
do so by comparing the outcomes of two economies. In the first one agents can 
do no better than to trade non-contingent claims in financial markets subject 
to borrowing constraints and to rely on benefits provided by the government 
to insure against unemployment; In the second firms can provide additional 
insurance by signing contracts with their workforce subject to limited commitment. 
In both economies financial markets axe incomplete but the range of insurance 
opportunities is not the same; I argue that in the second environment contracts can 
in some cases provide complete insurance in a way that other formal instruments 
such as severance payments or dismissal delays become redundant (in fact I 
establish this equivalence).
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In line with the literature of heterogenous agents and wealth accumulation 
I focus on a restricted class of policies. In one experiment I keep constant 
the duration of benefits and allow the planner to choose the replacement ratio. 
In another I let the government choose the level of benefits for two classes of 
unemployed agents; those with duration less than two quarters and those with 
longer durations. In both cases employed workers are burdened with a constant 
tax levi.
I find that the optimal provision of unemployment benefits varies with the range 
of private markets and in particular when firms can remove part of the overall 
uncertainty, the optimal level of benefits is much lower than when no private 
risk sharing (other than simple wealth accumulation) exists. Put differently the 
provision of benefits by governments can crowd out private insurance by the same 
token that in the standard model with incomplete markets, UI payments crowd 
out the precautionary role of assets. Even more important is the result I get for 
the timing of payments; With firm insurance optimal payments are back-loaded in 
the sense that the government sets benefits equal to zero for the first two periods 
of an unemployment spell and positive afterwards, but without firm insurance, 
UI payments have the typical downward sloping path.
None of these implications seems to be qualitatively surprising. For one 
thing the possibility tha t public insurance can crowd out other arrangements 
in the economy has already been addressed in different contexts, and insofar 
as the timing of payments is concerned, the fact tha t workers can save means 
tha t benefits don’t have to be decreasing in the duration of an unemployment 
spell for consumption to be decreasing (Werning (2002), Shimer and Werning
(2005)). Then the important contribution of this work is first that it introduces 
a tractable framework that can be used to quantify the role of unemployment 
insurance provided by governments in the two economies, and second to establish 
quantitatively that optimal policies are indeed different. I argue that the latter is 
not a trivial task since in models where the distribution of agents across the state 
space is endogenously determined, steady state comparisons confound genuine 
differences in the scope of public policy with differences in the distributions and 
the analysis contains an exhaustive account of these issues.
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Related Literature.
There is a large literature that investigates the role of labour market policies such 
as firing costs severance payments and unemployment benefits in economies with 
labour market frictions. Usually these models build on the tradition of the search 
and matching framework and rarely include risk averse consumers that can self 
insure with assets. 1 Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) is the only exception where 
the role of severance payments in a dynamic model with wealth accumulation and 
unemployment benefits is considered but in their economy all forms of insurance 
(other than wealth) are controlled by the government. In contrast my intention 
here is to investigate how the planner’s program changes when all other insurance 
(except benefits) is provided by optimizing firms and the planner takes these 
private policies as given.
Moreover the idea that public policy can crowd out private insurance doesn’t 
appear to be new in the literature. In a different context (with redistributive 
taxation) Krueger and Perri (2006) illustrate how public policy can throw off 
private risk sharing arrangements and reduce welfare. In their model allocations 
are also summarized in contracts with limited commitment but there the role of 
wealth accumulation is secondary since partnerships never break up. When there 
are unemployment risks or to put differently states where agents are beyond the 
reach of their insurance agencies wealth accumulation is important. Furtheron 
Attanasio and Rios Rull (2002) consider an economy where private risk sharing 
occurs between two ex ante identical agents that form a family and risks derive 
from a stochastic labour income process. They show that public insurance th a t 
takes the form of a reduction in the aggregate (family) component of risk has a 
disruptive role on the realm of private risk sharing.
Closer to mine is the work of Pissarides (2004) who considers an environment 
where workers have access to savings and can search for job opportunities whilst 
employed, and uses it to investigate the optimal response of firms when they 
are granted two margins of insurance; one is th a t they can make payments 
contingent on the event of job loss (severance compensation), and another is 
that they can retain their workforce for a given period of time even when jobs 
become unproductive (dismissal delay). The worker employer relationship is 
contaminated with moral hazard in that the firm doesn’t observe the optimal 
search policy of the worker. In some cases, he argues, benefits can crowd out
1See for instance Bentolila and Betrola (1990), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Ljungqvist
(2002).
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private insurance (in particular they can eliminate the incentive to postpone 
layoffs) and this result introduces an array of economically meaningful interactions 
that he discusses. My intention here is different however. I ’m mostly interested 
in aggregate effects and instead of characterizing the optimal response of private 
policies taking public insurance as given, I explore how alternative UI schemes 
affect welfare in economies where some aspects of private insurance are important 
and in economies where they are not.
In the model the arrangement tha t firms and workers use to tradeoff risk is 
made under the following assumptions; Assets are observable and investment 
lies in the same side of the market as wages. There are three reasons for this: 
First it turns out that with limited commitment and exogenous separations asset 
contractibility is a rather innocuous assumption to make 2. Indeed in the simple 
benchmark that delivers the model’s main result standard Euler equations seem 
to hold approximately in the relevant state space, although a modified Euler 
equation applies more generally. Second in macro contexts these assumptions 
are rather common. 3 For instance macroeconomists are not concerned with 
unobservable storage, in the same ways that the literature on optimal allocations 
with incomplete information or moral hazard condemns private savings (Cole and 
Kocherlakota (2001(a), 2001(b)), Werning (2002), Kocherlakota (2004), Abraham 
and Pavoni (2003) ). The focal point of this analysis is not to put limits of private 
risk sharing possibilities but rather to take them as given and investigate how 
they vary when public policy regimes change.
Finally chapter one of this thesis is also part of the related literature; Many of 
the features of the comparison between these two economies, are analogous to the 
contrast between commitment and markov perfect allocations attem pted there. 
For one thing there is a similar ordering of the set of insurance opportunities 
but as before it is impossible to put bounds on risk sharing just by working 
out optimality conditions. This is more of an applied issue and in the analysis 
that follows I look closely at measures that summarize the consumption costs of 
unemployment in the two economies.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the baseline 
model. The framework is a variant of the work Wang and Williamson (2002) that 
features risk sharing opportunities between firms and workers. In the economy 
of section 2.2.1 wage contracts are flat and agents have to rely on self insurance
2See the first chapter of this thesis.
3See Krusell et al (2008) for a model with observable savings and Nash bargaining.
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to alleviate unemployment risks. In section 2.2.2 private partnerships between 
workers and firms provide additional insurance by trading risks optimally. In the 
benchmark separations occur at a constant rate each period, and unemployed 
workers choose the level of effort that determines their reemployment probability 
(standard moral hazard problem). Section 2.3 contains the main results. I 
compare various UI schemes and rank their welfare properties and I find that the 
differences in optimal policy between the two environments are stark. Finally in 
section 2.3.3 I add endogenous separations to the model (as in the original work 
of Wang and Williamson (2002)) by endowing employed workers with a search 
technology that maps effort into job retention. I explain how this addition limits 
the range of insurance opportunities by introducing moral hazard in the worker 
employer relationship, but again I find that the implications of the comparison of 
the two economies are the same.
2.2 The Model.
There is a continuum of infinitely lived risk averse households with the preferences 
of the following form:
oo
- « ( * ) )  (2.2.1)
0
where ct denotes the consumption of a general multipurpose good and v(st) 
denotes the disutility of search in the labour market.4
Each period a fraction e =  1 — u of the economy’s workforce are employed mat­
ched with firms in joint production and the remaining u workers are unemployed 
waiting for suitable employment opportunities to arrive. Such opportunities 
entail the investment of resources in the form of labour market search and each 
unemployed worker possesses a technology tha t maps search effort st in a job 
finding probability 7 j(s t). I use the subscript j  = 0 ,1 ,2 ,.... to denote the 
number of periods that this worker has spent in unemployment ( a worker with 
an index j  is running her j  + 1 period) and this construction permits to match 
the decreasing hazard rate (escape rate from unemployment) in labour market 
data (Wang and Williamson (2002)).
4Notice that with separable utility the first best allocation would feature the same level of 
consumption in employment and unemployment.
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In production an agent is entitled to y units of output per period. Production 
presupposes the collaboration of a worker with a firm th a t is an entity whose 
contribution in output is irrelevant. Since search costs are borne exclusively by 
workers here, it is assumed that firms earn zero profits in expectation when the 
job starts, but there is nothing that precludes active matches from generating 
positive payoffs for firms at longer horizons. Further on employed workers don’t 
search (hence st = 0 for them) but their matches terminate at an exogenous rate 
A per unit of time. When this occurs they become unemployed and an index 
j  = 0 applies for each newly unemployed worker.
In this economy the government provides insurance against unemployment in 
the form of replacement income which is denoted by bj. It depends on the index 
j  to make clear that not all workers are eligible for the scheme. In particular there 
is a maximum horizon m  (duration of non-employment spell ) beyond which the 
unemployed worker’s income is normalized to zero (i.e. bj = 0 V j  > m)  and 
for all j  < m  the level of income received by the worker is a constant b. This 
construction is meant to capture the current UI scheme that operates in most the 
US whereby workers are eligible for benefits for a period up to 26 weeks (Wang 
and Williamson (2002)).
Total resources available to firms and workers are taxed each period and r  
denotes the amount that is levied from the match product. The proceeds are used 
to finance benefits subject to budget balance. If there are e employed workers 
in the economy then it must be that er  =  J2j Ujbj where Uj denotes the total 
number of unemployed workers who are running their j  +  1 period of joblessness. 
Finally financial markets are incomplete and agents can trade non-contingent 
securities subject to an ad hoc limit a. The interest rate on savings is denoted 
by R. The equilibrium in this economy mandates that (3R < 1 for the agent’s 
program to be well defined.
In su ran ce  O p p o rtu n itie s . I consider two environments. In the first one (in 
section 2.2.1) agents can do not better than to accumulate assets to buffer shocks 
in labour income and they can also find comfort in the replacement income b 
provided by the government. Wage contracts are flat in the sense that active jobs 
pay out y  (gross of taxes) each period. In the second (section 2.2.2) firms sign 
contracts with their workforce subject to limited commitment and any timing 
of payments is possible, so long as the equivalent in present discounted value of 
income is delivered to the worker over the life of the match.
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Many of the features of the comparison between these two economies, are 
analogous to the contrast between commitment and markov perfect allocations 
made in the previous chapter. For one thing there is a similar ordering of the 
set of insurance opportunities with which agents are presented; the economy of 
section 2.2.2 features complete insurance in some of the regions of the state space 
(this depends on whether participation binds) and section 2.2.1 has a standard 
incomplete markets model with ad hoc borrowing constraints and uncertain 
labour income and under general conditions these ingredients grant the agents 
with a precautionary savings behavior. 5 Since the technical aspects were laid out 
in the previous chapter, I only summarize some of these features here informally. 
There is one implication that I exploit here much more than previously though; 
that optimal allocations under commitment are attainable with a simple wage 
and severance payment scheme. In fact I establish this equivalence.
In a slight abuse of the term I refer to the economy of section 2.2.1 as the no 
private insurance case. By that I mean that besides wealth accumulation (and 
the precautionary effort that unemployed workers exert) there is no risk sharing 
between workers and their employers in this economy.
2.2.1 No Private Insurance
Consider an environment where insurance opportunities are limited and wage 
contracts are restricted to pay y each period. Let W(a) and U(a,j) denote the 
lifetime utilities for an employed and an unemployed worker respectively (the 
latter running her j th  +  1 period in unemployment) when their current stock of 
wealth is a. Their optimal choices consist of current consumption and, for the 
unemployed agent, a level of search intensity that will determine her probability 
of finding a job in the next period. Applying standard arguments we can represent 
these lifetime utilities recursively as:
Em ployed Workers.
W{a) = max log(c) +  (3 ( A U{a\ 0) +  (1 -  A) W{a')) (2.2.2)
a '> a
5It is possible to show that the latter economy corresponds to a markov perfect contract where 
the share of the worker equals one.
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Subject to the constraint set:
a' =  Ra + y — t  — c (2.2.3)
Unem ployed Workers.
U{a,j) =  max log(c) — •u(s) +  /? 'jj(s) W{a!) +  /?(1 - 7 j 0 0 )  U ( a \ j  + 1)) (2.2.4)
a'>a,s
Subject to the constraint set:
a! = Ra + bj — c (2.2.5)
In the standard notation primes denote next period variables. Notice that 
in (2.2.2) whenever the job is destroyed, which occurs at rate A each period, 
the worker becomes unemployed and an index j  =  0 applies. Further on for 
the unemployed worker if search in the labour market is unsuccessful, then next 
period the state j  is updated deterministically to j  + 1 since in this case the 
worker accumulates an additional period of nonemployment duration.
The implications of this environment for the agent’s optimal policies are well 
understood in the literature. Under standard assumptions uncertainty about 
income coupled with incomplete markets result in a precautionary savings behavior 
whereby the agent will accumulate assets in employment and run them down 
whilst unemployed to minimize the impact of income fluctuations on her private 
consumption path. Further on search in the labour market is an additional margin 
of insurance here and wealthier workers will search less intensively 6 cause they 
can finance current consumption out of wealth. The following paragraph defines 
the competitive equilibrium in this economy.
Recursive Competitive Equilibrium: No Private Insurance Economy
The stationary competitive equilibrium, in the economy without private insurance 
consists of a set of value functions {U(a, j) , W(a)},  and a set of decision rules on 
asset holdings {a'w ^ ,  a!u^aj)}  and an optimal search intensity rule of the form 
s(a,j) .  It also consists of a level of taxes r  and an invariant measure /x of agents 
over the relevant state space (employment status and wealth) such that:
1) Agents optimize: Lifetime utilities solve the functional equations (2.2.2) and
6See Lentz and Tranaes (2005) for discussion of wealth effects on optimal search intensity.
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P e r io d  W a g e s .
fo llo w in g  fu n c t io n a l  e q u a t io n :  7:
W( a, J)  =  m a x  lo g (—a' +  Ra — r  — J  +  y  +  ——— J' — (2.2.13)v '  a',J',z ov R R
+  p(\U (a ' +  -^,0) +  (1 —
S u b je c t  to  th e  c o n s t r a in t  se t:
a' >  a cl + — > a
i t
T h e  fo llo w in g  s im p le  R ic a rd ia n  e q u iv a le n c e  a rg u m e n t  c a n  b e  u se d  to  e s ta b lis h  
t h a t  th e  w o rk e r ’s p ro g ra m  u n d e r  (2.2.14) is th e  sa m e  as t h a t  in  e q u a t io n  (2.2.6): 
In c re a se  w e a lth  fo r th e  e m p lo y e d  w o rk e r b y  ^  a n d  le t t h e  n ew  level o f a s se ts  b e  
a! =  a' -\- A lso  d e c re a se  th e  c o n t in u a t io n  u t i l i ty  J' b y  £ a n d  d e fin e  J =  J' — £. 
T h e n  c le a r ly  W ( a J ' )  =  W( ar, J') s in c e  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  r e s o u rc e s  a v a ila b le  t o  
f in a n c e  c o n s u m p t io n  fo r th e  w o rk e r  n e x t  p e r io d  is u n c h a n g e d . T h u s  a  p ro g r a m  
t h a t  s e ts  £ =  0 a n d  u se s  n e x t  p e r io d ’s  w e a l th  a s  a  s in g le  c o n tro l  v a r ia b le  a s  in  
e q u a t io n  (2 .2 .6 ) is p ay o ff e q u iv a le n t to  o n e  w h e re  b o th  in v e s tm e n t in  w e a lth  a n d
7The promise keeping constraint in this case is given by J  =  y — w +  - ^  J' — The 
formulation of the value function in (2.2.14) makes use of the fact that with log utility the 
promise keeping constraint binds with equality.
81
2 Optimal Unemployment Insurance In The Presence o f Private Insurance
(2.2.4) and optimal policies derive.
2)The invariant measure p  is consistent: In particular the law of motion of p 
can be represented in the following equations:
Pe ,A  — (1 I d  p e a^ + f  nf j { s { a , j ) ) d p u a^j
(e,a) ^  j Ja[u,a,j)^A
pu,A,j =  AX0=0) I d  Pe,a T 0 I (1 3 ^)))^ Pu,a,j—1Ja', .6.4 Jo,', . ,,€A(e,o) —1)
where pe,a ( p u,a) is the marginal cdf for employed (unemployed) workers and T  
is an indicator function.
3) Taxes and benefits are consistent with Budget Balance: e r =  Ylj ujbj
2.2.2 Private Insurance
Consider now an environment whereby instead of constraining active jobs to 
pay out y  each period to workers, wage tenure profiles are optimal. When they 
meet, the firm and the worker enter in a long term agreement that specifies the 
entire path of consumption, wealth and wages (assume th a t there is sufficient 
commitment to adhere to such date zero allocations) and let J  and W(a, J ) 
be the associated payoffs (lifetime utilities) for the two parties. Allocations in
this economy are optimal in the sense that they maximize W (a, J) subject to
delivering an expected present discounted value of profits equal to J  to the firm, 
and in line with the notion tha t there are limits to the scope of commitment, 
efficient outcome paths must satisfy participation by both parties at all future 
dates. This program admits a recursive representation (see Ligon et al (2002)) 
that can be written as follows:
W(a, J) = max log(c) +  (3{\U{a\ 0) +  (1 -  A)W (a \  J')) (2.2.6)
a'>a,J'
Subject to the constraint set:
a ' = Ra + w  — r  — c (2.2.7)
J  < y  — w +  1 ^ J'  (2.2.8)
H
J ’ > 0 (2.2.9)
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W(a!, J') > U(a\  0) (2.2.10)
In equation (2.2.6) the worker solves for a pair of optimal policies for next 
period wealth a' and a continuation utility J' for the firm. Equation (2.2.8) 
is the so called promise keeping constraint that imposes the requirement that 
the firm’s expected profit is at least J  over the life of the match. Further on 
optimal allocations must never violate participation by either firms or workers a 
requirement that is imposed by equations (2.2.9) and (2.2.10). In particular in 
(2.2.10) the worker must be weakly better off than quitting her job and becoming 
unemployed (notice tha t her outside option is the value function U(a',0) ). In 
(2.2.9) the expected profits of the firm next period must be non-negative.
Equilibrium payoffs for unemployed workers solve the following functional 
equation:
U(aJ )  = max log(c) -  v(s) +  (3 ^ ( s )  W {a\  0) +  0(1 -  7 .7+1OO) U ( a f j  +  1))
a ’> a ,s
(2 .2 . 11)
Subject to the constraint set:
a' = Ra + bj — c (2.2.12)
Notice th a t when the job starts it must always be th a t J  = 0 so th a t firms 
make zero profits in expectation as in the model of section 2.2.1. But here it is 
obvious th a t allocations th a t solve equation (2.2.6) can accomplish a lot more 
than in the case of the constrained contracts. Optimal choices of J ' define an 
implicit sequence of transfers (wages) tha t could in principle be different from 
y  at any point in time and in general there is a whole range of outcomes that 
is admissible here, and th a t was not available when contracts were restricted 
to be flat. W ithout loss of generality we can write Wi(a,  0) >  W n i (cl) where 
subscripts I  and N I  denote models of insurance and no insurance respectively.
This type of arrangement whereby a number of agents pool their resources to 
alleviate risks subject to limited commitment is rather common in the literature 
(see Attanasio and Rios Rull (2002), Krueger and Perri (2006)) but what is 
different here is that wealth is an important state variable along with expected 
utility J. Most of the relevant literature analyzes the implications of limited risk 
sharing in economies where there are two (or more) ex ante identical agents and
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private partnerships never dissolve. In contrast in the current context, at rate 
A each period the worker and the firm separate and wealth is the only way to 
contract upon unemployment.
Implications.
Chapter one of this thesis examined the implications of a risk sharing arrangement 
between workers and firms tha t was, at least technically, very similar the one 
I use here. I showed that incomplete (limited commitment contracts) provide 
some insurance against unemployment but there were also regions of the state 
space where complete insurance obtained (that depended critically on whether 
the participation constraints were slack). These conditions continue to hold in 
this context.
The timing of payments was shown to be central to the notion that firms could 
alleviate the risks of unemployment and this feature is summarized in Figure 
2.1. It shows wages in the first two periods of the optimal contract (borne out 
of the baseline calibration of this chapter) along with the analogous objects of 
an arrangement tha t ignores the constraints in equations (2.2.9) and (2.2.10) 
altogether (more precisely the full commitment solution).
The gap between the two first period wage functions indicates the range of 
investment possibilities in these two cases. Complete (full commitment) contracts 
offer higher compensation against unemployment, by allowing the worker to 
accumulate more savings but they violate participation and the two paths differ 
precisely where the desired provision of insurance makes the worker better off in 
unemployment (the marginal gains from investment are higher when the wealth 
endowment is low).
There were also other implications but one that is particularly important here 
is that in this simple environment it is possible to implement allocations that solve 
the worker’s program in (2.2.6) using severance payments as an alternative margin 
of insurance. I establish this in this chapter (I only mentioned this property 
preciously) by showing that whenever wealth and severance payments (the latter 
is denoted by £) are part of the worker’s optimal control variables, they are 
perfect substitutes and th a t there always exists a payoff equivalent allocation 
that sets f  =  0 as in (2.2.6).
To see this consider first a model th a t features complete contracts and both 
margins of insurance are available to the firm. Optimal allocations then solve the
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fo llo w in g  fu n c t io n a l  e q u a t io n :  7:
W ( a , J )  =  m a x  lo g (—a' +  R a  — r  — J  +  y  +  — —— J '  — (2 .2 .1 3 )
v '  a',J',z ov R  R
+  p ( \ U ( a '  +  - ^ ,0 )  +  (1 —
S u b je c t  to  th e  c o n s t r a in t  se t:
a' >  a  cl + — > a
i t
T h e  fo llo w in g  s im p le  R ic a rd ia n  e q u iv a le n c e  a rg u m e n t  c a n  b e  u se d  to  e s ta b lis h  
t h a t  th e  w o rk e r ’s p ro g ra m  u n d e r  (2 .2 .1 4 ) is th e  sa m e  as t h a t  in  e q u a t io n  (2 .2 .6 ): 
In c re a se  w e a lth  fo r th e  e m p lo y e d  w o rk e r b y  ^  a n d  le t t h e  n ew  level o f a s se ts  b e  
a! =  a ' -\- A lso  d e c re a se  th e  c o n t in u a t io n  u t i l i ty  J '  b y  £ a n d  d e fin e  J  =  J '  — £. 
T h e n  c le a r ly  W ( a J ' )  =  W ( a r, J ' )  s in c e  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  r e s o u rc e s  a v a ila b le  t o  
f in a n c e  c o n s u m p t io n  fo r th e  w o rk e r  n e x t  p e r io d  is u n c h a n g e d . T h u s  a  p ro g r a m  
t h a t  s e ts  £ =  0 a n d  u se s  n e x t  p e r io d ’s  w e a l th  a s  a  s in g le  c o n tro l  v a r ia b le  a s  in  
e q u a t io n  (2 .2 .6 ) is p ay o ff e q u iv a le n t to  o n e  w h e re  b o th  in v e s tm e n t in  w e a lth  a n d
7The promise keeping constraint in this case is given by J =  y — w +  - ^  J' — The
formulation of the value function in (2.2.14) makes use of the fact that with log utility the
promise keeping constraint binds with equality.
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on following Wang and Williamson the real rate of return on savings is set to 
zero so that agents in the economy have access to a simple storage technology.
I assume tha t the search functions are of the following standard form: 7 j = 
1 — e(~7jS) and the cost function is quadratic (i.e t;(s) =  s6 where 8 = 2 ) .  The 
parameters 7 j for j  = 0 , 1 , 2 ,... are calibrated to match certain observations in 
the US. In particular Wang and Williamson (2 0 0 2 ) use a sample from the CPS 
spanning the years 1977-87 and find an unemployment rate of 7.5 % and of these 
workers approximately 70 % have had a duration in unemployment of a quarter 
or less and 15 % between one and two quarters. For these observations it suffices 
to let the reemployment probability drift between the first and second quarters 
of an unemployment spell and then remain constant; I obtain 7 0  =  1.81 (1.855) 
and 7 >i =  .62 (.6 8 ) for the economy of section 2.2.1 ( 2.2.2) respectively. With 
these choices there are three relevant value functions for the unemployed worker 
to consider, and one for employed agents and this reduces the computational 
burden considerably. Finally separations in the model are pinned down by the 
requirement tha t 70 % of unemployed workers are in state j  = 0. The implied 
value is A =  .0568.
As the baseline UI scheme I adopt the calibration of Wang and Williamson 
(2002) whereby the worker earns 50 % of gross after tax income in the first two 
quarters of her spell and zero afterwards. Hence the replacement income is of 
the following form: bj = .5 For j  = 0,1 and bj = 0 For j  > 2. Table (1) 
summarizes these choices.
Ta ble  2.1: T he m odel  para m eter s  (quarterly  va lu es)
P a ra m e te r Sym bol B aseline
Time Preference /3 .99
Real Rate R -  1 0
Replacement Rate b .5
Separation Rate A 0.0568
Search Cost Function 5 2
Search Technology 7 7o, 7>i (see text)
There is a number of im portant features tha t are missing from this analysis. 
The first is that all newly unemployed workers in the economy are eligible for the 
UI scheme, whilst in reality only a fraction of them qualify for benefits 11. This
11 Wang and Williamson (2002) calibrate the fraction of eligible workers to 30% which is the
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severance payments are allowed.
Under limited commitment m atters are more complicated but we can always 
construct examples where the constraint set is such that allowing for severance 
payments makes no difference for optimal allocations. For instance two such 
participation constraints are given by the following equations:
/ - £ >  0 W ( a ' , J ' ) > U ( a '  + ± , 0)
R
These objects mandate that next period profits are such that the employer would 
never find it profitable to dissolve the match and pay £ to the worker, and 
th a t the worker would not want to quit her job and become unemployed when 
her resources in that state are given by a' +  Under these conditions the 
equivalence between assets and severance payments as vehicles of insurance is 
straightforward to establish. 8
A corollary from this is that the optimal transfers shown in Figure 2 .1  are the 
result of the particular insurance arrangement considered here and th a t under 
alternative mechanisms one can get more realistic wage profiles out of the model. 
Private risk sharing can be reinterpreted as a simple wage and severance payment 
scheme and off course the empirical relevance of this arrangement is obvious. 9 
The caveat from this analysis is that since severance compensation is not uniquely 
defined in the model it is also difficult to have an empirical evaluation of the range 
of private insurance opportunities in the economy (although imperfect measures 
can be constructed).
Finally note that wherever through wealth or severance payments (or any mix­
ture between the two), limited commitment contracts feature complete insurance, 
tha t doesn’t  mean that the worker’s entire consumption path is unaffected by 
the risk of job separations. On the contrary since in unemployment the worker is 
beyond the reach of the firm, her consumption will fall (it just won’t fall in the 
first period of the spell if insurance is perfect) through standard wealth effects as 
she runs down her stock of assets. That is to say that in this economy there is still
8Note however that an outside option W{a! , J') > U { a '  +  £, 0) may not be realistic here in 
the sense that when the worker quits she may not be entitled to severance compensation. 
A constraint of the form W(af,J') >  U(a \  0) however would make an allocation between 
assets and severance payments non neutral since by increasing £ and lowering a' the 
worker’s participation constraint is relaxed.
9For instance Chetty and Saez (2009) use a sample from a survey conducted by Mathematica 
on behalf of the department of Labor and find that 15 % of newly unemployed workers 
receive severance compensation. See also Pissarides (2004).
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ample room for public policy to alleviate the welfare costs of prolonged periods 
of joblessness. This is an implication that will prove to be particularly important 
for the optimal timing of UI payments considered in section 2.3.2 that contains 
the baseline results. The next paragraph defines the competitive equilibrium.
Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The stationary competitive equilibrium consists of a set of value functions 
{[/(aj), W(a^ )}  for employed and unemployed workers respectively, and a set 
of decision rules on asset holdings {a'w (a j )-> a 'u (a , j ) }  and continuation values 
( J[a,J)) and search intensity ( s(a,j)).  It also consists of a level of taxes r  and 
an invariant measure /z of agents across assets, employment status and (promised 
value to firms) such that:
1 ) Agents optimize: (U(ajj), W(a,j)} solve functional equations 2 .2 .6  and 2 .2 .1 1  
above and optimal policies derive.
2 ) Taxes and benefits are consistent with Budget Balance: e r  =  ^  Ujbj
3) The measure /z is consistent: In particular the law of motion of /z can be 
represented as: 10
^ { e , A , J )  —  ( 1  /  d  f l ( e}a , J ) + Z o £ j  ^  I l j ( s { a i j ) ) d  ^ ( u , a , j )
( e , o , J ) G ’J  j  J a (u , a , j ) ^ A
(^u,A,j) =  /  d  /i,(e)a)tj)+X j>o /  ( l —/y j ( s ( a , j —l ) ) )d  fi(u,a,j-i)
J a {e,a,J)€ A  (u,a,j — 1) ^
2.3 Numerical Analysis
2.3.1 Calibration
I briefly explain the choice of parameters and functional forms: Since one period 
in the model corresponds to one quarter, the time preference parameter (3 is set 
to .99. Choosing a long horizon serves to make computations more manageable 
and for the case in hand it doesn’t seem to m atter for the conclusions. Further
10Notice that expected utility J  is part of the relevant state space here.
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on following Wang and Williamson the real rate of return on savings is set to 
zero so that agents in the economy have access to a simple storage technology.
I assume tha t the search functions are of the following standard form: 7 j = 
1 — e(~7jS) and the cost function is quadratic (i.e t;(s) =  s6 where 8 = 2 ) .  The 
parameters 7 j for j  = 0 , 1 , 2 ,... are calibrated to match certain observations in 
the US. In particular Wang and Williamson (2 0 0 2 ) use a sample from the CPS 
spanning the years 1977-87 and find an unemployment rate of 7.5 % and of these 
workers approximately 70 % have had a duration in unemployment of a quarter 
or less and 15 % between one and two quarters. For these observations it suffices 
to let the reemployment probability drift between the first and second quarters 
of an unemployment spell and then remain constant; I obtain 7 0  =  1.81 (1.855) 
and 7 >i =  .62 (.6 8 ) for the economy of section 2.2.1 ( 2.2.2) respectively. With 
these choices there are three relevant value functions for the unemployed worker 
to consider, and one for employed agents and this reduces the computational 
burden considerably. Finally separations in the model are pinned down by the 
requirement tha t 70 % of unemployed workers are in state j  = 0. The implied 
value is A =  .0568.
As the baseline UI scheme I adopt the calibration of Wang and Williamson 
(2002) whereby the worker earns 50 % of gross after tax income in the first two 
quarters of her spell and zero afterwards. Hence the replacement income is of 
the following form: bj = .5 For j  = 0,1 and bj = 0 For j  > 2. Table (1) 
summarizes these choices.
Ta ble  2.1: T he m odel  para m eter s  (quarterly  va lu es)
P a ra m e te r Sym bol B aseline
Time Preference /3 .99
Real Rate R -  1 0
Replacement Rate b .5
Separation Rate A 0.0568
Search Cost Function 5 2
Search Technology 7 7o, 7>i (see text)
There is a number of im portant features tha t are missing from this analysis. 
The first is that all newly unemployed workers in the economy are eligible for the 
UI scheme, whilst in reality only a fraction of them qualify for benefits 11. This
11 Wang and Williamson (2002) calibrate the fraction of eligible workers to 30% which is the
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would be an important addition if the focal point here was to assess the welfare 
implications of currently active policies in the US, but rather the purpose is to 
compare the outcomes of two economies that offer a different menu of insurance 
opportunities. Further on making this consideration part of the analysis would 
raise additional concerns for how eligibility and non eligibility can be handled in 
an economy with contracts, because there optimal policies could in principle be 
contingent on the outcome of this lottery. Such additions would complicate the 
analysis unnecessarily without being clear how they would affect the ordering of 
policies.
The second important omission is capital and there is a good reason why market 
clearing conditions for private savings are not part of my analysis here. The work 
of Young (2004) shows that capital overwhelms the welfare calculations, and 
always the optimal UI scheme features zero benefits. This in my case would throw 
off any meaningful comparison between the two economies. The intuition for this 
result is simple; when b increases precautionary savings fall and lower equilibrium 
capital labour ratios result in lower productivity for active jobs. On the other 
hand search theory is filled with examples that produce the converse implication 
(just think of a model with a distribution of productivity and reservation wage 
policies) and there is no reason to draw the line by including one feature and 
leaving out the rest. I leave all these possibilities to future work.
W elfare C rite rio n . To evaluate optimal policies I assume tha t the social 
planner assigns equal weight to all agents in the economy. The welfare criterion 
is of the form:
© =  I lU(fl) d fie,a “h ^ ] I U(a,j)d fin,a,j
J . J
and denotes the ex ante utility of the typical agent in the economy. 12 Further on 
to rank the various policies I convert the welfare numbers in terms of percentage 
consumption using the following calculation:
0 i  =  ©o +  Y Z T p  +  e)
corresponding observation for the US economy
12With optimal contracts the relevant state space includes expected utility of the firm so that:
0  — J* VF(a, i/) d fie,a,j t  U(a, j )d  fiu,a,j
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Where ©o is the expected utility in the baseline case and ©i is the analogous 
object under the new policy regime. The fraction e is a standard measure of 
compensated variation. After each policy change I compute the value of e to 
give sense of the magnitude of the associated gains or losses.
2.3.2 Results
There are three dimensions for optimal policy considered in this section. First I 
determine the level of optimal benefits in the two economies when duration is 
kept constant at two quarters. Then I let the duration of payments be indefinite 
and I determine the optimal permanent UI scheme. Finally I consider a less 
constrained optimal policy, one that keeps b constant for two periods and sets a 
(potentially different) level of benefits for higher durations.
The result that comes out of the analysis is that the range of private insurance 
sets the scope of optimal public policy. I find th a t the level of benefits is lower 
when firms can give additional insurance than in the simple incomplete market 
economy with wealth accumulation. Further on the shape of optimal payments 
is different in the two economies with the economy of section 2 .2 .1  having the 
typical front-loaded payment scheme whilst in that of section 2 .2 .2  (with contracts) 
payments are typically zero for the first two quarters of an unemployment spell 
and positive afterwards.
Section 2.3.2 assigns an interpretation to these differences by looking at the 
risk sharing role of private markets and the shape of the worker’s policy functions 
for consumption and search, that determine the wealth distribution. The latter 
object is central to any meaningful comparison, for in a steady state the asset 
holdings of unemployed workers determine the gains for public insurance. There 
is much less dispersion in wealth in the baseline incomplete market economy and 
to understand whether the differences are important for the results I perform the 
following simple experiment: I let the government choose the optimal permanent 
level of benefits and a constant tax  levi for each worker as a function of her 
employment status and wealth, subject to the scheme being self financing. This 
is a different requirement than having to rely on the distribution to finance 
unemployment compensation and in fact it is similar (dual) to the more standard 
program considered in the literature. The finding is that preferred benefits are
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F ig u r e  2 .2 : P e r c e n t a g e  D r o p  in  C o n s u m p t io n : 2 E c o n o m ie s .
F ig u r e  2 .2  m a k e s  th i s  p o in t  b y  p lo t t i n g  t h e  d r o p  in  c o n s u m p t io n  a s  a  f u n c t io n  
o f  w e a l th  a s s o c ia te d  w i th  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a  jo b  lo ss  ( th e s e  v a lu e s  a r e  b o r n e  o u t  o f  
t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e  c a l ib r a t io n ) .  W h e n  w a g e s  a r e  f la t  (n o  r is k  s h a r in g  w i th  f irm s )  
a g e n ts  h a v e  to  re ly  o n  th e i r  sa v in g s  to  in s u re  a g a in s t  u n e m p lo y m e n t a n d  in  th i s  
c a s e  c o n s u m p t io n  d r o p s  s ig n if ic a n t ly  e v e n  fo r  th o s e  w h o  h a v e  s to r e d  su f f ic ie n t  
w e a lth . O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d  w ith  o p t im a l  c o n t r a c t s  th e r e  a re  re g io n s  o f  th e  s t a t e  
sp a c e  w h e re  c o m p le te  in s u ra n c e  o b ta in s  a n d  th e  d ro p  in  c o n s u m p tio n  in  th e  f ir s t  
p e r io d  o f  u n e m p lo y m e n t  is z e ro . I n  t h e  f i r s t  c a s e  t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e  a l lo c a t io n  is  
su c h  t h a t  c o n s u m p t io n  fa lls  o n  a v e ra g e  b y  r o u g h ly  17%  fo r n e w ly  u n e m p lo y e d  
w o rk e rs , w h ils t  in  t h e  l a te r  th i s  s t a t i s t i c  is in  th e  o rd e r  o f  7% .
T a b le  (2 .3 ) s u m m a r iz e s  th i s  f e a tu r e  a n d  in d ic a te s  h o w  c h a n g e s  in  t h e  le v e l 
o f  b e n e f i t s  im p a c t  o n  p r iv a te  c o n s u m p t io n  fo r  u n e m p lo y e d  w o rk e rs  a t  v a r io u s  
h o r iz o n s . T h e  f i r s t  th r e e  c o lu m n s  re fe r  t o  t h e  p e rc e n ta g e  d r o p  f ro m  o n e  p e r io d  
to  th e  n e x t  fo r th e  ty p ic a l  w o rk e r  h o ld in g  h e r  w e a lth  c o n s ta n t .  F o r in s ta n c e  th e  
c o lu m n  la b e le d  1 s t is  th e  a v e ra g e  lo ss  fo r  w o rk e rs  w h o  a r e  r u n n in g  t h e i r  f i r s t  
q u a r t e r  in  u n e m p lo y m e n t,  a n d  fa il t o  f in d  a  jo b  n e x t  p e r io d , b u t  h a v e  th e  s a m e  
level o f  a s se ts .
T h e r e  a r e  th r e e  p o in ts  t h a t  m e r i t  a t t e n t io n ;  F i r s t  w h e n  b e n e f i ts  d e c re a s e  t o  
z e ro  n e w ly  u n e m p lo y e d  w o rk e rs  (c o lu m n  la b e le d  E U ) su ffe r  s u b s ta n t i a l ly  m o r e  
losses in  o n e  e c o n o m y  th a n  in  th e  o th e r . W i th o u t  p r iv a te  in su ra n c e  o p p o r tu n i t ie s
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much lower in the economy with private risk sharing which I interpret as an 
indication th a t the impact of the wealth distribution on the ranking of optimal 
policies is of second order.
Optimal Policy.
Sim ple Policies. The baseline results for optimal policy are summarized in 
table 2 .2 . The first row presents the optimal level of UI in the two economies 
when payments are constrained to be constant for two quarters and then zero 
forever and the associated welfare gains in terms of the value of e. With flat wage 
contracts (no insurance) the value of b tha t maximizes ex ante welfare is equal 
to 1.81 but when insurance opportunities include risk sharing between workers 
and firms (as in the model of section 2.2.2) the optimal replacement ratio is 1.32. 
With permanent benefits (second row) these numbers are .47 and .39 respectively.
Table  2.2: O ptim al  P olicy
Insurance No Insurance
b, 6>i Gains e b, b> i Gains e
2  Quarters (1.32 , 0.00) .40% (1.81 , 0 .0 0 ) .40%
Permanent (0.39 , 0.39) .59% (0.47 , 0.47) .50%
Unconstrained (0.00 , 0.46) .63% (0.95 , 0.38) .63%
No UI (0 .0 0  , 0 .0 0 ) -.03% (0 .0 0 , 0 .0 0 ) -.2 1 %
To give sense of the magnitude of welfare gains that accrue to the economy’s 
workforce in steady state, the second and fourth columns of Table 2.2 report 
the value of e. For both regimes a move to the optimal policy with benefits 
that last for two quarters, is associated with a .40 % gain in welfare whereas 
with permanent benefits the gains are .59 % and 50% with and without private 
insurance respectively. These gains are not too large but they are still an order of 
magnitude larger than what Wang and Williamson (2002) get out of their model 
and there are two reasons for this; first in their calibration roughly 70% of all 
newly unemployed workers are not eligible for benefits and second workers can 
exert search effort on the job to avoid unemployment. W ith separations being 
exogenous here, and eligibility not being an issue, it is no wonder that changes in 
b have a larger impact on welfare, since workers face more risks when employed,
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and the scope of the gains from public insurance is wider to include all newly 
unemployed workers.
Finally the last row of Table 2 .2  presents the percentage losses from a policy 
that sets benefits equal to zero in the two economies. Relative to the benchmark 
these losses are minuscule with private risk sharing and they are substantially 
larger without, which seems to suggest tha t private and public insurance axe 
substitutes and that when the government steps down private employers step in 
to insure their workforce.
To understand these results notice that both economies present the planner 
with the following tradeoff: First to minimize the cost of the scheme optimal 
policy must invoke a penalty against long term unemployment (this is a standard 
moral hazard interpretation). Second since search becomes much less effective 
after a quarter spent in unemployment, part of the planner’s objective is to 
minimize the loss of utility associated with long durations. For a policy that 
lasts for two quarters this means that benefits must be high enough to allow the 
agent to build a buffer against these risks, but then again such a policy cannot 
be optimal since the cost of financing insurance unconditionally for everyone is 
much larger than financing it conditionally for those who fail to find a job. This 
is why permanent benefits can perform so much better.
To address these possibilities I turn to a more flexible policy, one that allows the 
planner to treat differently the short and long term unemployed, and investigate 
whether it can engineer even larger gains by virtue of optimizing along the 
important timing dimension; There is an additional reason why such a comparison 
is important between the two economies; since contracts can go a long way towards 
insuring the worker against short term  unemployment (I give a quantitative 
assessment of how far later on) the main concern becomes to manage utility 
losses for the long term unemployed and in this environment there could be large 
differences in the optimal timing of payments stemming from the insurance role 
of private markets.
F lexib le  Policy. I consider the following experiment: I introduce replacement 
income for agents with durations that exceed two periods which I denote by 6>i, 
and I let the planner choose b and 6>i to maximize welfare subject to budget 
balance. The results are stacked in the third row of Table 2.2 . Optimal policies 
in the absence of private insurance do indeed have the typical shape. They are 
front-loaded since part of the planner’s concern is to minimize the costs of the
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scheme by penalizing long durations of unemployment. W ith private contracts 
however they are zero for the first two quarters and positive (equal to  .46 ) 
indefinitely after.
I give the following interpretation to these results; First, when workers can 
save, UI benefits need not be decreasing for consumption to be decreasing and 
indeed under both arrangements consumption falls through standard wealth 
effects when agents run down their assets. In principle in this environment any 
timing of payments could be optimal (Werning (2002), Shimer and Werning 
(2004)); Second the difference between the two economies is again th a t with 
private contracts the role of insurance against unemployment is partly assigned 
to firms and thus benefits need not be large for consumption smoothing at least 
in the first period of an unemployment spell. Although the cost of insurance per 
worker increases with the duration of her spell (since search is more ineffective 
along this dimension) the cost to a society of financing the scheme out of the 
distribution of workers is not. In the calibration of both economies there are 
substantially more workers unemployed up to than more than 2  quarters and by 
setting b = 0  in an environment with private contracts the planner saves a lot in 
the tax levi.
How robust are these predictions to changes in the institutional environment, 
or to more complicated UI schemes (say a scheme that sets a potentially different 
level of benefits in every quarter) is a point tha t merits considerable attention 
from future work. For instance I find tha t there is a large range of payment 
schedules th a t perform almost as well as  the policy th a t sets (b, b>i) =  (0,46) 
but their allocations and the prediction on who gains who doesn’t amongst 
the population differ substantially. It is important however to realize th a t the 
central message of this section is that in the context of an economy where private 
and public insurance margins coexist the government would like to devise more 
complicated mechanisms to minimize its interference with private markets. Here 
more complicated mechanisms have an obvious form; they are related to the 
timing of benefits and by postponing benefits the government leaves ample scope 
for private insurance and minimizes the costs of financing the UI scheme.
Understanding The Result.
A llocations an d  C o n su m p tio n  Losses. The range of private insurance op­
portunities lies at the heart of the differences in the scope of public policy here.
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F ig u r e  2 .2 : P e r c e n t a g e  D r o p  in  C o n s u m p t io n : 2 E c o n o m ie s .
F ig u r e  2 .2  m a k e s  th i s  p o in t  b y  p lo t t i n g  t h e  d r o p  in  c o n s u m p t io n  a s  a  f u n c t io n  
o f  w e a l th  a s s o c ia te d  w i th  t h e  e v e n t  o f  a  jo b  lo ss  ( th e s e  v a lu e s  a r e  b o r n e  o u t  o f  
t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e  c a l ib r a t io n ) .  W h e n  w a g e s  a r e  f la t  (n o  r is k  s h a r in g  w i th  f irm s )  
a g e n ts  h a v e  to  re ly  o n  th e i r  sa v in g s  to  in s u re  a g a in s t  u n e m p lo y m e n t a n d  in  th i s  
c a s e  c o n s u m p t io n  d r o p s  s ig n if ic a n t ly  e v e n  fo r  th o s e  w h o  h a v e  s to r e d  su f f ic ie n t  
w e a lth . O n  th e  o th e r  h a n d  w ith  o p t im a l  c o n t r a c t s  th e r e  a re  re g io n s  o f  th e  s t a t e  
sp a c e  w h e re  c o m p le te  in s u ra n c e  o b ta in s  a n d  th e  d ro p  in  c o n s u m p tio n  in  th e  f ir s t  
p e r io d  o f  u n e m p lo y m e n t  is z e ro . I n  t h e  f i r s t  c a s e  t h e  s t e a d y  s t a t e  a l lo c a t io n  is  
su c h  t h a t  c o n s u m p t io n  fa lls  o n  a v e ra g e  b y  r o u g h ly  17%  fo r n e w ly  u n e m p lo y e d  
w o rk e rs , w h ils t  in  t h e  l a te r  th i s  s t a t i s t i c  is in  th e  o rd e r  o f  7% .
T a b le  (2 .3 ) s u m m a r iz e s  th i s  f e a tu r e  a n d  in d ic a te s  h o w  c h a n g e s  in  t h e  le v e l 
o f  b e n e f i t s  im p a c t  o n  p r iv a te  c o n s u m p t io n  fo r  u n e m p lo y e d  w o rk e rs  a t  v a r io u s  
h o r iz o n s . T h e  f i r s t  th r e e  c o lu m n s  re fe r  t o  t h e  p e rc e n ta g e  d r o p  f ro m  o n e  p e r io d  
to  th e  n e x t  fo r th e  ty p ic a l  w o rk e r  h o ld in g  h e r  w e a lth  c o n s ta n t .  F o r in s ta n c e  th e  
c o lu m n  la b e le d  1 s t is  th e  a v e ra g e  lo ss  fo r  w o rk e rs  w h o  a r e  r u n n in g  t h e i r  f i r s t  
q u a r t e r  in  u n e m p lo y m e n t,  a n d  fa il t o  f in d  a  jo b  n e x t  p e r io d , b u t  h a v e  th e  s a m e  
level o f  a s se ts .
T h e r e  a r e  th r e e  p o in ts  t h a t  m e r i t  a t t e n t io n ;  F i r s t  w h e n  b e n e f i ts  d e c re a s e  t o  
z e ro  n e w ly  u n e m p lo y e d  w o rk e rs  (c o lu m n  la b e le d  E U ) su ffe r  s u b s ta n t i a l ly  m o r e  
losses in  o n e  e c o n o m y  th a n  in  th e  o th e r . W i th o u t  p r iv a te  in su ra n c e  o p p o r tu n i t ie s
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agents in the two economies. When private contracts are present firms encourage 
the accumulation of wealth by front-loading part of the compensation to newly 
employed workers whereas without private risk sharing wealth accumulation can 
only be financed out of current consumption for these workers. Smaller differences 
in the ratios ^  also reflect this timing but these don’t  have any allocational 
implication whatsoever; if say insurance was given through severance payments 
which is an equivalent margin of insurance here, then unemployed workers would 
hold more assets but all other statistics (unemployment rates, durations etc.) 
would be unaffected.
I conclude the following from this analysis; Although the model of section
2 .2 .2  doesn’t permit to construct empirical measures of the extent of private risk 
sharing in the economy (such as severance payments relative to income say), 
imperfect measures can be constructed (i.e. consumption losses in unemployment) 
and these indicate that the insurance role of private markets is important. Further 
on equilibrium allocations are also different in a way that raises some concern of 
whether the differences in optimal policy axe partly attributed to differences in 
the steady state distribution. This is a possibility th a t I scrutinize in the next 
paragraph.
T h e  W ealth  D is tr ib u tio n . Figure 2.3 describes the distribution of assets 
in the two economies. It shows fractions of agents as a function of the ratio 
of current wealth to the steady state level of wealth in the economy without 
private contracts (which is equal to 1.05). 13 There are large differences in the 
distribution of agents over the relevant state space. For instance the standard 
incomplete market model (red bars) predicts that most agents cluster in the 
region where wealth is between .75 and 1.25 relative to the average. With private 
insurance (blue bars) there is a lot more dispersion in outcomes; more agents near 
the borrowing constraint but also a lot more holding higher levels of wealth.
To understand these differences it is important to look at some of the features of 
the calibrated solution in the two economies. Figure 2.4 plots the consumption for 
unemployed workers for the economy with private insurance. Under the baseline 
calibration agents decrease consumption between periods one and two because 
the search technology deteriorates, and a further cut back takes place after the 
second quarter since government benefits drop to zero thereafter. Further on the
13This serves to make the two distributions more comparable since mean assets differ in the
two economies.
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F i g u r e  2 .3 :  S t e a d y  S t a t e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  W e a l t h .
a n a lo g o u s  fu n c t io n s  fo r  u n e m p lo y e d  a g e n ts  in  t h e  in c o m p le te  m a r k e t  e c o n o m y  
o f  s e c t io n  2 .2 .1  t u r n e d  o u t  t o  b e  v e ry  s im i la r  ( s in c e  t h e  e n v ir o n m e n ts  p r e s e n t  
u n e m p lo y e d  a g e n ts  w ith  a  s im ila r  p ro g ra m ) .
W h a t  e x p la in s  th e  d iffe ren ces in  a llo c a tio n s  is th e  b e h a v io r  o f em p lo y e d  a g e n ts . 
In  F ig u re  2 .5  I g r a p h  th e s e  p o lic ie s  sh o w in g  t h a t  th e r e  is a  la rg e  g a p  in  t e r m s  o f  
th e  o v e ra ll level o f c o n s u m p tio n  fo r th e  g e n e ric  w o rk e r b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  eco n o m ies . 
C o n s u m p t io n  is  s u b s ta n t i a l ly  h ig h e r  a t  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  jo b  fo r  a n  a g e n t  in  
t h e  in s u r a n c e  e c o n o m y  b e c a u s e  t h e  o p t im a l  c o n t r a c t  p r e s c r ib e s  a  p a t h  t h a t  is  
d e c r e a s in g  o v e r  t im e  a n d  w e a l th  c a n  b e  f in a n c e d  th r o u g h  h ig h e r  in i t i a l  w a g e s . 
In  t h e  in c o m p le te  m a r k e t  o f  s e c t io n  2 .2 .1  t h e  o p t im a l  b e h a v io r  is  t o  c o n s u m e  
l i t t l e  a t  th e  s t a r t  o f  th e  jo b , a c c u m u la te  a s s e ts  a n d  t h e n  a f te r  a  su ffic ie n t b u f fe r  
is b u i ld ,  c o n s u m p tio n  a n d  w e a lth  s ta y  c o n s ta n t .
T h e s e  f e a tu r e s  e x p la in  t h e  s h a p e  o f  th e  w e a l th  d i s t r ib u t io n s  sh o w n  in  F ig u r e
2 .3 . I n  e ffec t in  t h e  p r iv a te  in s u r a n c e  m o d e l  o f  s e c t io n  2 .2 .2  a g e n ts  t h a t  a r e  
’lu c k y ’ e n o u g h  to  e x p e r ie n c e  f r e q u e n t  t r a n s i t io n s  a c ro s s  la b o u r  m a r k e t  s t a t e s  
( e m p lo y m e n t  a n d  u n e m p lo y m e n t)  w ill a lso  h o ld  h ig h e r  le v e ls  o f  w e a l th .  T h i s  
im p l ic a t io n  is  n o t  c o u n te r f a c tu a l  a n d  in  f a c t  i t  is  t h a t  is  n o t  a t  o d d s  e v e n  w i th  
c o n v e n tio n a l in c o m p le te  m a rk e t  m o d e ls , s in ce  th e re  th o s e  a g e n ts  t h a t  face  h ig h e r  
r isk s  o f  u n e m p lo y m e n t w ill a lso  h a v e  a  s t ro n g e r  p re c a u t io n a ry  sa v in g s  m o tiv e . I t  
is in c o n s is te n t  how ev er w ith  a n  eco n o m y  w h e re  a ll a g e n ts  face  th e  sa m e  s e p a ra t io n
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the percentage drop given the wealth distribution is 23% when 6 =  0 and 17% 
in the baseline economy. W ith private insurance these numbers are 7.9% and 
7.7 % respectively. Second the drop in consumption from the first to the second 
quarter comes from the change in the search technology and the deterioration 
of reemployment prospects for the typical worker. Then the possibility of long 
term unemployment is much more imminent (or the drop in expected permanent 
income larger) and the worker needs to account for this in her optimal path. 
Finally consumption between the second and third quarters drops when benefits 
are positive but not when they are zero because in the latter case the worker’s 
conditions in terms of income or search remain the same.
Aggregating these statistics over all periods would seem to suggest that changes 
in UI payments send consumption losses to the opposite direction. However this 
implication should not be misconstrued to contradict the findings of Gruber (1997), 
th a t UI alleviates unemployment risks by minimizing impact on consumption, 
because these calculations don’t not account for the drop in wealth from one 
period to the other and the differences in the reemployment probabilities of 
workers who hold different levels of assets. This is performed in the last column 
of Table 2.3 tha t looks at the percentage drop in consumption of workers who 
’report’ being employed in one year and unemployed in the next (clearly there 
are many transitions consistent with this censored spell).
This is precisely the measure constructed by Gruber (1997) and he finds that a 
fall in benefits to zero (relative to the current UI scheme in the US) increases 
annual consumption losses from 6 .8 % to 2 2  % in his sample (equivalently a rise in 
the replacement income of 10% reduces the consumption loss by 2.68%). By this 
metric both economies seem to underestimate the importance of publicly provided 
insurance precisely because the ability of agents to insure privately (either by 
accumulating wealth of through contracts with firms) mitigates the effects of an 
unemployment spell on consumption in the steady state. Put differently Engen 
and Gruber (2001) estimate tha t a reduction in the level of benefits by 50% 
increase households financial wealth by 14% giving an indication of the extent 
to which UI payments crowd out the precautionary role of assets. Both models 
fail to match this elasticity; in the no insurance economy a similar reduction in 
UI engineers an increase of roughly 35% in the households net worth and 25% 
in the insurance model. It is no wonder therefore th a t the two models tend to 
underestimate the impact of the UI scheme on risk sharing.
Table 2.4 summarizes some important features of equilibrium allocations in the
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F ig u r e  2.4: C o n s u m p t io n  P o l ic y  F u n c t io n s : U n e m p l o y e d  A g e n t s .
risk since in this case more frequent transitions mean that agents don’t have 
enough time to accumulate wealth.
P re fe rred  Benefits. It is clear that these asymmetries are far too important 
for the central message of this chapter to be left unexplored. To investigate their 
impact I perform the following simple experiment: I let the government choose the 
optimal permanent level of benefits (denoted by b) and constant taxes separately 
for each worker as a function of her employment status and wealth, subject to the 
scheme being self financing (that is the overall discounted cost has to equal zero). 
This is a different requirement than having to rely on the distribution to finance 
the UI scheme, and closer to the standard program considered in the literature 
whereby an insurance agency sets the level of benefits and taxes to minimize the 
costs of insurance, subject to delivering to the worker a prescribed level of utility. 
14. Off course since the qualitative features of optimal policies and transitions are 
still present it is only an imperfect measure of controlling for the different steady 
allocations in the two economies.
More specifically consider a planner that solves the agent’s program in the no 
insurance economy (equations (2.2.2) and (2.2.4) in section 2.2.1) subject to the 
following laws of motions of costs and taxes:
14 See Shimer and Werning (2004) for a similar experiment
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T a b l e  2.3: P e r c e n t a g e  D r o p  in  C o n s u m p t io n  d u e  t o  U n e m p l o y m e n t
M odel b Period
EU (1st) (2 nd) Total
0 .0 .23 .17 .0 0 .30
No Insurance 0.5 .17 .28 .2 2 .28
0 .0 .079 .18 .0 0 .2 1
Insurance 0.5 .077 .28 .31 .2 0
two environments across alternative policy regimes. Benefits are assumed to last 
for two quarters and hence b = .5 corresponds to the benchmark steady state 
calibration of the two economies. Columns 1 through 3 give the economy’s rate 
of unemployment, the fraction of unemployed workers with duration greater than 
2  quarters and the level of taxes needed to finance the scheme respectively.
In both cases (with and without private contracts) associated with increases 
in benefits is a fall in search effort and a rise in the number of unemployed 
workers and in the incident of long term  unemployment. For instance in the 
economy without private insurance a value of b equal to unity means that 16.1% 
of unemployed workers have spent at least six months looking for work and a 
similar value ( 16.6%) obtains when private risk sharing is present. The reason 
is that a large upfront provision of insurance encourages savings for unemployed 
workers that affect their search behavior even when benefits stop. Further on 
notice that insofar as the aggregate labour market is concerned the two economies 
share more or less the same response to changes in the policy regime.
T a b l e  2.4: A l l o c a t io n s
M odel b u T u> 2 Wealth " W £ " W u
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
0 .0 .0731 0 .0 .142 1.97 1.14
No Insurance 0.5 .0750 .033 .150 1.05 1 .1 0
1 .0 .0771 .065 .161 0.26 0.82
0 .0 .0735 0 .0 .145 2.24 1.17
Insurance 0.5 .0750 .033 .150 1.34 1 .1 1
1 .0 .0773 .065 .166 0.69 .95
Columns 4 and 5 give the average level of assets in the economy and the ratio of 
wealth ( l^2-) held by employed to unemployed workers respectively. The standard 
result tha t government insurance crowds out the precautionary role of assets 
holds in both cases but there are large differences in average wealth held by
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F i g u r e  2 .5 :  C o n s u m p t io n  P o l i c y  F u n c t i o n s :  E m p lo y e d  A g e n t s
C0 ( a , f c , r )  =  b -  7 ° ^ ,6,T V (a ;( a ) , 6 ,r )  H ^ C i ( a , b , T )  (2 .3 .1 )
C i ( a , 6 , r )  =  b -  7 l  ^^  T ( a ' ( a ) , b ,  r ) H 6, r )  (2 .3 .2 )
T ( a , b , r )  =  r  +  i - ^ T ( a ' ( a ) , 6 , r )  -  -^C 0( a '( a ) ,  6, r )  (2 .3 .3 )
E q u a t io n s  (2 .3 .1 )  to  (2 .3 .3 )  r e p re s e n t  th e  la w s  o f  m o tio n  o f  th e  p r e s e n t  v a lu e  
c o s ts  (b e n e f its )  a n d  ta x e s  (n o tic e  t h a t  s in ce  b e n e f its  a re  p e rm a n e n t  o n ly  th e  f irs t  
tw o  q u a r t e r s  o f  a n  u n e m p lo y m e n t  s p e ll  a r e  d if f e r e n t) .  T o  c o n s e rv e  n o ta t i o n  I 
l e t  a' (a)  a n d  s ( a ,6 ,  r )  b e  t h e  o p t im a l  c h o ic e  o f  a s s e ts  a n d  s e a rc h  in te n s i ty  fo r  
th e  g e n e r ic  a g e n t  t h a t  h a s  a  c u r r e n t  lev e l o f  w e a l th  a.  F u r th e r  o n  th e s e  o b je c ts  
g e n e ra l iz e  in  th e  in s u ra n c e  m o d e l o f  s e c t io n  2 .2 .2  th e  o n ly  d if fe re n c e  b e in g  t h a t  
t h e  p r e s e n t  d is c o u n te d  v a lu e  o f  p ro f i t s  J  m u s t  b e  a d d e d  t o  t h e  l is t  o f  s t a t e  
v a r ia b le s  a lo n g  w i th  a s s e ts  fo r th e  e m p lo y e d  a g e n t .
T o  e n s u re  c o n v e rg en ce  I a s su m e  t h a t  th e  in te r e s t  r a te  R  e q u a ls  1 .005 so  t h a t  th e  
c o m p o u n d  r e tu r n  is 2 .02%  a t  a n  a n n u a l  h o riz o n . W ith  th e  sa m e  d is c o u n t fa c to r  a n  
in c re a se  in  th e  in te re s t  r a t e  im p lie s  t h a t  th e  e m p lo y e d  a g e n t’s c o n s u m p tio n  in  th e  
o p t im a l  c o n tr a c t  eco n o m y  is n o t  as  f ro n t- lo a d e d  a n d  th u s  if a n y th in g  th e  o p tim a l
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agents in the two economies. When private contracts are present firms encourage 
the accumulation of wealth by front-loading part of the compensation to newly 
employed workers whereas without private risk sharing wealth accumulation can 
only be financed out of current consumption for these workers. Smaller differences 
in the ratios ^  also reflect this timing but these don’t  have any allocational 
implication whatsoever; if say insurance was given through severance payments 
which is an equivalent margin of insurance here, then unemployed workers would 
hold more assets but all other statistics (unemployment rates, durations etc.) 
would be unaffected.
I conclude the following from this analysis; Although the model of section
2 .2 .2  doesn’t permit to construct empirical measures of the extent of private risk 
sharing in the economy (such as severance payments relative to income say), 
imperfect measures can be constructed (i.e. consumption losses in unemployment) 
and these indicate that the insurance role of private markets is important. Further 
on equilibrium allocations are also different in a way that raises some concern of 
whether the differences in optimal policy axe partly attributed to differences in 
the steady state distribution. This is a possibility th a t I scrutinize in the next 
paragraph.
T h e  W ealth  D is tr ib u tio n . Figure 2.3 describes the distribution of assets 
in the two economies. It shows fractions of agents as a function of the ratio 
of current wealth to the steady state level of wealth in the economy without 
private contracts (which is equal to 1.05). 13 There are large differences in the 
distribution of agents over the relevant state space. For instance the standard 
incomplete market model (red bars) predicts that most agents cluster in the 
region where wealth is between .75 and 1.25 relative to the average. With private 
insurance (blue bars) there is a lot more dispersion in outcomes; more agents near 
the borrowing constraint but also a lot more holding higher levels of wealth.
To understand these differences it is important to look at some of the features of 
the calibrated solution in the two economies. Figure 2.4 plots the consumption for 
unemployed workers for the economy with private insurance. Under the baseline 
calibration agents decrease consumption between periods one and two because 
the search technology deteriorates, and a further cut back takes place after the 
second quarter since government benefits drop to zero thereafter. Further on the
13This serves to make the two distributions more comparable since mean assets differ in the
two economies.
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F i g u r e  2 .3 :  S t e a d y  S t a t e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  W e a l t h .
a n a lo g o u s  fu n c t io n s  fo r  u n e m p lo y e d  a g e n ts  in  t h e  in c o m p le te  m a r k e t  e c o n o m y  
o f  s e c t io n  2 .2 .1  t u r n e d  o u t  t o  b e  v e ry  s im i la r  ( s in c e  t h e  e n v ir o n m e n ts  p r e s e n t  
u n e m p lo y e d  a g e n ts  w ith  a  s im ila r  p ro g ra m ) .
W h a t  e x p la in s  th e  d iffe ren ces in  a llo c a tio n s  is th e  b e h a v io r  o f em p lo y e d  a g e n ts . 
In  F ig u re  2 .5  I g r a p h  th e s e  p o lic ie s  sh o w in g  t h a t  th e r e  is a  la rg e  g a p  in  t e r m s  o f  
th e  o v e ra ll level o f c o n s u m p tio n  fo r th e  g e n e ric  w o rk e r b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  eco n o m ies . 
C o n s u m p t io n  is  s u b s ta n t i a l ly  h ig h e r  a t  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  jo b  fo r  a n  a g e n t  in  
t h e  in s u r a n c e  e c o n o m y  b e c a u s e  t h e  o p t im a l  c o n t r a c t  p r e s c r ib e s  a  p a t h  t h a t  is  
d e c r e a s in g  o v e r  t im e  a n d  w e a l th  c a n  b e  f in a n c e d  th r o u g h  h ig h e r  in i t i a l  w a g e s . 
In  t h e  in c o m p le te  m a r k e t  o f  s e c t io n  2 .2 .1  t h e  o p t im a l  b e h a v io r  is  t o  c o n s u m e  
l i t t l e  a t  th e  s t a r t  o f  th e  jo b , a c c u m u la te  a s s e ts  a n d  t h e n  a f te r  a  su ffic ie n t b u f fe r  
is b u i ld ,  c o n s u m p tio n  a n d  w e a lth  s ta y  c o n s ta n t .
T h e s e  f e a tu r e s  e x p la in  t h e  s h a p e  o f  th e  w e a l th  d i s t r ib u t io n s  sh o w n  in  F ig u r e
2 .3 . I n  e ffec t in  t h e  p r iv a te  in s u r a n c e  m o d e l  o f  s e c t io n  2 .2 .2  a g e n ts  t h a t  a r e  
’lu c k y ’ e n o u g h  to  e x p e r ie n c e  f r e q u e n t  t r a n s i t io n s  a c ro s s  la b o u r  m a r k e t  s t a t e s  
( e m p lo y m e n t  a n d  u n e m p lo y m e n t)  w ill a lso  h o ld  h ig h e r  le v e ls  o f  w e a l th .  T h i s  
im p l ic a t io n  is  n o t  c o u n te r f a c tu a l  a n d  in  f a c t  i t  is  t h a t  is  n o t  a t  o d d s  e v e n  w i th  
c o n v e n tio n a l in c o m p le te  m a rk e t  m o d e ls , s in ce  th e re  th o s e  a g e n ts  t h a t  face  h ig h e r  
r isk s  o f  u n e m p lo y m e n t w ill a lso  h a v e  a  s t ro n g e r  p re c a u t io n a ry  sa v in g s  m o tiv e . I t  
is in c o n s is te n t  how ev er w ith  a n  eco n o m y  w h e re  a ll a g e n ts  face  th e  sa m e  s e p a ra t io n
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risk since in this case more frequent transitions mean that agents don’t have 
enough time to accumulate wealth.
P re fe rred  Benefits. It is clear that these asymmetries are far too important 
for the central message of this chapter to be left unexplored. To investigate their 
impact I perform the following simple experiment: I let the government choose the 
optimal permanent level of benefits (denoted by b) and constant taxes separately 
for each worker as a function of her employment status and wealth, subject to the 
scheme being self financing (that is the overall discounted cost has to equal zero). 
This is a different requirement than having to rely on the distribution to finance 
the UI scheme, and closer to the standard program considered in the literature 
whereby an insurance agency sets the level of benefits and taxes to minimize the 
costs of insurance, subject to delivering to the worker a prescribed level of utility. 
14. Off course since the qualitative features of optimal policies and transitions are 
still present it is only an imperfect measure of controlling for the different steady 
allocations in the two economies.
More specifically consider a planner that solves the agent’s program in the no 
insurance economy (equations (2.2.2) and (2.2.4) in section 2.2.1) subject to the 
following laws of motions of costs and taxes:
14 See Shimer and Werning (2004) for a similar experiment
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2.3.3 Other Models
How robust are the results of the previous sections to changes in the economic 
environment? In the first chapter of this thesis I take stock of the vast literature 
of search and matching models of the labour market to develop a similar policy 
experiment and I reach similar conclusions. I rely on a two alternative equilibrium 
concepts; the first one is the undirected search model of Krusell et al (2007) and 
Bils et al (2009(a), (2009(b)) (there the no insurance case is represented with 
a contract that is rebargained each period) and the second is a variant of the 
directed search equilibrium with assets of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) (there 
no insurance corresponds to a flat wage contract). Both models have the same 
implication that depending on the range of private risk sharing in the economy 
the insurance role of public policy is different.
It is not important to summarize this work here; rather what I seek to address 
in this section is whether some important additions to the model th a t limit 
the insurance role of private markets, can throw off the main predictions of the 
previous analysis. For this I turn  to a model where separations are endogenous 
as in the work of Wang and Williamson (2002) and as I explain this feature alone 
implies tha t the optimal contract of section 2 .2 .2  is fraught with moral hazard 
which, as is well known, trades off risk sharing for incentives to maximize the 
duration of the job.
The technical treatm ent of these issues attem pted in this chapter is rather 
primitive. It appears that there is a growing literature that investigates the effects 
of self insurance in partnerships that are fraught with moral hazard or that feature 
incomplete information (see Karaivanov and M artin (2009) and the references 
therein). For one thing the assumptions about who controls investments in this 
context are much less innocuous than before. The previous chapter argued that 
fundamental violations of the Euler equation were tiny and in this sense adding 
marginal utility as an additional state variable (as in Abraham and Pavoni (2005) 
or Werning (2002)) would have no impact on optimal policies. This need not be 
the case here however. Further on neither the equivalence between assets and 
severance compensation holds, since the latter is a margin of insurance that is 
contingent on the observable outcome (separation) whilst the former is not.
These considerations may be important for a more thorough look at optimal 
policies by firms and their response to the government’s scheme but this possibility 
is left for future work. Further on there appears to be only one paper in the
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C0 ( a , f c , r )  =  b -  7 ° ^ ,6,T V (a ;( a ) , 6 ,r )  H ^ C i ( a , b , T )  (2 .3 .1 )
C i ( a , 6 , r )  =  b -  7 l  ^^  T ( a ' ( a ) , b ,  r ) H 6, r )  (2 .3 .2 )
T ( a , b , r )  =  r  +  i - ^ T ( a ' ( a ) , 6 , r )  -  -^C 0( a '( a ) ,  6, r )  (2 .3 .3 )
E q u a t io n s  (2 .3 .1 )  to  (2 .3 .3 )  r e p re s e n t  th e  la w s  o f  m o tio n  o f  th e  p r e s e n t  v a lu e  
c o s ts  (b e n e f its )  a n d  ta x e s  (n o tic e  t h a t  s in ce  b e n e f its  a re  p e rm a n e n t  o n ly  th e  f irs t  
tw o  q u a r t e r s  o f  a n  u n e m p lo y m e n t  s p e ll  a r e  d if f e r e n t) .  T o  c o n s e rv e  n o ta t i o n  I 
l e t  a' (a)  a n d  s ( a ,6 ,  r )  b e  t h e  o p t im a l  c h o ic e  o f  a s s e ts  a n d  s e a rc h  in te n s i ty  fo r  
th e  g e n e r ic  a g e n t  t h a t  h a s  a  c u r r e n t  lev e l o f  w e a l th  a.  F u r th e r  o n  th e s e  o b je c ts  
g e n e ra l iz e  in  th e  in s u ra n c e  m o d e l o f  s e c t io n  2 .2 .2  th e  o n ly  d if fe re n c e  b e in g  t h a t  
t h e  p r e s e n t  d is c o u n te d  v a lu e  o f  p ro f i t s  J  m u s t  b e  a d d e d  t o  t h e  l is t  o f  s t a t e  
v a r ia b le s  a lo n g  w i th  a s s e ts  fo r th e  e m p lo y e d  a g e n t .
T o  e n s u re  c o n v e rg en ce  I a s su m e  t h a t  th e  in te r e s t  r a te  R  e q u a ls  1 .005 so  t h a t  th e  
c o m p o u n d  r e tu r n  is 2 .02%  a t  a n  a n n u a l  h o riz o n . W ith  th e  sa m e  d is c o u n t fa c to r  a n  
in c re a se  in  th e  in te re s t  r a t e  im p lie s  t h a t  th e  e m p lo y e d  a g e n t’s c o n s u m p tio n  in  th e  
o p t im a l  c o n tr a c t  eco n o m y  is n o t  as  f ro n t- lo a d e d  a n d  th u s  if a n y th in g  th e  o p tim a l
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literature tha t attem pts to provide an answer to a similar question (Pissarides 
(2004)) but again in that analysis the principal (firm) can control all investment 
decisions and on top of this contracts are complete. I do think however that the 
model of presented in this section can be a good starting point for this research 
agenda.
There are two types of arrangements to consider. One derives from an environ­
ment where commitment is abundant and utility promises summarize the history 
of the contract and allocations are determined at date zero and specify a path 
for the all possible future states. This is similar to the insurance model studied 
in section 2.2.2. The other is an environment where commitment is scarce and 
allocations have to be re-bargained each period to make the optimal plan time 
consistent. This latter case corresponds to a Markov perfect contract whereby 
no variable other than the endowment of wealth of the agent can summarize 
the histories (see Karaivanov and M artin (2009)). I establish tha t under some 
conditions the optimal policy under this contract is a flat wage similar to the 
model of section 2 .2 .1 .
The optimal public policy in these two worlds differs in the same way that 
it differed so far. The scope of public policy gains is reduced when private risk 
sharing permits agents to mitigate consumption losses in the first period of a 
unemployment spell. Further on with less risks (agents choose the separation 
rate) the importance of public insurance is dwarfed by the concern to minimize 
the outflow rate from employment and indeed in this case I find tha t in both 
regimes the optimal policy features near zero benefits, even when the UI scheme 
is constrained to last for two quarters. Finally the conclusion th a t the optimal 
timing of payments is different is preserved here.
Commitment.
Consider the program with commitment as in section 2 .2 .2  with the addition that 
employed workers can determine the separation rate %(s) as a function of the 
choice variable s (search intensity). Further on let v(s) be the per period level 
of disutility suffered by the worker associated with this choice. The rest of the 
setup (interest rates, discounting, taxes etc) is the same as before.
Each period an employed worker’s contract with her firm is summarized in the 
promised value J  (expected value of cash flows that accrue to the firm) which is
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policies in the two economies are closer than in the baseline model. Further on I 
use the same search technology parameters in both economies setting 7 0  =  1.81 
and 7 >i =  .62. To calculate the preferred level of benefits, I solve the worker’s 
value functions using standard methods (value function iteration) and then I use 
the optimal policies to iterate convergence on equations (2.3.1) to (2.3.3). For 
a worker with assets a running her first quarter in unemployment it must be 
Co (a, 6 , r) =  0 for the scheme to be self financing and similarly Ci(a, 6 , r)  =  0  for 
an agent that has accumulated more than one quarter in unemployment. For any 
given level of b I use a simple bisection algorithm to bracket the required the tax 
levi and then I use a simple grid search method for the optimum over all levels of 
benefits.
Figure 2.6 displays the optimal levels of benefits as a function of wealth for 
workers in their first quarter in unemployment. The analogous object for agents 
with higher durations is almost the same. It is clear that the two economies deliver 
largely different levels of preferred government insurance for their workforce with 
standard incomplete markets economy having systematically higher levels of 
benefits for all unemployed workers. Over the state space the preferred taxes 
are lower by 20% to 25% in the economy with private insurance. From this I 
conclude that the impact of the wealth distribution is of second order insofar as 
the main results are concerned.
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an argument in her value function, and optimal policies consist of a level of wealth 
for next period, a continuation value J'  and a level of effort s that determines 
the probability of unemployment. Let W (a , J) be the expected lifetime utility 
of the worker that solves the following functional equation:
W (a ,J )  = max log(c) -  v(s) +  (3((1 -  r)e{s))U{a\ 0) +  'ye( s )W (a', J')) (2.3.4)
a '> a ,J ' , s
Subject to the constraint set:
a1 = Ra  +  w — r  — c J  < y  — w + J7
R
J ’ > 0 W(a', J') > U(a\  0)
This type of arrangement has wealth and search effort chosen on the same 
side as wages and hence it corresponds to an environment where these choices 
are both observable (no moral hazard) and contractible. The optimal allocation 
would feature (can be characterized by) a set of first order conditions for wealth 
and continuation payoffs to the firm (similar to those of the model of section
2.2.2) with an additional object the optimality condition for the level of s. The 
latter solves the following equation:
v'(s) =  Y (s ) /? (w y , J ’) -  U(a', 0 ) +  ^ - J ' )  (2.3.5)
where u'{c) denotes the marginal utility of current consumption. Thus the 
optimal allocation (with complete information) sets search effort such that the 
marginal cost to the worker equals the weighted benefit to her and the firm. On 
the other hand when the worker’s action is not observed by the firm, the optimal 
choice of search intensity that is incentive compatible sets this last term equal to 
zero and incentive compatible allocations rather satisfy the following first order 
condition:
t/(s) =  i{s)P(W (a ' ,  J') -  U{ot, 0 )) (2.3.6)
This distinction is crucial for the ordering of optimal policies in the two environ­
ments. For instance a planner that seeks to maximize the duration of existing 
jobs will always set a lower level of benefits in the economy where the agent’s 
program includes equation (2.3.6) in the constraint set, since the worker doesn’t 
internalize the payoff to the firm in her optimal choice. On the other hand since 
usually such an addition trades off insurance for incentives in private policies it is
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2.3.3 Other Models
How robust are the results of the previous sections to changes in the economic 
environment? In the first chapter of this thesis I take stock of the vast literature 
of search and matching models of the labour market to develop a similar policy 
experiment and I reach similar conclusions. I rely on a two alternative equilibrium 
concepts; the first one is the undirected search model of Krusell et al (2007) and 
Bils et al (2009(a), (2009(b)) (there the no insurance case is represented with 
a contract that is rebargained each period) and the second is a variant of the 
directed search equilibrium with assets of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) (there 
no insurance corresponds to a flat wage contract). Both models have the same 
implication that depending on the range of private risk sharing in the economy 
the insurance role of public policy is different.
It is not important to summarize this work here; rather what I seek to address 
in this section is whether some important additions to the model th a t limit 
the insurance role of private markets, can throw off the main predictions of the 
previous analysis. For this I turn  to a model where separations are endogenous 
as in the work of Wang and Williamson (2002) and as I explain this feature alone 
implies tha t the optimal contract of section 2 .2 .2  is fraught with moral hazard 
which, as is well known, trades off risk sharing for incentives to maximize the 
duration of the job.
The technical treatm ent of these issues attem pted in this chapter is rather 
primitive. It appears that there is a growing literature that investigates the effects 
of self insurance in partnerships that are fraught with moral hazard or that feature 
incomplete information (see Karaivanov and M artin (2009) and the references 
therein). For one thing the assumptions about who controls investments in this 
context are much less innocuous than before. The previous chapter argued that 
fundamental violations of the Euler equation were tiny and in this sense adding 
marginal utility as an additional state variable (as in Abraham and Pavoni (2005) 
or Werning (2002)) would have no impact on optimal policies. This need not be 
the case here however. Further on neither the equivalence between assets and 
severance compensation holds, since the latter is a margin of insurance that is 
contingent on the observable outcome (separation) whilst the former is not.
These considerations may be important for a more thorough look at optimal 
policies by firms and their response to the government’s scheme but this possibility 
is left for future work. Further on there appears to be only one paper in the
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literature tha t attem pts to provide an answer to a similar question (Pissarides 
(2004)) but again in that analysis the principal (firm) can control all investment 
decisions and on top of this contracts are complete. I do think however that the 
model of presented in this section can be a good starting point for this research 
agenda.
There are two types of arrangements to consider. One derives from an environ­
ment where commitment is abundant and utility promises summarize the history 
of the contract and allocations are determined at date zero and specify a path 
for the all possible future states. This is similar to the insurance model studied 
in section 2.2.2. The other is an environment where commitment is scarce and 
allocations have to be re-bargained each period to make the optimal plan time 
consistent. This latter case corresponds to a Markov perfect contract whereby 
no variable other than the endowment of wealth of the agent can summarize 
the histories (see Karaivanov and M artin (2009)). I establish tha t under some 
conditions the optimal policy under this contract is a flat wage similar to the 
model of section 2 .2 .1 .
The optimal public policy in these two worlds differs in the same way that 
it differed so far. The scope of public policy gains is reduced when private risk 
sharing permits agents to mitigate consumption losses in the first period of a 
unemployment spell. Further on with less risks (agents choose the separation 
rate) the importance of public insurance is dwarfed by the concern to minimize 
the outflow rate from employment and indeed in this case I find tha t in both 
regimes the optimal policy features near zero benefits, even when the UI scheme 
is constrained to last for two quarters. Finally the conclusion th a t the optimal 
timing of payments is different is preserved here.
Commitment.
Consider the program with commitment as in section 2 .2 .2  with the addition that 
employed workers can determine the separation rate %(s) as a function of the 
choice variable s (search intensity). Further on let v(s) be the per period level 
of disutility suffered by the worker associated with this choice. The rest of the 
setup (interest rates, discounting, taxes etc) is the same as before.
Each period an employed worker’s contract with her firm is summarized in the 
promised value J  (expected value of cash flows that accrue to the firm) which is
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an argument in her value function, and optimal policies consist of a level of wealth 
for next period, a continuation value J'  and a level of effort s that determines 
the probability of unemployment. Let W (a , J) be the expected lifetime utility 
of the worker that solves the following functional equation:
W (a ,J )  = max log(c) -  v(s) +  (3((1 -  r)e{s))U{a\ 0) +  'ye( s )W (a', J')) (2.3.4)
a '> a ,J ' , s
Subject to the constraint set:
a1 = Ra  +  w — r  — c J  < y  — w + J7
R
J ’ > 0 W(a', J') > U(a\  0)
This type of arrangement has wealth and search effort chosen on the same 
side as wages and hence it corresponds to an environment where these choices 
are both observable (no moral hazard) and contractible. The optimal allocation 
would feature (can be characterized by) a set of first order conditions for wealth 
and continuation payoffs to the firm (similar to those of the model of section
2.2.2) with an additional object the optimality condition for the level of s. The 
latter solves the following equation:
v'(s) =  Y (s ) /? (w y , J ’) -  U(a', 0 ) +  ^ - J ' )  (2.3.5)
where u'{c) denotes the marginal utility of current consumption. Thus the 
optimal allocation (with complete information) sets search effort such that the 
marginal cost to the worker equals the weighted benefit to her and the firm. On 
the other hand when the worker’s action is not observed by the firm, the optimal 
choice of search intensity that is incentive compatible sets this last term equal to 
zero and incentive compatible allocations rather satisfy the following first order 
condition:
t/(s) =  i{s)P(W (a ' ,  J') -  U{ot, 0 )) (2.3.6)
This distinction is crucial for the ordering of optimal policies in the two environ­
ments. For instance a planner that seeks to maximize the duration of existing 
jobs will always set a lower level of benefits in the economy where the agent’s 
program includes equation (2.3.6) in the constraint set, since the worker doesn’t 
internalize the payoff to the firm in her optimal choice. On the other hand since 
usually such an addition trades off insurance for incentives in private policies it is
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well understood that the optimal allocation under moral hazard would feature 
less risk sharing between workers and firms thus inducing higher gains from public 
policy. The overall effect is ambiguous.
These features are not central to my analysis, since the purpose here is really 
to get some confirmation that an alternative model yields more or less the same 
predictions for optimal policy as the baseline economy. Rather I report the 
optimal UI scheme in both cases (with and without moral hazard) and I use this 
result to infer the impact of unobserved actions on optimal allocations. I find 
only a small effect.
Markov Perfect Contracts.
I next tu rn  to a model that features no private private risk sharing as the one 
laid out in section 2.2.1. There is a very straightforward way to generalize the 
worker’s value function to include search intensity as a control variable here, but 
instead I attem pt to connect this model with the markov perfect contracts that 
were discussed in the previous chapter. The reason is tha t this construction is 
instructive and permits to generalize the analysis in other equally important 
models of labour market frictions.
In the analogy of the commitment programs the general contracting problem 
here will also feature a state variable (firm’s profits) that summarizes the allocation. 
But in markov perfect contract this object is a function of the wealth endowment 
of the agent and continuation policies must always conform with this object. 
This was the significant difference between commitment and time consistent 
allocations before, in particular tha t equilibrium payoffs are of the form J (a) 
and W(a,  rather than simply J  and W ( a , J ) for firms and workers
respectively. Then optimal allocations solve the following functional equation:
W ( a , J ( a ) ) =  max log(c) -  v(s) +  0((1 -  -fe{s))U(a\ 0) +  % {s)W{a', J(a')))
a ' > a , J , s
(2.3.7)
Subject to the constraint set:
a' = Ra + w — t  — c J7(a) <  ?/ — w + (a!)
R
Further on what determines the shares of the surplus that accrue to each party 
is a generalized Nash bargaining procedure where 77 and 1 — 77 are the weights
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attached to the firm and the worker respectively. Then the solution to J (a )  
satisfies the following requirement:
J (a )  6  argm ax(IV(a, J )  -  U(a,0))1- ’’ (2.3.8)
where J  is a generic value of the firm’s payoffs (not necessarily on the equilibrium 
path). Clearly it must always be (at least for matches th a t generate positive 
surplus as in this model) that J (a )  > 0  everywhere on the state space. When 77 
equals zero the allocation corresponds to a particular case where all the gains 
from search accrue to the worker and the following proposition argues that in this 
case the solution to equation (2.3.7) sets wages equal to productivity each period.
P r o po sit io n  2 .1  In a Markov Perfect Equilibrium with rj = 0 the only 
incentive compatible allocation has wages equal to productivity each period (flat 
wage contract).
To see this suppose that there is a point a in the state space where payments 
are frontloaded (i.e. y < w) in the sense tha t the worker receives a loan from 
the firm that helps her build a stock of wealth. Assume without loss of generality 
that the worker’s choice of assets for next period is a' and her current choice of 
search intensity s. The firm’s payoff is given J(a ')  and must conform with the 
notion that firms break even in equilibrium (hence J(a ')  =  0). But then it must 
be that J (a )  = y — w +  -!^ J 7 ( a ')  < 0 which is a contradiction. 15
Hence flat wage contracts in the current context are nothing but a time 
consistent allocation where the worker’s bargaining power is the highest possible. 
When I compute the equilibrium for this model I make no use of the value 
functions above, but instead I add a choice of effort in the worker’s value function 
tha t is similar otherwise to that in section 2 .2 .1 . That is I simply approximate
15More generally the solution to the workers value function in equation (2.3.7) is characterized 
by the following two first order conditions:
=  7 -  U(a',0)) + — L - ^ ( o ) )
\ ^ a / ^dW (a!, J  (a!)) . . .dU(a',  0) 1 .U'(ct) >  ^  +  p(1 _  7 . ^  J ' {a)
The first equation governs the choice of search intensity and the second determines the 
optimal investment for the worker. Clearly under g =  0 whether these choices are observable 
or not by the firm makes no difference for allocations since in the case J { a )  =  0 every 
where on the state space.
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the solution to the following functional equation:
W(a) = max lo g (-a ' +  Ra  +  y -  r)  +  /3(/ye{s)W(a') +  (1 -  7 e(s))U(a', 0))
a'>a,s
Results.
To solve the model I use the same calibration procedure outlined in section 2.3.1. 
There is parameter 7 ,^ governs the rate at which in equilibrium workers exit from 
jobs (the search function is 1 — e~lwS ) and I find tha t 7 ^ =  7.45 for the no 
insurance model and 7 ^ =  7.48 for the commitment cases make the steady state 
consistent with the targets. Search costs derive from a quadratic function. The 
baseline UI scheme is again one that sets b = .5 for two quarters and no benefits 
afterwards.
Table 2.5 presents the levels of optimal policy in the various environments. For 
all models I consider the optimal value of the insurance scheme that runs for two 
periods, the optimal permanent policy and a flexible policy that treats differently 
short and long term  unemployed (i.e. workers with more than six months in 
unemployment). The first two columns refer to the optimal policies in economies 
with flat (time consistent) wage contracts and the associated welfare gains, whilst 
columns three to six present the analogous objects for the commitment models 
with and without moral hazard respectively.
W hat is different here relative to the models of sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 is 
that part of the planner’s objective is to maximize the duration of existing jobs 
by encouraging higher search effort by employed workers and off course this is 
accomplished by lowering benefits at all horizons. But the central implications of 
the previous section (that the two economies present the planner with a different 
tradeoff) seem to hold in this case as well.
Allocations under commitment feature much more risk sharing between workers 
and firms and optimally the planner sets lower benefits in these economies. With 
benefits that run for two quarters the planner optimally sets b = .26 for a markov 
perfect contract (the first row of Table 2.5 ) and .1 and .1 1  in the two commitment 
economies. A similar result obtains for a scheme that features permanent benefits. 
Further on the shape of the optimal UI scheme has again the typical shape with 
flat contracts and an inverted shape with private insurance.
Finally notice tha t between the two commitment economies, moral hazard
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doesn’t seem to have such a big impact on the optimal policy. Despite the fact that 
allocations with moral hazard feature much less insurance against unemployment 
they also lead to inefficient separations since the worker doesn’t account for the 
firm’s payoff on her choice of effort. These effects seem to balance each other out 
here.
T a b l e  2 .5 :  O p t im a l  P o l ic y  w it h  E n d o g e n o u s  S e p a r a t io n s
Markov Perfect Commitment Commitment
Moral Hazard No Moral Hazard 
b, b>i e b, b>i e b, b>i e
2  Quarters (0.26 , 0 .0 0 ) .17% (0 .1 0  , 0 .0 0 ) .19% (0.11 , 0 .0 0 ) .19%
Permanent (0.19 , 0.19) .53% (0 .1 2  , 0.12) .55% (0.13 , 0.13) .50%
Unconstrained (0.20 , 0.13) .62% (0.00 , 0.22) .65% (0.00 , 0.28) .60%
It would generally take an extensive discussion to understand what private 
insurance does or doesn’t accomplish in this simple model. I do find for instance 
that this model features transfers between workers and firms that are similar to 
the ones I showed in the previous section but here there is a choice of another 
variable (precautionary effort) that brings a different perspective; generally agents 
with lower wealth will also exert higher effort so that insurance comes from two 
margins. Instead the results of this section can be interpreted more broadly 
as indicating that different risk sharing arrangements imply different choices of 
optimal benefits for the planner. This is precisely the confirmation th a t I was 
looking for from this model; that an optimal policy prescription should account 
closely for the range of private insurance opportunities.
There is a number of other im portant interactions here tha t are beyond the 
scope of this analysis but still are worth mentioning. An interpretation of the 
search technology possessed by employed workers in the current context is that 
separations are both quits and layoffs, and to the extent th a t the government 
cannot distinguish between the two it is not so clear what the optimal mechanism 
(UI scheme) is. Do firms have superior information so that governments should 
minimize the interference with private markets? For instance Hopenhayn and 
Nicolini (2009) use a model that features both quits and layoffs to conclude the 
optimal UI must take into account the worker’s employment history. But they 
don’t consider how the government could optimally contract with both firms and
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workers when it can gain information from both sources regarding the nature of 
separations. This could have important implications for the optimal UI scheme 
and the payroll taxes paid by firms (experience rating). Providing answers to 
these questions is an important task for future work but this entails a more 
exhaustive account of the interactions between firms workers and government 
than this chapter explores.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter I illustrate tha t alternative assumptions about the scope of 
risk sharing opportunities that are available through private markets affect the 
prescriptions for optimal public policy. This conclusion comes out of a comparison 
of two economies; the first one is a standard incomplete market model with wealth 
accumulation, the second is a model where firms can provide additional insurance 
by signing contracts with their workforce subject to limited commitment.
I find that the optimal UI is considerably different between these two economies; 
In the presence of private risk sharing optimal benefits are lower and the optimal 
payment schedule is backloaded. I argue that these predictions are symptomatic 
of the incentive of the planner to minimize his interference with private markets.
These implications don’t lack empirical relevance. Chetty (2008) finds that 
severance payments increase unemployment durations through a liquidity effect 
on the worker’s search intensity and Chetty and Saez (2009) use variation in 
the UI benefit laws across states to estimate that a 10% increase in UI reduces 
severance pay by around 7%. Since empirical estimates cannot go much further 
than characterizing simple policy rules one important contribution of this chapter 
is to provide a tractable framework that can be used to evaluate more complicated 
policies and the associated welfare gains from government provided insurance.
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2.5 Computational Appendix
N o in su ran ce  p rogram : To calibrate the model of section 2.2.1 the search 
functions must be recovered. In equilibrium the model has to be consistent with 
a target unemployment rate of 7.5% and a division of the workforce between 
workers that are running their first and second periods in unemployment of 70% 
and 15% respectively. Further on in this economy prices are fixed and taxes must 
be consistent with these targets and budget balance. To estimate the search 
parameters 7 0  and 7 >i I use a bisection algorithm that consists of the following 
steps:
1 Form an initial guess for the parameters 7 0  and 7 >i.
2 . Solve the worker’s program in equations 2 .2 .2  and 2.2.4 in text. Standard 
methods can be applied here to recover the optimal policy functions. The 
procedure is to approximate the lifetime utilities using a grid of wealth with 
na = 2 0 0  unevenly spaced nodes (more nodes near the borrowing constraint). 
Between the nodes value functions are interpolated using cubic splines.
Given 7 0  and 7 >i form an initial guess for the value functions Wo(a) and 
Uo(a,j). Solve for the optimal policy rules in equations 2 .2 .2  and 2.2.4 and recover 
the new (updated) lifetime utilities Wi(a) and U\(a,j).  For consumption a 
fixed grid of equally spaced nodes is used and for search policies the grid is 
endogenously determined after each iteration. When the updates are close enough 
to the initial functions optimal policies are found.
Use a finer grid of naB =  10000 nodes on assets to approximate the optimal 
policy of the form and s{a,j).
The final step is to compute the invariant distribution p  over the relevant 
state space. This can be accomplished by iterating convergence on the following 
equations:
106
3 Joint Search and Aggregate Fluctuations
107
3 Joint Search and Aggregate Fluctuations
3.1 Introduction
The idea that economic agents lack sufficient access to markets to insure against 
misfortune has been one of the founding blocks of modern macroeconomics. By 
now the literature that assigns a central role to heterogeneity and postulates that 
risk sharing is far from perfect is voluminous and has addressed most interesting 
aspects of macroeconomic theory (see Heathcote et al (2008) for a survey). It 
is not entirely clear though how far from complete markets, the actual risk 
sharing opportunities available to economic agents are. For instance the baseline 
incomplete markets paradigm builds on the assumption th a t households are 
formed by bachelor agents who, by trading claims on the aggregate capital stock, 
can self-insure against shocks in labour income. Over time alternative sources 
of insurance (either private or government provided) have been introduced to 
this framework, but much less common is the idea tha t within the family a 
considerable amount of employment and productivity risk diversification can be 
provided in the form of adjustments of the family members’ labour supplies.
In this chapter we set out to achieve two ambitious and closely related goals; 
first we perform an accounting exercise of the differences between economies where 
risk sharing is limited because agents stand alone against uncertain contingencies, 
and those where households are formed by unions of two ex ante identical (ex 
post heterogeneous) members tha t can mutually insure against economic risks. 
We do so by taking stock from the vast literature of search models of the labour 
market and the kind of risks that arise in this environment are uncertainty about 
the job quality and the possibility of rationing of employment opportunities. On 
both these margins joint labour supply decisions present households with an array 
of economically meaningful opportunities that we explore.
Second (and this is our main contribution) we use the model to understand 
whether granting joint insurance and labour supply to couples, can help match the 
suggestive business cycle correlations of aggregate employment, unemployment 
and labour force participation. Our substantive theme here is that if recessions 
are periods of high incidences of unemployment or low opportunities to find work 
then this induces household members to search jointly and intensively to insure 
against potential earnings losses. By contrast in bachelor household frameworks 
inactive workers are either those who have experienced a sequence of bad shocks, 
or those who have accumulated sufficient wealth to finance leisure or both. We 
do not believe that either is realistic is but rather view inactivity as a state that
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entails the presence of a main provider at home.
In section 3.2 we use the data from the CPS to illustrate that joint insurance 
though adjustments of labour supplies of household members can indeed explain 
the low procyclicality of the US labour force. We show tha t if it weren’t for 
fluctuations in the employment status of the main earner in the family (husbands 
in our sample), secondary earners (wives) would have a considerably more pro­
cyclical labour force participation. Further on there is a small literature on the 
added worker effect which, at least when it asked a similar question to ours, we 
found it to be conducive to our hypothesis.
Then we turn  to the theory in section 3.3. We build a general equilibrium 
framework th a t features realistic frictions in the labour market, and is flexible 
enough to allow for a comparison between the bachelor and couples household 
economies. The question we ask is whether family self insurance in the model 
economy can match the empirical facts, or to put differently we would like to 
use the model as a laboratory to see how far joint labour supply can go towards 
matching the qualitative patterns that we find in the data.
W hen we introduce aggregate fluctuations however, we find th a t the model 
fails miserably on both margins. We only get some improvement in the cyclicality 
of unemployment (in the bachelor household model it’s more procyclical) but this 
comes at a cost of a more volatile labour force. Further on there are virtually 
no gains in the correlation of the labour force with aggregate output at business 
cycle frequencies.
We explain tha t these predictions are consistent with two im portant failings 
of our model; first the benchmark economy features too few risks and too many 
choices to assign an important role to intra-family insurance. Second our simula­
tions suggest that with two ex ante identical agents in the model, it is extremely 
difficult to match the patterns of specialization of household members in home 
and market work and simultaneously match the average monthly flows of the 
labour flows from one state to the other (the latter is a crucial target for our 
calibration). We argue that if a model is to fare well against the data in terms of 
the aggregate labour market, it must also match the persistence of the identity 
of the main and the secondary earners in the family. Both of these possibilities 
however are left to future work.
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3.1.1 Related literature
This chapter is related to several strands in the literature: First a central mo­
tivation of our work is tha t traditional theories tha t rely on realistic frictions 
in the labour market have had a hard time to match the cyclical patterns of 
the labour force (see for example Veracierto (2008)). The reason is th a t the 
strong inter-temporal substitution motive tha t grants to these theories ample 
fluctuations in aggregate employment, convinces agents to flow into the labour 
force in good times and abandon it in bad. Further on when agents have to 
confront the frictions that impede instantaneous transitions between employment 
and unemployment these theories contain the counterfactual implication that 
aggregate unemployment is procyclical.
It is this implication along with the apparent a-cyclicality of the US labour force 
tha t has guided theoretical research in the field to restrict attention to models 
that feature only two labour market states (employment and unemployment), or 
equivalently feature large fixed costs of moving in and out of the labour force. In 
turn we argue th a t this runs into the difficulty of explaining why labour flows 
between activity and inactivity are large even at a monthly horizon, and we show 
that rather it is joint insurance within the household that explains the patterns 
that we see in the data.
Further on there has been an enormous interest on the implications of heteroge­
neity and incomplete insurance markets for the aggregate labour fluctuations (for 
example Gomes et al (2001) and Chang and Kim (2007) ). All of these attempts 
however build on the bachelor household paradigm which is precisely our point of 
departure here. Interestingly Chang and Kim (2006) develop a framework where 
families consist of two members ( a male and female) and use it to address how 
individual supply rules affect the value of the aggregate elasticity of labour supply. 
As far as incomplete markets models go this work is admittedly the closest to 
our intentions but many of the ingredients are different. First we emphasize the 
role of family in circumventing frictions in the labour market (such as the limited 
availability of job opportunities) whilst in CK (2006) the role assigned to frictions 
is secondary. Second contrasting the properties of two economies (the one with 
bachelor households and the ones with couples) in various environments is one 
of the main themes that we pursue. Most importantly none of the models of 
incomplete insurance markets from this literature takes up seriously on the task of 
matching the patterns of worker reallocation between employment unemployment
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and inactivity, but we do. For this reason we introduce a wealth of shocks to 
make our model consistent with the relevant empirical labour market flows.
There appears to be a sizeable literature that highlights the role of family 
labour supply as a mean of insuring against idiosyncratic labour income risks. 
In Attanasio et al (2005, 2008) and Heathcote et al (2008) an additional margin 
of insurance provided by female labour market participation becomes a valuable 
instrument to buffer shocks in labour income, and these papers go on to analyze 
the effects of various changes in the economic environment on the historical trends 
of female labour supply. This is not the interpretation we want to give to our 
story however. For all we are concerned our model is one of complete markets 
within the household unit and incomplete outside. More akin to our attem pt is 
the recent work by Guler et al (2008) that characterizes the effects of joint search 
to optimal reservation wage policies. Relative to them, they use a stylized search 
model, we build a general equilibrium framework with realistic heterogeneity that 
accounts for the observed labour market flows as well as the effects of shocks in 
aggregate productivity.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 uses the estimated 
flows from the CPS to provide evidence that joint insurance and labour supply 
are key factors that explain the low procyclicality of the US LF participation. In 
section 3.3, we develop the bachelor household model and the couple household 
model. In section 3.4, we show and discuss the basic results and implications of 
our theory. Section 3.5 concludes and the computational details are delegated to 
the appendix.
3.2 Labour Market Flows in the US
Table (3.1) summarizes the US labour market business cycle statistics. The data 
are constructed from the CPS and they correspond to observations spanning the 
years 1976 to 2005. They are logged and HP filtered and all quantities refer to 
quarterly aggregates and are expressed relative to a de-trended measure of GDP. 
Unemployment is extremely counter-cyclical and more than 6  times as volatile 
as aggregate output. Aggregate employment has two thirds of the volatility of
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output at business cycle frequencies and is very procyclical. The LF is not volatile 
and its contemporaneous correlation with GDP is low (.22).
T a b l e  3 .1 :  US B u s in e s s  C y c l e : L a b o u r  M a r k e t  S t a t is t ic s
E m ploym ent U  nem ploy  m en t LF LF C ouples LF W ives
Aged 16 and Above Aged 2 2  to 55
**■ 0 .6 6
G y
6 .6 8 0.34 0.35 0.47
Px,y -81 - . 8 8 .2 2 .05 .2
The last columns of Table (3.1) present a breakdown of the relevant quantities 
into demographic groups that are of particular interest to us. For married couples 
aged 22 to 55 in our sample, aggregate statistics are no different than  those of 
the full population (aged 16 and above). The labour force for this demographic is 
somewhat less procyclical (and hence even more puzzling from the point of view 
of theory) owning to the strong acyclical attachment of males in the sample, but 
also to the low contemporaneous correlation with GDP of female labour force 
participation. The volatility of both males (not shown) and females are higher 
than the aggregate volatility for this demographic group (column 4). In turn this 
might suggest that there is negative correlation of labour force participations of 
wives and husbands in our sample.
We note that this break down corresponds to an imperfect measure of our 
notion of couples in the model. Ideally we would like to have duads of agents 
that are linked with near perfect insurance opportunities and make labour supply 
decisions jointly, but the data preclude us from doing so. In what follows we 
treat household units that comprise of two spouses as an ideal ground to provide 
evidence for our theory.
Im p lica tions for m odels: F ixed  p a rtic ip a tio n ?  Are these observations 
consistent with the tendency of macro labour market theory to restrict attention 
to environments where economic agents can be either employed or unemployed 
at any point in time? We provide an answer to this question by looking at the 
monthly transitions of the US workforce across adjacent labour market states.
In Table (3.2) we summarize the relevant flows estimated from the CPS. Each 
month roughly 7 % of OLF (out of labour force) workers join the labour force, 
and 3 % of employed workers quit and become inactive. Further on to dilute the
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since for this demographic flow rates are remarkably stable over time (there is no 
secular trend in employment say).
T a b l e  3.4: E x p e r im e n t s
A ctual nt Actual ht CounterFactual nt 
One Month Horizon
Actual ht CounterFactual nt 
Three Month Horizon
G y
.3604 .3770 .3805 .4294 .4362
Px,y .2963 .2988 .3703 .2570 .3216
In table (3.4) we summarize the results from this experiment. We compare the 
relative standard deviations and contemporaneous correlation of our constructed 
measures with a de-trended measure of GDP. The first column refers to the 
cyclical properties of the labour force participation rate of married wives based on 
the actual population measure nt (the one we get from the data). 1 Columns 2
^ h e  differences in the quantities ^  and pn>y relative to Tables (2) and (3) stem from the 
fact that the population is normalized to unity.
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suspicion that these results are driven by demographics Table (3.3) presents the 
analogous matrix for the sub-sample of workers aged 22 to 55.
T a b l e  3.2: M a t r ix  f o r  F l o w  r a t e s  o f  A g e n t s  A g e d  A b o v e  16
E U I
E .9543 .0146 .0311
U .2743 .4983 .2274
I .0466 .0245 .9289
T a b l e  3.3: M a t r ix  f o r  F l o w  r a t e s  o f  M a r r ie d  C o u p l e s  A g e d  22 t o
55
E U I 
E .9662 .0112 .0226 
U .2891 .5159 .195
I .0623 .0282 .9095
A point tha t merits some attention is the fact th a t roughly 5 % of OLF 
workers find a job and become employed in the following month. There are 
two relevant possibilities: The first is that this is an immediate consequence of 
time aggregation since monthly horizons are more than enough for a worker to 
make a transition between inactivity and employment without having a recorded 
unemployment spell. The second pertains to the search behavior of passive 
searchers and marginally attached and discouraged workers. For these groups 
the work Jones and Riddell (1998,1999) demonstrates that they have transition 
probabilities into employment that are half as large as those of unemployed 
workers, and this implies th a t some of the flows between states U and I can 
be broadly interpreted simply as time variation in optimal search intensity for 
these groups. These implications have already been explored in the literature 
and it appears that adjusting the transition probabilities to embrace the idea 
tha t marginally attached workers should be treated as unemployed rather than 
inactive doesn’t make a big difference in the matrices of Tables (3.2) and (3.3) 
(see Krusell et al (2009)).
Hence we draw two conclusions from these calculations. First that the line 
between economically active and inactive workers is somewhat arbitrarily drawn 
by the theoretical models of the labour market and second tha t our model, 
calibrated at monthly frequencies should allow all agents (independent of their
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labour market status) to receive job offers and experience transitions between 
nonemployment and employment.
H ow  can  we use th e  d a ta  to  d e m o n s tra te  o u r po in t? . One possibility 
would be to run limited dependent variable models (such as linear probability 
or probit models) and estim ate the effect of the husbands employment status, 
on the wife’s labour force transitions, and this would allow us to control for 
some relevant aspects of heterogeneity. Such attempts however, to determine the 
magnitude of the added worker effect (AWE) are numerous in the literature and 
we can summarize these estimates without relying on our own empirical work 
(we do so in the following paragraphs). Further on this kind of analysis would 
have very little to say about the contribution of the joint labour supply on the 
low procyclicality of the LF which is precisely our focal point here.
Contrasting the (cyclical) behavior singles vs couples, even after controlling 
for demographic characteristics, would fare no better as an alternative, since our 
notion of singles is a very different one from what the data  could potentially 
suggest. In our framework singles are those agents who have an own idiosyncratic 
productivity and more importantly don’t possess ties with any other agent in the 
economy tha t could alleviate the risk from this process. In the data unmarried 
agents or even those who form a household unit on their own, could have joint 
insurance with other agents in the economy (a broad interpretation of family) 
and this consideration would cloud the conclusions we could potentially draw.
Rather we treat the two spouses (husband and wife) in the household unit as 
the closest data analogue to our notion of partnerships with joint labour supply 
and insurance. Using data on individual transitions we want to test the following 
prediction: If it weren’t for employment fluctuations over the business cycle of 
primary household earners, the labour force participation of secondary earners 
would be considerably more procyclical. We focus on individuals aged 22 to 55 
and for this demographic group married agents account for roughly 60 % of the 
population (for the entire sample of agents aged above 16 they form 36% of all 
individuals). In our sample we treat husbands as primary and wives as secondary 
earners.
For each period t we estimate the transition probabilities of a wife from state 
i to state j  conditional on her spouse making a transition from state k to 
I. We denote this object by p { (h j , k , l )  and analogously we let by p™(k, I) 
be the unconditional probability that the husband (and household head in our
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sample) makes the transition from state k to state I over the course of a month. 
Due to data limitations we cannot define conditional transition probabilities for 
all relevant labour market states. For this reason we restrict our attention to 
G {LF, OLF}  (that is wives can either be in the labour force or inactive) and 
k, I G {E, N }  (husbands can either be employed or not). Finally we let nt (i, k) 
be the share of the population of couples with a secondary earner is state i and 
a primary earner in state k.
The evolution of these measures is central to our experiment. With the estimates 
Pt (hj> P7{k, I) and nt(i, k) we construct counterfactual Markov transition 
matrices for couples over the relevant state space {LF, OLF}  x {E, N }  and 
counterfactual populations over time. The typical element of the matrices is 
given p((i, j, k, fyp171^ ,  I) where p771^ , /) denotes the transition probability of 
the husband averaged over all periods. W hat we mean to accomplish by that is 
to have data  on household transitions whereby the probability distribution of 
primary earners across labour market states is independent of time or, in other 
words, to shut down business cycle variation in the labour market flows between 
non-employment and employment for husbands.
First we use these matrices to construct population measures at one and three 
month ahead horizons. The way we do that is by feeding the actual populations 
nt once and track the measures over the relevant horizon using our constructed 
matrices. We denote by nt the constructed measure based on the time averaged 
probabilities for husbands.
Second to make our comparison meaningful we also compute populations based 
on the actual transition probabilities (that is without averaging) so tha t the 
typical element of the transition matrix is p{ (i , j , k, l)p™{k, I), and we let ht be 
the analogous measure under this calculation. The reason is that since there are 
small errors that compile over time, the comparison between nt and h t is much 
more meaningful than between nt and nt.
Figure (3.1) plots the labour force participation rate (based on measure nt that 
we draw from the data ) for wives over the sample period with the three month 
ahead counterfactual time series (based on nt ). Reassuringly the correlations 
between actual and counterfactual measures is high above .99 at our longest 
horizon. The correlation between nt and ht is even higher. Notice that this high 
correlation is a direct consequence of the fact that averaging out the transition 
probabilities of husbands over the years 1976 and 2005 (as opposed to using 
any other method of eliminating business cycles) involves no loss of generality
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In table (3.4) we summarize the results from this experiment. We compare the 
relative standard deviations and contemporaneous correlation of our constructed 
measures with a de-trended measure of GDP. The first column refers to the 
cyclical properties of the labour force participation rate of married wives based on 
the actual population measure nt (the one we get from the data). 1 Columns 2
^ h e  differences in the quantities ^  and pn>y relative to Tables (2) and (3) stem from the 
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loss of income due to unemployment translates into a drop in consumption), when 
the wife’s contribution to household resources is significant (so that the insurance 
role of labour supply adjustments of secondary earners is important) and when the 
household production (or leisure) technology allows for substitutability between 
the time inputs of the household members. Below we explain why our framework 
bodes well with these requirements.
3.3 The model
We develop two related models in which households face uninsurable idiosyncratic 
labour income risk. In the first model a household consists of one agent, a bachelor. 
In the second model, and this is our key contribution, a household consists of 
two agents, a couple, who share their income risk.
3.3.1 Bachelor economy
We consider an economy populated by a unit mass of strictly risk averse bachelor 
households tha t are identical in preferences and value the consumption of a 
general multipurpose market good c. We denote the discount factor for these 
agents by (3s and the period utility deriving from consumption by u(c).
At any point in time a household member can be either employed, unemployed 
or not part of the labour force and we assume tha t labour supply decisions 
are formed at the extensive margin and are subject to the frictions that impede 
instantaneous transitions across these adjacent labour market states. In particular 
employed agents spend a fraction h of their unitary time endowment each period 
in market activities associated with a utility cost which we denote by $(/i). For 
non employed agents we assume that job availability in the economy is limited: 
We endow them with a technology that transforms units of search effort s into 
arrival rates of job opportunities p(s) at a cost k(s) per unit of time. As we 
elaborate below on the basis of these optimal choices, we classify household 
members as either unemployed (active searchers) or out of labour force workers.
Further on we assume that households face idiosyncratic labour productivity 
risks and we summarize this in two independent stochastic processes e and
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to 3 and 4 to 5 compare the analogous objects based on the measures h t and n t, 
for one and three months horizons respectively. As the horizon expands the errors 
tha t compile over time make the processes display considerably more volatility. 
The result however is both qualitatively and quantitatively encouraging. The 
cyclical correlation of labour force participation for wives jumps from .2988 to 
.3703 in columns 2 and 3 and from .257 to .3216 in columns 4 and 5 (which 
roughly corresponds to a 25% increase in cyclicality). Further on in light of this 
higher correlation with GDP we can argue that the increase in volatility from ht 
to nt is mostly due to the business cycle.
We give the following interpretation for this result; If the US economy was 
populated by bachelor households then the labour force would be substantially 
more volatile and procyclical. Off course this conclusion is reached rather prema­
turely we are unable to control for observed heterogeneity and our notion joint 
insurance cannot be perfectly captured by couples. We can only do so much as 
to summarize a related literature below that has estimated the magnitude of the 
added worker effect and when it asked a similar question to ours we found it to 
be conducive to our hypothesis.
T h e  li te ra tu re  on  a d d ed  w orker effects. We give a brief summary of a 
related literature that uses panel data to investigate the effect of income shocks 
experienced by the husband on the spousal supply of labour. Our reading suggests 
tha t at least with respect to data and methodology there are three strands in 
this literature.
First there are models tha t use variation in annual hours of work to identify 
how the husband’s recorded unemployment spells affect the wife’s labour supply. 
There doesn’t appear to be a consensus in this empirical work for the magnitude of 
the AWE. For instance Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) find a small but significant 
AWE but the work of Pencavel (1982) doesn’t. The reason for this is twofold. 
First there are other forms of insurance that minimize the loss of income due to 
an unemployment spell, and the work of Culen and Gruber (2000) shows that 
unemployment benefits do indeed have a massive crowding out effect on family 
self insurance. Second more recently Stevens (2001) argues tha t the empirical 
literature fails to identify unemployment spells that result in substantial earnings 
losses (essentially the distinction of job leavers and job losers) and he shows that 
for displaced workers family insurance does have an important role.
There is a recent subset of studies that focus on the responses of spousal labour
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supply to shocks other than unemployment (health shocks in particular) such 
as Gallipoli and Turner (2008(a), 2008(b)) for Canada and Coyle (2004) for the 
US. This work documents the complete lack of AWEs although in the context of 
health shocks this lack of mutual insurance has an obvious interpretation; since 
disability and health shocks entail an intra-household transfer of time (that allows 
wives to ’care’ for the their ill spouse) they are unable to increase hours in the 
market to make up for the lost income.
W hat is more related to our story is the subset of studies tha t use short 
run transitions across labour market states (employment, unemployment and 
inactivity). These studies tend to find significant added worker effects even when 
controlling for observed heterogeneity (which is missing from our experiment). 
Lundberg (1985) uses monthly employment histories from a sample of the Seattle 
and Denver Income Maintenance experiments to conclude tha t if a husband is 
unemployed then the probability that the wife enters the LF increases by 25 % 
and the probability of leaving the LF is 33 % lower. The wives are also 28 % less 
likely to leave employment for unemployment. Furtheron Speltzer (1997) uses 
a sample from the CPS monthly data and estimates limited dependent variable 
models of the probability tha t wives enter the LF on demographics and the 
husbands employment transitions. His estimates show that there is an important 
AWE even when observable heterogeneity is taken into account 2.
We conclude this section by noting tha t when the relevant literature (on the 
AWE) has asked the ’right’ question the answer has been conducive to our 
intuition. It is clear that insofar as monthly transitions between labour market 
states are concerned joint insurance is important and further on our own empirical 
work illustrates that i t’s important in explaining the cyclical patterns of the US 
labour force. Further on if there is anything to be taken from the literature 
on spousal labour supply tha t can guide us in building the right theory its the 
following; the AWE is more pronounced when markets are incomplete (so that the
2The sample used by Speltzer (1997) spans the months June to December in the years 1988 - 
1989 and 1990 -1991 which is a much smaller range than what we use, and off course it is 
an entirely different empirical perspective. Our approach is much more similar to Lundberg 
(1985) who after estimating the transition probabilities plots the impulse response functions 
of a spousal hours and labour force participation when the husband’s unemployment rate 
falls by 5 percentage points. She gets a similar result to us. Further on Speltzer (1997) 
shows that there are two variables that drive the AWE to be near insignificant; these are the 
previous year unemployment spells of the husband and the previous year LF participation 
of the wife. He interprets this as evidence of a spurious AWE due to assortative mating, but 
it is also consistent with the AWE in the data being driven by couples that can use more 
readily the family self insurance margin (and this shows as higher propensity to experience 
transitions between labour market states).
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loss of income due to unemployment translates into a drop in consumption), when 
the wife’s contribution to household resources is significant (so that the insurance 
role of labour supply adjustments of secondary earners is important) and when the 
household production (or leisure) technology allows for substitutability between 
the time inputs of the household members. Below we explain why our framework 
bodes well with these requirements.
3.3 The model
We develop two related models in which households face uninsurable idiosyncratic 
labour income risk. In the first model a household consists of one agent, a bachelor. 
In the second model, and this is our key contribution, a household consists of 
two agents, a couple, who share their income risk.
3.3.1 Bachelor economy
We consider an economy populated by a unit mass of strictly risk averse bachelor 
households tha t are identical in preferences and value the consumption of a 
general multipurpose market good c. We denote the discount factor for these 
agents by (3s and the period utility deriving from consumption by u(c).
At any point in time a household member can be either employed, unemployed 
or not part of the labour force and we assume tha t labour supply decisions 
are formed at the extensive margin and are subject to the frictions that impede 
instantaneous transitions across these adjacent labour market states. In particular 
employed agents spend a fraction h of their unitary time endowment each period 
in market activities associated with a utility cost which we denote by $(/i). For 
non employed agents we assume that job availability in the economy is limited: 
We endow them with a technology that transforms units of search effort s into 
arrival rates of job opportunities p(s) at a cost k(s) per unit of time. As we 
elaborate below on the basis of these optimal choices, we classify household 
members as either unemployed (active searchers) or out of labour force workers.
Further on we assume that households face idiosyncratic labour productivity 
risks and we summarize this in two independent stochastic processes e and
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x. The former ( e ) is an agent specific process ( an own labour productivity 
component ) that is a persistent state variable in the agents value function 
independent of her labour market status. The latter a; is a job specific component 
th a t pertains to the quality of active jobs and available job opportunities in 
the economy. These objects evolve stochastically over time according to the 
transition cumulative distribution functions 7r£/iC =  Pr(et+1 < e\ et = e) and 
7Tx',x = Pr(xt+1 < x ' , x t = x) respectively. Further on we assume that the initial 
assignment of job quality x  derives from a general density H(x).
Financial markets are incomplete and agents can self insure by trading non 
contingent claims on the aggregate capital stock, earning a return R t each period, 
subject to an ad hoc borrowing limit at > a  V£. Wages per efficiency units of 
labour wt as well as rental rates R t are determined in competitive markets where 
it is assumed that a representative firm aggregates all inputs into a multipurpose 
final good. The technology is of the standard form Yt = where
capital K t depreciates at rate 8 each period and Lt = f  f  f  exha,e,xlha e x=K^t  
denotes the aggregate efficiency units of the labour input. Finally Tt is the 
density over the relevant state space (of employment status, productivity and 
wealth) and A* is the TFP process which evolves according to the non-stochastic 
transition cdf 7Ta'|a' =  Prob(\t+i < A'|At =  A'). The law of motion for the 
distribution of workers is defined as: Tt+i = T ( T t , At) where T  is the relevant 
transition operator.
The tim ing o f events. Each period t (and after the resolution of all 
relevant uncertainty) a non-employed agent chooses optimally the number of 
search units st to exert and finances her consumption out of the current stock of 
savings. Her choice of st maps into a probability p(st) of receiving a job offer in 
the next period. When this opportunity arrives the new value et+i and the value 
x t+i are sampled and the aggregate state vector { r t+i, Xt+i} is revealed and the 
agent will decide whether she wants to give up search and become employed. 
Notice tha t given tha t all jobs entail a fixed cost $(h)  the realization of the 
relevant state vector might not be such that the prospective match (job) generates 
a positive surplus for the worker. In tha t case the agent continues to search in 
the labour market.
Similarly for an employed agent the sampling of the new values for x t+i and 
et+i generates the risk of separation. In this case the worker may decide that it 
is not worthwhile to spend h of her time working and would rather search for
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new opportunities next period. For this worker optimal consumption and savings 
decisions are borne out of the stock of wealth and labour earnings, conditional 
on her keeping her current employment status.
V alue functions. Consider the problem of an agent with a stock of wealth 
at and a productivity endowment et who is currently non employed. She must 
optimally allocate resources between current consumption and savings and choose 
the number of units of search effort to exert to maximize her well-being. In the 
notation we let V n be the lifetime utility for this worker. We also define an 
auxiliary object Qe =  max{Vn, V e} which is the outer envelope over the relevant 
menu of choices for this worker conditional on her receiving a job offer next period. 
Applying standard arguments we can represent her program recursively as:
V n{a, e, T, A) =  max u(c) — k(s) +  /3s( [  p(s) f  x'Qe{a!,e',x',Y',X)) d H(x')
a'>a,s J
+  (1 - p ( s ) )  V n(a ',e ' ,r ' , \ ' )  d7re/|ed7TA/|A (3.3.1)
Subject to the constraint set:
a' = Rxpa  — c (3.3.2)
Notice that the distribution T becomes a state variable in the worker’s value 
function. In order to forecast prices in the current context and to make optimal 
savings and labour market search decisions knowledge of T' is necessary since 
this object determines the economy’s aggregate capital stock and effective labour 
in the next period. 3
In a similar fashion we can represent the employed worker’s lifetime utility as 
a solution to the following functional equation:
3We use primes to denote next period variables. Furtheron we chose to use integrals instead 
of the conventional expectation operators to clarify that the relevant uncertainties faced 
by employed and non employed workers differ in the current context. The initial draws 
of x derive from the general distribution H(x ) and the continuation match qualities are 
determined by 7rx / | x  s o  that in general:
( /  Qe{a,,e ' ,x 'X , \ ' ) )d 'Kx'\xd x ' ) 1L f  Qe(a', e', x', T', A')) d H(x')
J x '  j  X*
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V e(a, 6, x, T, A) =  max u(c) — $(h)
a R\,ra +  WA.r^x — c (3.3.4)
A few comments are in order here: First our classification criterion for nonem­
ployed workers is of the following form:
That is to say that we classify a worker as unemployed if she chooses effort above 
a given threshold smjn, and as out of the labour force otherwise. This mapping 
is consistent with the notion th a t inactive agents search less intensively in the 
labour market and as coarse as it may seem it is very close to the analogous 
criterion used by the CPS. 4
Further on we normalize the value of income for both unemployed and OLF 
workers to zero so that their consumption is financed exclusively out of the stock 
of savings. This assumption is made mainly to avoid the complications of having 
to talk about eligibility in government insurance schemes as it is not clear how 
benefits would be distributed across the population. For instance inactive workers 
in principle should not receive any sort of replacement income but in our model 
there is a considerable amount of mobility between the two non employment 
states. In turn keeping track of benefit histories would add to the computational 
burden of our exercise without being clear how it would affect the main results. 5
4More specifically the CPS classifies non employed workers on the basis of the following 
algorithm. First a non-employed respondent is asked whether he would like to have a job. 
Those who reply ’no’ are automatically considered as OLF workers. Those who reply ’yes’ 
are then asked to indicate what steps they have taken towards finding employment in the 
previous month, and in particular they are asked to outline their methods of search (there 
are twelve such methods). Those that have not searched but also those who have not exerted 
sufficiently active search effort are classified as OLF workers. Further on active search 
effort consists of using any of the proposed methods of search other than or beyond reading 
newspaper adds. See Shimer (2003) for further details.
5 Arguably the unemployment insurance in the current context would crowd out family self-
IF s* < Smin Worker is OLF
> Smin Worker is Unemployed
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Com petitive Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of a set of value functions { V n, V 6}, and a set of decision 
rules for consumption, asset holdings ( a'e(a, x, e, A, T) and a'n(a, e, A, T)), search 
( s(a, e, A, T) ) and labour supply ( h(a, x , e, A, T) ). It also consists of a collection 
of quantities { K t , L t} and prices {wt, R t} and a law of motion of the distribution 
Tt+1 =  T(Tt , At) such that:
• Given prices households solve the maximization program in 3.3.1 and 3.3.3 
and optimal policies derive.
• The final goods firm maximizes its profits:
wt = K ? \ t1~aL ; a A nd  rt = K ; a\ tl- aL]-a
• Goods and factor markets clear:
Yt +  (1 ~  $)Kt = JZh=h{aw(at, £t, Ttj At) +  cw(at, et , x t , Tf, A*)) dTt 
+  J T h=o(a'n(at, eu Tt, At) +  cn(au eu r t , At)) dTt R esource  C o n s tra in t
Lt = J  ^ h a,e,x,x,rTiha e x X r=K) dTt L ab o u r M ark e t
K t = j  at dYt Savings M ark e t
• Individual behavior is consistent with the aggregate behavior.6
insurance (see Cullen and Gruber (2000)) but it would also crowd out the precautionary 
role of assets (see Engen and Gruber (2001)) . Further more although empirically one 
effect may not make up for the other it seems to be the case for the incomplete market 
model that we use here. For instance Young (2004) finds that the optimal level of UI in an 
economy with search frictions is always zero and part of the explanation is that in general 
equilibrium wealth accumulation minimizes the utility costs from a lack of buffer provided by 
the government. In the context of our model it seems likely that introducing UI would only 
shift the regions in the state space where all the action takes place without any significant 
impact on the main conclusions. On the other hand eliminating UI can be interpreted as a 
necessary feature of our analysis because we want to get the maximum AWE we can out of 
the model.
6The law of motion of the measure T can be represented as follows:
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3.3.2 Couples economy
We introduce households that consist of two members in the economy retaining 
as many elements from the singles environment as possible. In particular we have 
a measure one of agents (so a total mass a half of households ) and each one of 
them is endowed with a unit of time. Household members derive utility from 
consumption and the felicity function is given again by the general form u(ct). 
We denote the time preference parameters for households in this case by /3c•
As far as intra-household allocations are concerned we adopt the unitary 
model whereby the household as a whole is treated as a decision unit and the 
members share the same common utility function; income and wealth are pooled 
and consumption and labour supply or search decisions are formed jointly to 
maximize the households well being. Each agent in the economy has her own 
idiosyncratic productivity and consequently household members differ in their 
productive endowments and we denote by et and x t the vector of productivities 
of the members of a generic household. Further on to conserve on the notation 
we let n e/|e be the joint cdf for the household members own productivities.
Having labour supply decisions formed jointly within households that comprise 
of two members gives rise to opportunities of specialization in market and non- 
market work that were absent in a world of bachelor agents. Ideally a household 
would like to have at any point in time, the most productive agent in the market 
but it cannot do so without confronting the frictions tha t impede instantaneous 
transitions across labour market states. In what follows we adopt the convention 
that the array (k , I) k ,l  6  {E , N }  denotes a household whose first and second
Where Tn and Te denote the marginal cdfs for non-employed and employed workers 
respectively and A S X  are subsets of the relevant state space.
p(s(a, e,a:,r, A)) d7re>\€ dH(x') dTn
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members are in state k and I respectively. Also it will prove useful to define the 
following objects beforehand:
Qen = m ax{yn", K'"* (3.3.5)
Qne = ma,x{Vnn,V ne} (3.3.6)
Qee =  = m a x{Q en,Q ne,V eej  (3.3.7)
These objects define the relevant menu of choices for our households. For 
instance a household with one employed member can in any given period decide 
to withdraw her from the labour market and allocate both agents to  search. 
This option is described in equation (3.3.5). Analogously in (3.3.7) a household 
with both members employed, can withdraw them to non-employment, or keep 
one working or both. W ith these definitions we can represent the dynamic 
programming problem of a household with two non-employed members as:
= max “(c<) -  Y  k(si)
a ' > a , s i , S 2
+ P c ( f  p(si)p(s2) f  Qee(a!, e', x'lt x'2, A', r ')d iJ ’(x'1), dH(x'2)
Jx'x,x'2
+  p(Sl) ( l - p ( s 2)) f  QeV , e ' )x'1,A ',r ')d i/(x '1)
Jx'x
+ p(s2)(l -  p(Sl)) [  Qne(a', e', x'2, A', T')dH (x2)
J X  j
+  (1 “ P(s2))(l -p ( s i ) )Q nn{a \e \ X )d 'K t'\ed'KX>\\) (3.3.8)
subject to:
a! = R \^ a  — c (3.3.9)
Optimal choices for these agents consist of current consumption and a pair of 
search intensity levels. Note that nothing precludes household members from 
setting Si ^  Sj although with standard convexity assumptions this can only be 
the case if the productivity endowments and ej are unequal. Further on with 
probability p(si)p(s 2 ) both members receive an offer and the sampling from the 
distribution of qualities H(x) is independent. Both joint search coupled with the 
limited availability of job opportunities, and the independent sampling introduce
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risk sharing possibilities to households (through adjustments of labour supply) 
that were non-existent in the singles economy.
The lifetime utility for a household with the first member employed solves the 
following functional equation:
Kf,e,xi,A,r =  max u{ct) -  k(s2) -  $(h)
’ ’ ’ ’ a ' > a , S 2
+  P c ([  {p(s2) f  Qee{a\ e', x'1? x'2, A', F)d'Kx' \XldH{x'2)
Jx'x,x j
+  ( l - p ( s 2)) f  Qen(a \e \x \ ,X X )d 'K x'\Xi)d'K€'\ed'Kx>\\) (3.3.10)
Jx'x
a' = R \p a  +  w \phx\ei — c (3.3.11)
For the sake of brevity we omit object V ne since the recursive representation is 
similar to that of equation ( 3.3.10). Finally for a household with both members 
employed we can write:
K ' , xi,z„x,r = max « ( * ) - £ * ( & )  (3.3.12)
— i
+  Pc{ I ( I f Qee(a\ e', x[, x'2, A', V,)dTTx>i\Xld^x>2\X2)d'Ke>\ed'KX'\\)
J £ ,A '
a! =  R \v a  + wKrh £  -  c (3.3.13)
Competitive Equilibrium
The definition is similar to the one in section 3.3.1 and for the sake of brevity is 
omitted.
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3.3.3 Discussion
Our story is similar to Chang and Kim (2006, 2007) and Gomes Greenwood and 
Rebelo (2 0 0 1 ) who use models of heterogeneous agents with aggregate uncertainty 
and assess their labour market implications. There as well as in our case the 
distribution of match (job) rents is governed by the idiosyncratic productivity 
endowments and according to their realizations, each period agents adjust their 
labour market status. To this framework we add the following ingredients: We 
introduce both own productivity shocks e and match quality shocks x  and we 
assume th a t search in the labour market is subject to a technology th a t maps 
search effort s into arrival rates of job offers p(s). We devote a few paragraphs 
to discuss why we think these additions are crucial.
W h y  do  we need  a  rich  s tru c tu re  o f shocks? The answer here is simple. 
Without them we wouldn’t be able to match the worker flows which we summarize 
in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Since our model has to disassociate the behavior of agents 
who make frequent transitions between employment and unemployment from 
those who move in and out of the labour force it is imperative that we introduce 
both own productivity and match quality shock. For instance in our calibration 
we choose the moments of the two processes in such as way so that the transitions 
between unemployment and employment are governed by the x  type shocks and 
those between unemployment an inactivity by the e. Further on decomposing 
the overall labour market risk in these two processes seems to be empirically 
relevant since in the data firm effects as well as individual effects both account 
for substantial fractions of the individual earnings uncertainty (see Abowd et al 
(1999)).
T h e  search  technology. We adopt a very parsimonious representation of the 
search technology. In particular we assume that there two levels of search intensity 
tha t a worker can exert s £ {s/, sy}  where the subscripts I  and U stand for 
inactive (out of labour force) and unemployment (active searchers) respectively. 
Associated with these choices are the following probabilities of receiving a job 
offer next period:
j p/ if s =  sT 
P(s) = \
[  P u  if S =  S u
Further on the search costs are assumed to be of the form: k(s) = 0  if s =  Sj 
and k(s) = k if s = su- These discrete choices are enough to capture our division
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between workers that search actively, and hence are counted as unemployed, and 
those whose optimal choice of search does not translate into a large enough 
contact rate with potential employers and hence are considered out of the labour 
force workers. Adding more thresholds would in general complicate things for 
us by requiring th a t the model be consistent with a larger set of targets. For 
instance if we were to include two thresholds of search for inactive workers we 
would have to make the model match the populations of agents who don’t search 
at all (and this is a large fraction of respondents in the CPS) and those who do 
search albeit in a passive way. We don’t believe th a t these considerations are 
important and that they would impact the results. Notice that there is in general 
nothing that precludes us from setting ( pj = 0 ) but in principle to match the 
observed flows from inactivity to employment in our model’s horizon it must be 
that pj > 0 .
We give the following interpretation to our technology: pu and pi are treated 
as technological upper bounds to the number of matches that are possible each 
period from states U and I  respectively. When we increase the values of 
these parameters we also need to increase the variance of the x  shocks to keep 
the transition rates close to the data, since by the standard intuition a mean 
preserving spread in a match quality distribution would make searchers more 
selective. Generally we set pu «  1 for our main result the reason being that with 
limited job availability we want give couples meaningful insurance opportunities 
against unemployment spells. Further on these bounds must not be too tight 
since in our model these probabilities are constant over the business cycle. If 
say we were to set pu = .28 (the steady state UE rate in the data) there would 
be no room for an increase job finding rates when the expansion comes, and 
unemployment in the economy would be counter-factually procyclical.
This last point merits some attention. If in our model the flows between labour 
market states were governed by the firms’ willingness to create jobs over the 
business cycle (as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)) then the probabilities pi 
and pu would change over time. However the implications of such a model would 
be no different from ours, since search and matching models generate procyclical 
search intensity (so agents would flow from inactivity to unemployment) which is 
precisely what we want to avoid by introducing couples. Further on our model 
generates endogenous separations and job finding by virtue of the processes x  and 
e and the fixed cost of participation in the labour market. Whether firms bear the 
costs of investment in search (as in the Mortensen and Pissarides framework) or
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workers as we assume here is completely irrelevant. The only thing that matters 
is how these investments change over the business cycle.
3.4 Calibration and Baseline Results
3.4.1 Parametrization
We briefly discuss our choice of parameters and functional forms: We adopt a 
period utility function of the form:
u(ct) = log(ct)
Following Chang and Kim (2007) we set the disutility from working equal
T - i + 7
to B y . a n d  we normalize 7  to unity (this is unim portant in the current 
context). Parameter B  is chosen to target the average employment population 
ratio of 60 % in the data. Since we draw no distinction between male and female 
population in the economy we don’t have to worry about matching the division of 
employment between these two demographics and we set the disutility of labour
- r l+ l
for a household that comprises of two employed members equal to 2 B We 
do however show how the model fares in terms of the specialization of home vs 
market activity in primary and secondary earners against the data.
For the search technology we set pu = ■ 5 and pi = .1 in our benchmark 
which given the empirical labour market flows seem like reasonable values. The 
cost of search for unemployed workers k is chosen to target the fraction of the 
population of nonemployed workers tha t are unemployed ( i.e. those tha t set 
s = Su )• In the US data the unemployment rate is on average 5.5 % over our 
sample period.
Given that the model’s horizon is one month we fix the time preference para­
meter for couples (3c to .995 and the depreciation rate S to .0083. These values 
tu rn  out to be roughly consistent with an (average steady state) interest rate 
R  = 1 + r — 5 of 1.0041 ( a yearly analogue of 5 % ). The discount factor for 
singles /3s is chosen so th a t the produced capital labour ratios ( and hence the 
interest rates ) in the two economies are equal.
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Further on the share of capital to value added a  is calibrated to .33 and we 
assume that the employed agents spend roughly a third of their time endowment 
in market work ( hence we set h = 0.33). Following Chang and Kim (2007) 
the aggregate TFP  process is calibrated such tha t the quarterly first order 
autocorrelation is p \ = 0.95 and the conditional standard deviation g\  = 0.007. 
Table 3.5 summarizes these choices.
Finally our idiosyncratic labour productivity processes are of the following 
form:
log(zt) =  px log(xt_i) +  vXjt 
log(et) =  pe log(et_i) +  u6)t
These choices is guided by the relevant literature that uses similar representations 
of the stochastic process of labour income (see Heathcote et al (2008)). Further 
on we assume that the innovations are mean zero processes (i.e. vx,t ~  A f(0 , ax) 
and v€tt~  Af(0 , ae)).
Table 3.5: The model parameters (quarterly values)
P a ra m e te r Sym bol B aseline
std of TFP shock <*\ 0.007
AR1 of TFP shock Px 0.95
Share of capital a 0.33
Depreciation rate S 0.025
Discount Factor Couples Pc 0.995
Fraction of time working h 0.33
Offer Rate: OLF Pi .1
Offer Rate: Unemployed Pu policy paratmeters
Labor Disutility B
Discount Factor Singles (3s
Search cost 
Moments of x  
Moments of e
k
&Xl Px 
®et Pe
jointly calibrated 
(see text)
Our calibration procedure is as follows: For each one of the models (singles, 
couples) we choose the moments of the idiosyncratic productivity processes p and 
a along with B  and k to match the observed labour market flows. We have six 
parameters for six targets but this doesn’t mean tha t we can match the worker
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flows perfectly. It turns out tha t there is a range of the p and o parameters 
where the models perform well in some dimensions and bad in some others. In 
turn we set our targets so that fit is good and the calibration matches aspects of 
the data  tha t are really im portant for our exercise. As we explain our couples 
economy is able to match the flow rate from unemployment to employment and 
the flows in and out of the labour force. W hat it cannot match is the division 
between the EU and El flows, given a total outflow rate from employment.
Solution method
We solve the model with aggregate uncertainty using the bounded rationality 
approach whereby agents forecast future prices using a finite set of moments of 
the distribution Tf. As in Krusell and Smith (1998) we find that first moments 
(means) are sufficient for very accurate forecasts in our context (approximate 
aggregation holds) . A detailed description of the algorithm is delegated to the 
appendix.
3.4.2 Steady S tate Findings
We use this section to provide information on the models’ performances in a 
number of relevant dimensions. In Table 3.6 we summarize the estimated worker
Table 3.6: Estimated Labour Market Flows: Singles vs Couples
Bachelor Households Couples Households
E U I E U I
E .9507 .00432 .0450 .9515 .00567 .0428
U .2801 0.5831 .1368 .2830 .5051 .2119
I .0503 .0322 .9175 .0507 .0381 .9112
flows from the bachelor and the couple economy. We use Table 3.2 for our targets 
(so the flows for all agents that are aged 16 and above independent of m arital 
status ) because when we compare the business cycle properties of our economies 
relative to the data we don’t have aggregate statistics (say output) for different 
demographic groups. In both cases the decomposition between movements in 
and movements out of labour market states is such that the model output is 
consistent with an employment population ratio to 60 % rate an unemployment
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rate to 5.5 % and a outflow rate from unemployment to employment of 28 % 
which is what we find in the data.
Both models can match the total outflow from employment to non-employment 
but the composition between the number of workers who leave their jobs to search 
intensively (unemployed) and those who leave their jobs but don’t is off targets. 
In particular in the data the EU rate is around 1.4 % on average and the El is 
3.11 % but even the couples economy produces values for these objects of .567 % 
and 4.28 % respectively.
Further on a striking difference in terms of the performance of the two models 
is the resulting UI flows. We find that in the data the couple household economy 
can easily attain a target of 2 1  % (which is the data counterpart for this quantity) 
whilst with bachelor households the best we can do is a value of 14 %. This 
discrepancy is at the center of our notion of joint insurance here. In the steady 
state there is a large fraction of families where one member is employed and another 
not and also a large number of families were both members are unemployed. In 
the first case the choice of search intensity for the non-employed member is 
affected by the own productivity state e and the composite productivity of their 
partner’s ( e and x). Changes in household income in this case ( a change in 
productivity of the employed agent) entail a wealth effect on the labour supply 
of non employed agents which could induce them to drop out of the labour force. 
Similarly when both members of a household are unemployed and one of them 
receives a job offer and becomes employed, there is an analogous wealth effect 
to the labour supply of the other family member. We show below th a t this 
happens a lot in the equilibrium with couples. In contrast in a bachelor household 
economy this channel is absent and the two factors that determine the choice of 
labour market status are wealth and productivity. Since wealth is run down in 
nonemployment, productivity must be less persistent to match the data.
To give sense of the magnitudes of these differences we report the values for the 
implied stochastic processes in the two models. First given the above intuition 
we estimate p f  =  .7 and p f  =  .5 (so tha t persistence is larger in the couples 
economy). Second it turns out that the required conditional standard deviation 
of the shocks in the singles economy is twice as large as the analogous object in 
the couples model, so we get that <rf =  .095 and <rf =  .42 and <7% = .043 and 
ctf  =  .21 although the overall household risk in both cases may be similar. Finally 
in both models match quality shocks need to be equally and very persistent so 
that we set p? = pf =  .99.
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W ith these numbers in our baseline calibration we get that employed agents 
care more about match quality than own productivity shocks. That is to say 
an agent in a high ir job can let her own productivity e component drift to 
a very low level before she considers quitting her job (since it is likely to  drift 
back again due to low persistence) but when the match quality deteriorates she 
is almost certain to become non-employed. On the other hand the transition 
between unemployment and OLF is governed by the e shocks and in this case 
they have to be less permanent to give us the UI and IU flow rates that we see in 
the data.
These numbers don’t have a particular interpretation since our model confounds 
risks from many sources and below we provide more relevant statistics by estima­
ting wage processes from a sample of agents out of our steady state calibration. 
For the moment suffice is to say although our model features two independent 
stochastic processes for labour income risk it is yet too parsimonious to match 
some aspects of the data and the rest of this section is devoted to analyzing that.
O th e r  ca lib ra tio n s . We briefly discuss how the model performs when dif­
ferent values for the stochastic processes are chosen. First when we increase 
the persistence we always get a smaller UI flow rate and a larger EU flow. For 
instance in the couples model with p f  =  .8 8  and erf =  .13 we get UI equal to .14 
and the EU flow rate equals .008 (much closer to the data). The reason is tha t 
the assignment of household members to market work and leisure is much more 
persistent in this case so when the employed member looses her job the family 
assigns her to become unemployed rather than withdraw her from labour force. 
In contrast in our baseline calibration with p f  =  .7 the pool of non employed 
agents is more or less equally productive, in terms of e, as the pool of employed 
agents and there are frequent changes in the identity of the main earner within 
the family (this is something that we scrutinize below).
Further on changes in the other parameters present us with much worse tradeoffs. 
For instance decreasing the value of px increases the UE flow rate to above .4 
(a similar result applies if we decrease the value of crx) since now match quality 
shocks become less important and there are virtually no gains in the other flows.
Overall our criterion in choosing the best model is the following. First we 
demand that the equilibrium output is such that the UE flow rate is .28 ( as in the 
data). The reason is that, as we said before we want expansions to increase the job 
finding rate in the economy without necessarily hitting the upper bound on the
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number of matches (which is pu =  1/2). When this target is met we adjust the 
relevant parameters to match as close as possible the flows between unemployment 
and inactivity and the total outflow from employment. Why this order? Because 
we found that models that match all the relevant flow rates between employment 
and unemployment usually feature too few transitions between inactivity and the 
labour force; and too few transitions mean tha t these models could potentially 
have the labour force close to being fixed. In section 3.4.3 which contains our 
main results we also report the cyclical properties for the economy tha t sets 
p f  =  .8 8  and <rf =  .13 as an alternative calibration.
H ow  read ily  can  househo ld  m em bers su b s ti tu te  in  te rm s  o f th e ir  
lab o u r  incom e? To answer this question we look at the persistence of 
employment status over time in a cohort of agents ( a sample of 5000 families) 
simulated from the steady state distribution. For each period we assume that a 
family’s primary earner is the agent that had the highest recorded annual labour 
income. Annual horizons serve to mitigate the effect of frictions on recorded 
employment histories.
To uncover the persistence we simply estimate the Markov transition matrix of 
primary and secondary earners (that is to say the probability that the identity 
of the household head changes from one year to the next). By this metric we 
find tha t roughly 30 % of our families alternate roles as primary and secondary 
earners in the labour market each year. Further on when we use the number of 
hours as our index, and drop productivity from the calculation we find that this 
rate decreases to 2 0 %.
Arguably the employment status of agents is a much more persistent state, 
and the reason that our theory cannot match this aspect of the data is precisely 
that we put two ex ante identical agents within each household. In reality agents 
differ in fixed productivity and command different rewards in the labour market 
based on age, sex experience among other things. We can only do so much as to 
summarize some of these features in our two stochastic processes but our model 
requires low persistence in the e risk to match the flows between inactivity and 
unemployment.
To see how specialization in market work vs leisure is determined within the 
household consider the decomposition inactivity and unemployment in the steady 
state summarized in Table 3.7. Roughly a 35 % of all OLF agents in the economy 
live in households where both members are inactive and the remaining 65 %
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percent are in families where one member is either unemployed or employed. In 
the data the analogous fractions are 24 % and 76 % respectively, for a population 
aged between 16 and 65, and 50 % for ages 16 and above. Clearly demographics 
play a significant role here but we think that our model strikes a good balance 
between the two samples in the data.
Further on insofar as the cross section of unemployed agents is concerned we 
observe that our model overestimates the fraction of agents tha t are part of 
households where both members are non-employed. In the data for instance 
conditional on unemployment the probability th a t an agent is part of a family 
where the second member is also unemployed is 7% when the couple occupies the 
age bracket 16-65. Analogously the probability that the other member is out of 
the labour force is 19%. The model produced values of 20% and 27% respectively 
and again this probably is symptomatic of the fact that independent shocks and 
identical agents exacerbate the role of insurance in the couples economy.
Table 3.7: Decompositions of Unemployment and Inactivity
U nem ployed U U U I U E
Bechmark Model .2 .27 .53
US Data: Ages 16-65 .07 .19 .74
US Data: Ages >16 .1 .2 2 .6 8
O LF II U I IE
Bechmark Model .354 .026 .62
US Data: Ages 16-65 .24 .026 .734
US Data: Ages >16 .5 .0 2 .48
T h e  im plied  p rocess of w ages. Since in our model idiosyncratic labour 
incomes confound risks from various sources (search frictions and the joint sto­
chastic processes of productivity) to evaluate how realistic our choices are we 
need to estimate the realized profiles of wages for individuals in our economy. 
We use a simple representation of the logarithm of annual (time aggregated) 
wages: lnu;t =  (j)\nwt- i  +  vt and use a sample of 1 0 0 0 0  individuals over 2 0  years 
to estimate the implied values for <fi and the variance of the shock ov. Further 
on since in our model the distinction between household heads and secondary 
earners seems to be virtually irrelevant (with two ex ante identical agents) we 
pool the estimates from all household members in the simulated population.
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Both of these values seem to be far away from the data. Our estimates are 
(frs = • 1 for the singles economy and (j>c = .4 for couples (notice tha t couples is 
much closer to a high persistence process that is empirically relevant). Furtheron 
there is a wealth of estimates for the data analogues for these statistics (see 
Heathcote et al (2008) ) and all of them yield a value for <fr in the neighborhood 
of .9. 7 Given that both of our models imply that labour income is less persistent 
than  in the data we conclude tha t only temporary components of shocks are 
important in matching the labour market flows.
3.4.3 Cyclical properties
Table 3.8 presents the results from our benchmark calibration with pu = 1/2 
Pi = .1 for both the couples and the bachelor household economies. We restrict 
attention to key labour market statistics and all quantities are expressed relative to 
a de-trended measure of GDP (They are logged and HP filtered with a parameter 
A =  1600). The data are quarterly aggregates of the simulated aggregate paths.
In the singles economy unemployment is extremely procyclical (contempora­
neous correlation with GDP is .65) and so is the labour force. The model produces 
a contemporaneous correlation with GDP equal to .65 and .97 for these quantities 
whilst in the data the analogous statistics are -.81 and .2 respectively. Further on 
aggregate unemployment is not nearly as volatile as in the the data (1.78 vs 6 .6 8 ) 
and the LF is nearly 50% more volatile (.32 vs .22 in the data).
The benchmark couples model (columns 3-4) produces a slightly different set 
of statistics. Unemployment now becomes more acyclical ( the contemporaneous 
correlation with GDP is .22) and more volatile than  with bachelor households. 
It is closer to the data. Aggregate employment is more volatile and equally 
procyclical and the LF is nearly twice as volatile (.62) and only marginally less 
procyclical (.95) than in the previous case. Finally columns 5-6 contain the results 
of the economy that sets p f  =  .8 8  and erf =  .13. There aggregate unemployment 
is slightly more countercyclical (contemporaneous correlation with GDP is -.05) 
and more volatile ( =  3.5). Aggregate employment is still more volatile than in
the bachelor household model and equally procyclical, and the LF is again more
7In Chang and Kim (2007) a model that accounts for selection effects yields a value for the 
persistence component of .73
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volatile (although less than the baseline couples model) and again somewhat less 
procyclical 8.
Table 3.8: Results: Cyclical Properties of Labour Markets
Bachelors Couples Couples
Benchm ark Benchm ark H igh p e
O x
( J y Px,y <Jy Px,y
O x
(J y Px,y
U nem ploym ent 1.78 .65 2.7 .22 3.5 -.05
Em ploym ent 0.54 0.96 .85 0.97 .77 .96
Labor Force 0.32 0.97 .62 0.95 .41 .95
These results are extremely disappointing from the point of view of our theory. 
How so? Well in section 3.2 we showed tha t the labour force participation of 
females in our sample was substantially more procyclical and volatile when the 
influence of the husband’s employment status was removed. We interpreted this 
result as indicating th a t if the US economy was populated by bachelor agents 
(and joint insurance opportunities didn’t exist) then the LF would be considerably 
more procyclical. By this metric the model fails miserably in replicating this 
feature of the data. W hen we move from the singles to the couples economy 
(so more insurance) we see tha t the volatility of the LF increases and there are 
virtually no gains in the cyclical correlation of this statistic 9. The comparison 
of the two economies therefore sends the qualitative patterns to the opposite 
direction and this comes out of a model that features considerable insurance as 
we showed in section 3.4.2.
It is clear tha t this failure of all the models to  generate statistics close to 
the US data is due to the overwhelming motive in these economies to allocate 
agents to activity (employment and unemployment) during economic expansions. 
In the upturn jobs become more attractive and the typical agent increases her 
optimal level of search intensity. However before these agents can be allocated to 
employment they have to spend time in the pool of unemployed workers due to the
8Note that although the differences are small they are not the result of sampling variation; in 
the Appendix we outline an algorithm due to Young (2009) that computes the equilibrium in 
the economy by working with the histogram instead of simulating panels of a finite number 
of agents. There is no sampling variation due to the Law of Large Numbers.
9 Notice that repeating the analysis of section 2 here would be meaningless since our economy 
is not inhabited by males and females but by identical agents. Further on we argued that 
households change very frequently the identity of the main earner.
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existence of frictions. This is why aggregate unemployment becomes procyclical 
(or nearly procyclical) in the models.
Further on the larger volatility that we get in the couples model is possibly a 
result of three features all of which relate to the identity of the marginal worker 
in the economy. First our singles model has considerably more uncertainty in 
the idiosyncratic process and thus individual decisions are guided less by the 
aggregate state (expansion vs recession) and more by the labour income. Second 
the distribution of agents over the relevant state space is different in the two 
economies and bachelors OLF agents have sufficient wealth to finance leisure 
whilst in the couples model inactivity usually entails the presence of a main 
earner at home. In the latter case households use more readily labour supply as 
a margin of insurance and business cycles move more workers between labour 
market states. Finally another reason we get larger volatilities is precisely that 
households have secondary earners and in this case the aggregate elasticity of 
labour supply is considerably larger (as in Chang and Kim (2006)) 10.
We find tha t all of these possibilities are relevant here; for instance when we 
increase the volatility of idiosyncratic endowments in the couples economy we do 
get some fall in volatility in the aggregate labour market (we don’t report this 
because this model produces wrong labour market flows). Uncertainty however 
cannot be the only reason since our alternative calibration of the couples economy, 
features a similar level of unconditional uncertainty and yet produces a slightly 
different set of statistics.
Other models.
We take stock from the results of this section to discern whether there are 
im portant features th a t our model misses out on and tha t could potentially 
change its implications. For one thing with two ex ante identical agents we argued 
that our model is unable to match patterns of specialization within the household
10Chang and Kim (2006) build a model similar to ours that features husbands and wives in the 
household, incomplete markets and an extensive margin of labour supply and they get a 
much larger amplification of business cycle shocks to aggregate employment than what the 
values of elasticity of labour supply they assume would otherwise give. In their model as 
well as in ours the aggregate elasticity of labour supply is borne out of the reservation wage 
distributions and not the willingness to substitute leisure inter-temporally. The problem is 
that their analysis doesn’t go as far as to discern which one of the ingredients is responsible 
for the results; They don’t compare with a bachelor household economy (so as to single 
out secondary earners) vs the extensive margin of labour supply. Further on husbands and 
wives in their model are not ex ante identical.
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in terms of market work and leisure. And yet this appears to be im portant 
since in the US data  over our sample period we find tha t the LF participation 
of husbands is considerably higher and acyclical (it has a zero contemporaneous 
correlation with GDP).
But matching these aspects would probably have something to say about 
volatility but very few for the cyclical correlation. This is precisely what happens 
in our calibration of the model with p f  = .8 8  and erf =  .13. There the 
assignment of roles within the family is much more persistent (note tha t this is 
why the model produces a higher EU flow ) and whilst the labour force becomes 
less volatile the cyclical correlation doesn’t budge, because there is always a 
marginal worker tha t flows in economic activity in expansions. Analogously if 
we were to assign a gender to each member of our families and we assumed that 
secondary earners are less productive, as in the data, then we could hypothetically 
go a lot further towards matching volatility of the labour force. The problem is 
th a t this addition would kill off the insurance margin since the contribution to 
household resources of a wife when she increases her labour supply would also be 
considerably smaller than in our model, and in this sense matching aspects of 
intra-household correlation of incomes would also be important.
For the same reason what doesn’t seem to hold promise is to incorporate some 
departure from complete insurance within the family in our framework. If our 
modeling of household consumption and employment decisions was based on 
the collective approach as in Chiappori (1988) then, it is well understood, tha t 
household members would behave much more like bachelor agents. In contrast 
the unitary model th a t we adopt maximizes the added worker effect which we 
found to be responsible for the cyclical behavior of the labour force.
Then when should we expect for family self insurance to be most important? We 
answer; when there are unemployment risks (that entail large losses of income) and 
when there are incomplete markets so that consumption is affected. Our model 
builds on these assumptions but here risks are partly choices since the decision 
to move out of employment depends on the reservation wage tha t increases in 
wealth. For a constrained worker a fall in match quality doesn’t necessarily mean 
unemployment since the match surplus becomes negative only when wealth is 
sufficiently high. But on the other hand wealthier workers are nearly permanent 
income agents (Krusell and Smith (1998)).
Not even search and matching models of the labour market as in Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994) escape this critique since there the job surplus falls with wealth
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(see Bils et al 2008). Moreover if we were to add firms in the background tha t 
make hiring and firing decisions in our framework and we endowed agents with 
a search technology as we did here, then the search intensity of the economy’s 
workforce would still be too procyclical (see Shimer (2003), Merz (1995)). Further 
on the problem is that such as model would also have to deal with the low 
equilibrium volatility of unemployment and vacancies and hence it would create 
an additional concern.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we contrast the properties of economies where lack of insurance 
opportunities means that agents stand alone against uncertain contingencies 
with those where risk sharing exists in households that comprise of two ex ante 
identical members. We ask how the implications for the labour market are 
affected in an otherwise standard incomplete market model with search frictions 
and endogenous labour force participation, depending on the structure of the 
household, and especially how the two economies respond to fluctuations in 
aggregate productivity.
W hat we get is that the model is completely unable to match the empirical 
patterns that we see in the data. The labour force in the artificial economy is too 
pro-cyclical and too volatile relative to the data and it is also too volatile relative 
to a model that populates the economy with bachelor agents. Using data from 
the CPS we were led to the converse implication. We found that joint insurance 
is an important factor that explains why the participation of secondary earners 
(wives in our sample) is not correlated with aggregate output.
We explain why although out theory is incomplete in some respects, we build 
a model that we anticipated to give us a very large effect (possibly the maximum 
) from joint search and insurance. Instead it produces disappointing results. In 
the outset we explore what other relevant additions need to be made to our 
baseline framework to be able to match the data. We single out the following; 
first matching better the cross sectional aspects of intrahousehold division of time 
in home vs market work and second matching better the cross sectional aspects 
of risks. These are possibilities that we explore in future work.
It is important to note that our contribution goes far beyond analyzing the 
cyclicality of the key labour market statistics in a search model with imperfect
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insurance. A generation of macro-economists believed that the key of explaining 
fluctuations in aggregate employment is the elasticity of the labour supply of 
secondary household earners (females). And whilst we find some theoretical work 
th a t is conducive to this intuition our conclusions point to the fact tha t it is 
misleading to draw implications for the aggregate elasticity of labour supply from 
models that circumvent the effort of matching the cross sectional aspects of labour 
supply.
Our attem pt can be viewed as a necessary step to a more ambitious research 
agenda. We yet don’t have a clear understanding of how allocations are affected in 
economies where insurance is abundant in the family. There must be a wealth of 
policy or welfare related questions where these alternative environments produce 
different answers. For instance in incomplete market models with bachelor 
households wealth encodes the history of productivity and those agents who build 
up a stock of wealth can finance leisure and drop out of work. In contrast in 
social planning economies most productive agents are always send to work. We 
suspect that allocations in couples economies must be somewhat in between, and 
the interest lies in determining how much.
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3.6 Appendices
3.6.1 Computational strategy for steady-state equilibrium
In steady state, factor prices are constant and the distribution of agents over 
the relevant state space T is time invariant. The calibration consists of three 
nested loops. The outer loop is the estimation loop where we set the endogenous 
parameters {B , k, pe, ae, px, ax} is chosen, We solve the model and check whether 
the generated moments (labour market flows) are close enough to their empirical 
counterparts. If not, we try a new set of parameters.
The middle loop is the market clearing loop. We guessed an interest rate r 
which implies a wage rate w and then solve for the value functions and the steady 
state distribution T). The steady sate distribution yields an aggregate savings 
supply. If the implied marginal product of capital is equal to the guessed interest 
rate, we found the equilibrium. If not, we update our interest rate guess. For the 
singles version of our model instead of changing interest rates to clear the market 
of savings we adjust the discount factor (3s and keep constant the aggregate rate 
of return R.
The inner loop is the value function iteration. Details are as follows:
1. We choose an unevenly spaced grid for asset holdings (a) (with more nodes 
near the borrowing constraint) and a grid for individual productivities e and 
x. We experiment with different number of nodes for the asset grid, usually 
between N a = 101 and Na = 161.The number nodes for the idiosyncratic 
labour market risks are N e =  5 and Nx = 2 . These are equally spaced and 
the transition matrix of idiosyncratic shocks is obtained by the discretization 
procedure described by Adda and Cooper (2003).
2 . Given our guess for the interest rate r, we solve for the individual value 
functions, V n, V e in the bachelor model and Vnn, V en, V ee in the couples 
model. This is done by finding the optimal savings and search intensity 
choice at each node. Values that fall outside the grid are interpolated with 
cubic splines. Once the value functions have converged we recover the 
optimal policy functions of the form a'(a, e), s(a, e) and h(a , e).
3. The final step is to obtain the invariant measure T over the relevant state 
space (asset productivities and employment status).
a) We first approximate the optimal policy rules on a finer grid which
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Nqbig = 2 0 0 0  nodes and we initialize our measure IV
b) We update it and obtain a new measure Ti
c) The invariant measure is found when the maximum difference between 
To and Ti is smaller than a pre-specified tolerance level.
d) By using the invariant measure, we compute aggregate labour supply 
and asset supply. This implies a new marginal product of capital which 
we then compare to our initial guess.
3.6.2 Computational strategy for equilibrium with 
aggregate fluctuations
Aggregate shocks imply that factor prices are time varying. When solving 
their optimization program agents have to predict future factor prices. 
Therefore they have to predict all the individual policy decisions in all 
possible future states. This requires agents to keep track of every other 
agent. Thus in order to approximate the equilibrium in the presence of 
aggregate shocks, one has to keep track of the measure of all groups of 
agents over time. Since T is an infinite dimensional object it is impossible to 
do this directly. We therefore follow Krusell and Smith (1998) and assume 
tha t agents are boundedly rational and use only the mean of wealth and 
aggregate productivity to forecast future capital K  and factor prices w and 
R.
Compared to the steady-state algorithm we now have two additional state 
variables that we must add in the list of the existing state variables in the 
inner loop: aggregate productivity A and aggregate capital K . As the outer 
loop, we iterate on the forecasting equations for aggregate capital and factor 
prices. 11 The details are as follows:
a) We approximate the aggregate productivity process with 2 nodes and 
use again the methodology of Adda and Cooper (2003) to obtain the 
values and transition probabilities. We choose a capital grid around 
the steady-state level of capital K ss , particularly we V  -  6  equally 
spaced nodes to form a grid with range [0.95 * K ss \ 1.05ATSS].
b) As already mentioned, we choose the means of aggregate capital and
11In the steady state algorithm, there were three loops. Since we use the steady state values 
for the endogenous parameters, we do not have an estimation loop here.
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aggregate productivity as explanatory variables in the forecasting 
equations. We use a log-linear form
InKt+i = k° + K^ln K t + K%ln At (3.6.1)
lnw t = cjg +  u>iln K t +  u^ln At (3.6.2)
In R t = £$ +  Qiln K t +  Q%ln At (3.6.3)
c) We initialize the coefficients so that K t+1, w , R  are equal to their steady 
state values.
d) Given equations 3.6.1 to 3.6.3, we solve the value function problems as 
before, just that now the state vector is four-dimensional. Values that 
are not on the asset grid are interpolated using cubic splines. Values 
that are not on the aggregate capital grid are interpolated linearly.
e) Instead of simulating the economy with a large finite number of agents 
we use the procedure of Young (2009) and simulate a continuum of 
agents. This procedure has the advantage of avoiding cross-sectional 
sampling variation. We simulate the economy for 10,000 periods and 
discard the first 2,000. In each period we get an observation for K , w 
and R. We use the simulated data to run OLS regressions on equations 
3.6.1 to 3.6.3 which yield new coefficient estimates /c1’s, cjl 5s, £l 5s. If 
these coefficients are close to the previous ones we stop, otherwise we 
update equations 3.6.1 to 3.6.3 with the new coefficients and solve the 
problem again.
The convergent solutions for the forecasting equations of our models are as 
follows:
Table 3.9: Couples Economy Baseline.
E q u a tio n C o n s tan t ln(tft) ln(Ai) R 2
ln (^ + i) .05427 .98317 .04203 . 99996
-.16841 .39621 .55531 .99627
In (Rt) .04858 -.01355 .01546 .99108
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T a b l e  3 .1 0 :  S in g l e s  E c o n o m y .
Equation Constant ln(At) R 2
ln(tft+1) .07115 .98175 .02802 .99997
ln(iut) -.32154 .39338 .60769 .99636
.04485 -.01026 .01023 .98717
T a b l e  3 .1 1 :  C o u p l e s  E c o n o m y  H ig h  pe C a l i b r a t i o n .
Equation Constant ln(At) R 2
M K t + i ) .06117 .98221 .03501 . 99997
In (wt ) -.2184 .39011 .56834 .99598
In (Rt) .04766 -.01145 .01342 .99101
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